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Law and the Emotions: The Problems of
Affective Forecasting
JEREMY A. BLUMENTHAL*
Legal scholarship on "behavioralism" and the implications of cognitive biases for the law is
flourishing. In parallel with the rise of such commentary, legal scholars have begun to discuss
the role of the emotions in legal discourse. This discussion often addresses the
"appropriateness" of various emotions for the substantive law, or attempts to model the place
of the emotions in the law. Implicit in some of these theories, however, and explicit in others, is
the assumption that emotions are "predictable," "manageable, "and (for some commentators)
under conscious control. This assumption is belied by psychological research on affective
forecasting that demonstrates people's inability to accurately predict future emotional states,
both their own and those of others. Such inaccuracy has surprisingly broad implications for
both substantive and procedural aspects of the legal system. Affective forecasting research also
demonstrates the implausibility of some theoretical models of law and the emotions; if these
models are flawed, then the normative conclusions drawn from them may be flawed as well.
I review here the empirical data demonstrating that individuals predict emotions inaccurately,
and spin out the implications of this research for a number of substantive legal areas. The data
show potential flaws in the way civil juries assign compensatory awards, and in our approach
to certain aspects of sexual harassment law. The findings have profound implications for the
presentation of victim impact statements to capital juries, but also undercut some abolitionist
claims regarding the suffering that death row prisoners experience. Contract law is implicated
by these findings as well, especially in the context of contracts for surrogate motherhood.
Finally, the data are also relevant to the area of health law where, for instance, they apply
broadly to the use of advance health directives, and more specifically to the context of
euthanasia. I also discuss broader issues, such as the implications of the affective forecasting
research for theories of law and the emotions. In this discussion I include some of the specific
drawbacks to some current theories. I also address the data's implications for the very theories
of welfare and well-being that underlie much legal policy, and speculate about implications for
paternalistic policy initiatives.
* Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Faculty Fellow, Seton Hall Law School (2003-2005). A.B.,
A.M., Ph.D., Harvard University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. E-mail:
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L4W AND THE EMOTIONS
INTRODUCTION
By many accounts, "law and economics,"' with its assumptions of rational actors
and rational actions, began in the 1960s, with Ronald Coase's influential work on
bargaining, negative externalities, and rules of allocation,2 Guido Calabresi's
application of economics to tort law,3 and Gary Becker's economic analysis of crime
and punishment.4 Others trace the implicit use of economic reasoning in judicial
decisions back further, through the growth and development of the common law.' And
even earlier, Jeremy Bentham had laid out a classic discussion of rational cost-benefit
analysis in his treatment of punishment and deterrence.6 One of the central tenets of
such economic analysis, of course, is that of the rational decisionmaker: through an
exercise of intelligent reason (conscious or unconscious 7 ), humans act rationally,
seeking to maximize our welfare by "choosing the best means to [our] ends";8 we are
motivated to maximize our happiness or utility or wealth,9 we fully consider the
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 3 (1983) (using the term to refer to
the economic analysis of law).
2. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's
article was in turn expanded upon by Calabresi and Melamed's influential work in the 1970's.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
3. GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961).
4. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON.
169 (1968).
5. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). Posner is
sometimes seen as "the true founder of the law and economics movement," though with
acknowledgement of Coase's and Calabresi's work. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T
Man, and the Fuiure of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1665 n.3
(2003). Others focus more on Becker and Calabresi's work. E.g., KErrHN. HYLTON,CALABRESI
AND THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OFLAw AND ECONOMICS 1 (Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
04-04, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=547082
("[M]odem law and economics... had its start with Gary Becker's article on crime and Guido
Calabresi's book.").
6. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1823). For a historical overview of the law and
economics movement, noting earlier European antecedents, see FRANCESCO PARISI, POSITIVE,
NORMATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL SCHOOLS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Law and Econ., Working Paper
No. 04-22, 2004), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract_id= 548403.
7. POSNER, supra note 5, at 4 ("Rational maximization should not be confused with
conscious calculation."); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1551 (1998) ("Rational choice need not be conscious choice."); cf
WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 386 (Dover Publications 1950) (1890) ("Not
one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food
tastes good and makes him want more.").
8. Posner, supra note 7; POSNER, supra note 5, at 3 ("[M]an is a rational maximizer of
his ends in life.").
9. An assumption "basic to economic analysis" is that "'individuals maximize welfare
as they conceive it."' Michael E. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase
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information we have, and we tend to make the optimal decision based on that
information.' 0
As is becoming increasingly clear, however, this central tenet and its underlying
assumptions are flawed." Cognitive psychologists have long documented "heuristics
and biases" in human decisionmaking that reflect or lead to shortcuts in judgments;
12
these judgments tend to deviate systematically from those that rational decisionmaking
would predict. 13 Social psychologists have long documented group decisionmaking
phenomena that lead to nonoptimal decisions after group deliberation.' 4 More recently,
Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 24
(1998-1999) (quoting Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at
Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 386 (1993) (emphasis omitted)). Indeed, on one view,
"rationality requires maximization." ROBERTCOOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 15
(4th ed. 2004).
10. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler et al., Introduction to Symposium, Preferences and
Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 708-09
(2003) (describing the "traditional economic account" of rational decisionmakers); Mark
Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1347, 1350
(2003) (noting economics' "ground-floor proposition that individuals are rational, expected-
utility maximizers"). But see POSNER, supra note 5, at 17-18 (noting that these are, overall,
unrealistic but nevertheless helpful assumptions).
11. The literature documenting consistent departures from this standard rational
decisionmaker model is voluminous and increasing. For general overviews documenting the
departures, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
HEURISTICS AND BIASES]; and RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1993). For
general discussions of the application of this literature to the law, see, among others,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Symposium, Empirical Legal
Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1075 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1499 (1998); and Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious
Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739 (2000).
12. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 11; JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 11.
13. Moreover, this deviation is not random and centrally distributed, as law and
economics predicts. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-
First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 29 (2002) (citing sources). For law and economics'
prediction as to the distribution see, for example, POSNER, supra note 5, at 19 ("Economics is
concerned with explaining and predicting tendencies and aggregates rather than the behavior of
each individual person; and in a reasonably large sample, random deviations from normal
rational behavior will cancel out."); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational,
Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WisC. L. REV.
475, 478 ("If a few individuals depart from these modal tendencies [toward utility
maximization], the theory posits that they do not do so in sufficient numbers or with sufficient
regularity and cohesiveness to influence macro-social events.").
14. Some of the best known include "groupthink" and "group polarization" (including
both "risky shifts" and "cautious shifts"). See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
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legal scholars have not only conducted related empirical research, but have begun to
extensively develop the implications of this legal and psychological research for
legislative and judicial policy. This interdisciplinary work by social scientists and legal
academics has blossomed into a field known variously as "behavioralism,"' 15
"behavioral law and economics,' 16 "behavioral economics,"" "the 'new law and
psychology,"" 8 "legal decision theor[y],"' 19 or "law and behavioral science. 2 °
Briefly, the field's findings show that people do not always make optimal decisions,
do not always take into account all available information, do not always act to
maximize utility, and do not always think and act in the most rational way. Rather,
humans exhibit "bounded rationality,"21 "bounded willpower, ' 22 and "bounded self-
interest., 23 We take cognitive "shortcuts," failing to consider all available information,
and thus arrive at objectively incorrect, nonoptimal decisions. We make "irrational"
24judgments. We easily succumb to temptation, "tak[ing] actions that [we] know to be
,,25in conflict with [our] own long-term interests, And at times we act unselfishly, that
is, not purely in our own self-interest, instead choosing to be fair or to punish
unfairness in others.
26
Another body of scholarship challenging the focus on rationality and reasoning
seeks to remind us of the important role emotions play in making judgments, making
SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986) (disctlssing group polarization); IRVING L. JANIS, GROUrrHINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982) (discussing
groupthink); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 106-08 (2000) (discussing group polarization in the legal context). For additional citations
and examples, see, for example, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Who Decides? Privileging Public
Sentiment About Justice and the Substantive Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1, 19-20 & nn. 117-22
(2003).
15. E.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1420 (1999).
16. E.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 11.
17. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
18. Rachlinski, supra note 11.
19. E.g., Gregory S. Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The Unwanted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1915 (2002).
20. E.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11; Thomas S. Ulen, Evolution, Human
Behavior, and Law: A Response to Owen Jones's Dunwody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933
(2001).
21. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
ECON. 99 (1955) (discussing phenomenon); Hugh Schwartz, Herbert Simon and Behavioral
Economics, 31 J. SOClO-ECON. 181, 181-83 (2002) (reviewing Simon's work); Jolls eta]., supra
note I (further explaining phenomenon).
22. Jolls et al., supra note 11, at 1479 (giving examples of bounded willpower).
23. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1295, 1312 (2003) (defining bounded self-interest); Jolls et al.,
supra note 11, at 1479 (giving examples of bounded self-interest).
24. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 11; JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note It; THALER, supra note 11.
25. Jolls et al., supra note 11, at 1479.
26. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1312.
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decisions, and living lives.27 Traditionally, discussions of law and the emotions portray
emotions as a counterpoint to rational thought: emotion has typically been viewed as a
corruptive force that distorts logical reasoning.28 Under this view-also called the
"mechanistic" perspective, 29 and arguably the prevailing view in American law-
emotion is wholly distinct from cognition, and must be carefully cabined so that it does
not bias or influence logic and rational reasoning.30 In response, however, some legal
scholars have framed emotions as an equally valid and important aspect of legal
27. Among a number of others, see Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment:
A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1997); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within
Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REv. 435 (2000);
Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMErRICs J. 283 (1999). See
generally Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNElIL. REv. 974
(2001) (noting the recent increase in legal attention to the emotions); Blumenthal, supra note
13, at 24-25 (same).
28. Such a view stems back to ancient philosophy. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 CoLum. L. REv. 269, 278-79
(1996) (reviewing sources); John D. Mayer, Foreword to THE WISDOM IN FEELING:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE x, xi (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter
Salovey eds., 2002) (discussing Stoic philosophical approach to emotion). In modem times, the
perspective appears in both case law and commentary. E.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977) ("It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."); see also, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements
at Capital Sentencing: Traditional and Non-Traditional Perspectives, 50 DRAKEL. REv. 67,76
(2001) (noting "long-held belief that emotion interferes with reasoning [such that] any overly
emotional or inflammatory evidence should be excluded from the jury's decisionmaking
process"); Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705, 1732 (1996) ("Biases, framing effects, and emotions
constrain rational decisionmaking."); Feigenson, supra note 27, at 13 (noting law's "general
ban" on sympathy and that, ordinarily, "the appropriate role for sympathy, and emotion
generally, in legal judgment is no role at all"); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 n.5 (2002) (noting "concerns
that jury decisionmaking in patent cases may be based on bias or emotion rather than rationality
or merit"); Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent ": An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
377, 400-02 (2001) (noting "long tradition" of viewing emotions as impediments to reasonable,
rational thinking); Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1435, 1446 (1966) (noting assumption that "emotions, desires, and opinions ... [may]
interfere with the rational process"); Peter H. Huang, Emotional Investing and Regulating
Anxious or Exuberant Securities Markets, at 4 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Huang, Emotional Investing]; Peter H. Huang, Law and Economics in Xena,
Warrior Princess, 2 Whoosh 1 14 (Oct. 1996), at http://www.whoosh.org/issue2/huang.html
[hereinafter Huang, Xena] (noting the "commonplace... idea that a fundamental conflict exists
between thoughts and emotions").
29. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 28, at 278-79.
30. Cf Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical
Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. (forthcoming 2005)
(discussing affective biases on judgments); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,792-93 (1983) (discussing importance of disengaging emotions or
"desires" from reasoning and of making decisions "in a considered, dispassionate way").
[Vol. 80:155
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decisionmaking, seeking to give a fuller conception of human reasoning. 3' Some
commentators have drawn attention to the role of emotions in order to point out the
deficiency of cognition-based legal rules.32 Others suggest actually privileging
emotional judgments in some instances by encouraging the use of the "right" emotions
in legal decisionmaking. Under that approach, for instance, it is important that juries
neither consider the "wrong" emotions ("prejudice and bigotry") nor consider the
"right emotions in the wrong contexts" (empathy that is "unaccompanied by critical
reflection").33 Yet others attempt to explicitly reconcile emotion with rational
decisionmaking by incorporating emotional states into such decision processes. These
scholars suggest that even when experiencing an emotional state-the sort of
experience that under the "mechanistic" view supposedly corrupts rational thought-
we nevertheless continue to think rationally. Thus, they suggest that emotional states
nevertheless involve rational reasoning even as they are being experienced.
34
Running through such discussions of emotion is the implicit (and at times explicit)
assumption that emotional states are conscious and controllable, that people are aware
of and can predict their emotions, and that as a partial result, "people can cultivate their
emotions."35 Some of these discussions take the assumption for granted; 36 others
depend on it outright.
37
31. See generally THE PASSIONS OFLAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also Susan A.
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 361,366 (1999)
(not only do "emotions have a cognitive aspect," but "reasoning has an emotive aspect" as well);
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 28, at 285-86 (discussing "evaluative" conception of
emotions); Huang, Xena, supra note 28, at 16 ("Emotions are neither separate from, nor
opposite to, reason.").
32. E.g., Hanson & Kysar, Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 15; Huang,
Emotional Investing, supra note 28.
33. Bandes, supra note 31, at 393-94, 399; cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 28, at
365 (noting possibility of "inappropriate emotional evaluations" and of punishing criminals
more severely when jurors are motivated by such improper emotions).
34. E.g., Neal K. Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 2385, 2393 (1997)
("Passion, after all, comes in different forms, and a penalty structure may induce people to act in
particular ways by assigning costs to particular passionate activities. As Richard Herrnstein puts
it, when husbands and wives start throwing dishes at each other, they do not usually throw the
fine china.") (citation omitted); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1981
(2001) ("[P]eople continue to act rationally while in an emotion state, even though they act
differently from the way they do in the calm state."); Huang, Xena, supra note 28, at 16; cf.
George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 272,274 (1996) (suggesting that "visceral influences on
behavior can, in fact, be expressed in decision-theoretic terms").
35. Posner, supra note 34, at 1985; cf. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L.
REV. 297, 349 n.160 (discussing individuals' relative abilities "to predict and takes steps to
avoid... emotional volatility").
36. E.g., Bandes, supra note 31, at 370-71 (apparently assuming that the statement that
the emotion and cognition systems are related implies that one can consciously restrain the
effect of emotional information on one's reasoning). But see JOSEPH E. LEDoux, THE
EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MysTERIous UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 19 (1996) ("While
conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness. This is so because
the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the
20051
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But the degree of interplay in consciousness between emotion and cognition is much
less clear than these scholars suggest.38 More important, their work depends in part on
the assumption that people can accurately predict and consciously control emotional
states. As this Article shows, however, this assumption may be flawed, and legal theory
and policy based on these assumptions may be seriously misguided. First, neurological
evidence suggests that cognitive influence over emotions is weaker than emotional
influence over cognitions. 39 Second, as discussed more fully below, substantial
empirical evidence demonstrates that people are in fact unable to accurately predict
their own or others' emotional states. Recent social psychological research on affective
emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections from the cognitive
systems to the emotional systems."); Brian Rosebury, On Punishing Emotions, 16 RATIo Ju~ds
37, 43 (2003) (plausibly suggesting that certain psychological precursors of emotional
judgments are "less amenable... to conscious supervision").
37. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 28, at 273 (advocating an "evaluative" perspective
on the emotions that suggests that "persons (individually and collectively) can and should shape
their emotions through moral education"); Posner, supra note 34, at 1981.
38. Two examples may suffice. First, it seems intuitive that the experience of an
affective state is conscious in the sense that one "knows" one is angry, sad, elated, or aroused.
But this intuition may be wrong; empirical studies have long shown that emotional arousal-
that is, what would be perceived as an emotional state-can be misattributed to unrelated
causes. E.g., D.G. Dutton & A.P. Aron, Some Evidencefor Heightened Sexual Attraction Under
Conditions of High Anxiety, J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510 (1974); Stanley Schachter &
Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State, 69
PSYCHOL. REV. 379 (1962). That is, when ambiguous physiological activity or arousal exists, we
may look to our surroundings for cues as to the cause of that arousal, and label that arousal with
different emotions based on what we perceive. For instance, in Dutton and Aron's research male
subjects were asked to walk across a small bridge suspended over a ravine. See Dutton & Aron,
supra. Either as they were crossing (and thus were under some state of physiological arousal due
to the perceived danger), or as they were resting after having crossed (and thus had had the
physiological arousal diminish), an attractive female research confederate approached and spoke
to them. The variable of interest was the percentage of subjects in each condition who later
called the woman. Approximately twice as many men from the "crossing" condition called her
as did in the "resting" condition; the researchers interpreted this as a misattribution of the
physiological arousal from the crossing to the attractiveness of the woman. Id.
Second, evidence shows that affect can substantially influence judgments, "regardless of
whether the cause of that affect is consciously perceived. [Empirical work also demonstrates]
the independence of affect from cognition, indicating that there may be conditions of affective
or emotional arousal that do not necessarily require cognitive appraisal. This affective mode of
response, unburdened by cognition and therefore much faster, has considerable adaptive value."
Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BTASES, supra note 11, at 397, 401.
For a good discussion of the extent to which emotion and cognition may be integrated at a
subconscious level, see Jeremy R. Gray, Integration of Emotion and Cognitive Control, 13
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 46 (2004); for neurophysiological evidence regarding
such integration, see Jeremy R. Gray & Todd S. Braver, Integration of Emotion and Cognitive
Control: A Neurocomputational Hypothesis of Dynamic Goal Regulation, in EMOTIONAL
COGNMON 289 (Simon C. Moore & Michael R. Oaksford eds., 2002).
39. LEDoux, supra note 36, at 19. I will not discuss the neurological findings in detail,
as my focus is the social cognitive psychological data regarding affective forecasting. For a
useful discussion see, for example, Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience
Can Inform Economics, 43 J. ECON. LIT. (forthcoming 2005); Gray, supra note 38; Gray &
Braver, supra note 38.
[Vol. 80:155
LAW AND THE EMOTIONS
forecasting-the ability to predict future emotional states-provides strong evidence to
that effect.4°
The research has important implications for law and policy. For instance, in
deciding whether to impose a death sentence, capital sentencing juries may be
permitted to hear testimony from murder victims' family members about how the
murder affected them and will continue to affect them.4 1 Although judicial and
scholarly debate continues as to whether such "victim impact statements" are at all
relevant to a defendant's desert,42 both sides of the debate presume that witnesses'
subjective reports of their emotional reactions are valid and accurate. But, as I discuss
below, inaccuracies in such reports may in fact lead to the overapplication of capital
sentences. Similarly, legal commentators seeking to develop theories and models of
emotions' place in the law start from assumptions that emotions are predictable,
manageable, and (for some theorists) consciously controllable.43 Eric Posner, for
instance, draws inferences about emotion's role injury decisionmaking, contract law,
tort law, and property law from such assumptions. But the social science data reviewed
below shows such assumptions to be mistaken-suggesting that the policy suggestions
based on the derived models may be seriously flawed.
No mention of affective forecasting appears, however, in discussions of victim
impact statements. Nor is the phenomenon recognized in most theoretical efforts to
incorporate emotions into the law, or model their influence on legal topics. Indeed, few
legal scholars have recognized the affective forecasting phenomenon at all. 44 Fewer
40. E.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 621-33 (1998). For a popular
account of the recent research, see Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Sept. 7, 2003). See also John Sabini et aL., Underestimates and Truly False Consensus
Effects in Estimates of Embarrassment and Other Emotions, 21 BASiC & APP. Soc. PSYCHOL.
223 (1999); David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCiOL. Sci. 340, 340
(1998); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 821 (2000). For a thorough recent
review of the affective forecasting literature, see Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert,
Affective Forecasting, 35 ADvANcEs tN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 345 (Mark Zanna ed.,
2003). I draw on this review in Part I.
41. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 218-221.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1510 n.55 (2001) (referring to the affective forecasting
phenomenon); Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 85-86 [hereinafter Guthrie, Regret Aversion]
(noting individuals' inability to predict how they will feel in the future); Chris Guthrie & David
Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 817 (2004) (recognizing
social science literature on affective forecasting); Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?
The Costs of Options in Negotiations, 88 IOWA L. REv. 601, 648 (2003) (citing article on
affective forecasting); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259,368 (2000) (discussing
research on affective forecasting); Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual
Overviews, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1347, 1356 (2003) ("Consider also the important point made by
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still have discussed the important legal implications of such inaccurate predictions.45 In
the remainder of the Article I address this gap.
. First, in Part I, I define affective forecasting in more detail. I review the empirical
research documenting people's shortcomings in predicting future affective states.46 I
also point out some shortcomings of the research and directions it might be taken in
order to develop a fuller account of people's ability to predict affective experiences. In
Part II, I develop a number of implications that both the findings and the shortcomings
have for legal theory and legal policy, Such research has far-reaching implications for a
surprising number of areas in the substantive law that involve the ability to predict
one's own or another's future emotions: for instance, aspects ofjury decisionmaking,
47
capital punishment, 48 health and biomedical law,4 9 and others. I discuss these areas in
some detail; nevertheless, I also address reasons that militate against the immediate
application of affective forecasting research in such areas. In some instances I suggest
specific empirical research that might be conducted in order to address some of these
concerns.
In Part III, I address broader issues. Again, some legal theorists, for instance, Eric
Posner and Susan Bandes, have worked from the assumptions that people can well
predict and control their emotional experiences. I discuss how empirical research
suggesting otherwise, therefore, may undercut the models they develop from those
assumptions. Next, I note what the affective forecasting findings might mean for
welfare-based theories of rational decisionmaking more broadly, and for current
debates over paternalism. In the Conclusion, I also emphasize why I remain neutral as
to some of the implications discussed throughout. Although in some instances further
empirical research may be useful, I emphasize the usefulness of social science data in
behavioral social scientists who investigate hedonics: individuals invariably make concrete
choices and establish short-term behavioral plans in expectation that the choices they make will
make them happier than the ones they forego, but they may for a variety of reasons know very
little about what has made them happy or will make them happy."); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zanir,
The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669,
1678-79 (2003) ("We may wish our preferences to be fulfilled because we anticipate that their
fulfillment will improve our lives, but these expectations may be disappointed when we actually
experience the satisfaction of our desires."); see also Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 83-88
(discussing implications of affective forecasting for capital sentencing); Blumenthal, supra note
13, at 27 (discussing the phenomenon); Huang, Emotional Investing, supra note 28, at 7
(alluding to the phenomenon).
45. E.g., Allen & Leiter, supra note 44, at 1510 n.55 (noting relevance of affective
forecasting to issues of euthanasia); Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 83-88 (discussing
implications of affective forecasting for capital sentencing); Guthrie & Sally, supra note 44
(discussing implications for negotiation).
46. Of course, "affective forecasting" simply refers to the prediction of such states,
accurate or not. For shorthand, however, I will at times use the term to refer to the phenomenon
of inaccurate predictions, or to the literature documenting such inaccuracies. Increasingly, the
term "impact bias" is being used to cover various errors in predicting affective states. Wilson &
Gilbert, supra note 40, at 351; Guthrie & Sally, supra note 44.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See infra Part II.A.2.
49. See infra Part II.B.
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"calling the legal system's bluff."50 Identifying incorrect premises from which the law
develops its doctrine need not always mean that the law must be changed.51 Where it is
not changed-perhaps because we value other factors more than the application of
certain data-courts and legislatures must nevertheless acknowledge those data and
explain why they deliberately chose to reject them. "Forcing" such explanations will
increase the transparency, legitimacy, and perhaps the validity of the reasoning
underlying law and policy.
I. AFFECTE FORECASTING
Imagine that one morning your telephone rings and you find yourself speaking
with the King of Sweden, who informs you in surprisingly good English that you
have been selected as this year's recipient of a Nobel prize. How would you feel,
and how long would you feel that way?... Now imagine that the telephone call is
from your college president, who regrets to inform you (in surprisingly good
English) that the Board of Regents has dissolved your department, revoked your
appointment, and stored your books in little cardboard boxes in the hallway. How
would you feel, and how long would you feel that way?
5 2
Perspectives on what makes people happy, whether economic, philosophical, 3 or
psychological, 54 have tended (broadly speaking) to center on notions of utility or
welfare-very loosely, on notions of value or happiness.5 5 In more prosaic terms,
people want to be happy, to make themselves happy, and to have that which will make
them happy-be it love, marriage, a good job, children, money, potato chips, or money
with which to buy potato chips. Of course, substantial public policy debate exists over
how to best achieve such preferences, and over which preferences should be counted
for which people and to which degree. Such debates generally take as a starting point,
however, the intuitively plausible assumption that people know what will make them
happy (i.e., what will increase their welfare), and will seek out those things. To varying
50. Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 51; see Thomas Grisso & Michael J. Saks,
Psychology's Influence on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comment on How to Succeed, 15 L.
& HUM. BE-Av. 205, 208 (1991); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword:
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000).
51. For instance, if the implications suggested in Part II.B. L.a are played out to their
extreme, profound substantive changes in contract law might result, changes that may or may
not well serve the legal system.
52. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 617.
53. For a distinction between the economic and the philosophical perspectives, see, for
example, POSNER, supra note 5, at 12-13; POSNER, supra note 1, at 49.
54. See generally WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter WELL BEING]; Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On
Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-
Being, 52 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 141 (2001).
55. Most broadly, "welfare" or "preferences" or "happiness" are used in such
discussions to embrace that which people want. "Utility," or one of these proxies, may refer to
the experience of some outcome or to the desire for that outcome. E.g., Daniel Kahneman, New
Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY 105, 107 (1997).
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degrees economic analysis, philosophical notions of utilitarianism, and the hedonic
psychological approach assume this as well.
The accuracy of this assumption, therefore, has important repercussions both for
these perspectives on what makes people happy, and for the larger societal debates
about how to achieve such happiness and through what policies. People often make
decisions based on perceptions of how they will feel about different potential
outcomes. 56 Thus, "[ajccurate predictions of future tastes ... emerge as [a] critical
element[] of an individual's ability to maximize the experienced quality of his
outcomes."
57
Accordingly, social scientists have recently begun to investigate empirically
people's ability to predict their future feelings.58 Unfortunately for utility or hedonism
models, though, developing evidence runs counter to our intuitions, showing that these
predictions are typically inaccurate. The remainder of this Part discusses these
findings; Parts II and III then show their important implications for law and public
policy.
A. Predicting Future Feelings
Recent work in social psychology has moved from simply measuring individuals'
predictions about future emotional states to comparing those predictions with the actual
emotional states experienced by people in such situations. This has allowed
investigation of potential errors in those predictions.
Such errors might occur in at least four areas: predicting the valence of one's future
feelings, predicting the specific emotions that might be experienced, predicting the
intensity of the feeling, and predicting the duration of the emotional state.59 The first
two types of predictions are relatively unproblematic. Not surprisingly, people are
generally (though not always) accurate at knowing the valence of their emotional
reaction to an experience-of knowing, that is, whether an experience will evoke a
positive or negative emotional reaction. 6° Similarly-and again somewhat
unsurprisingly-people are usually able to predict which specific emotions they will
experience.6 ' For predictions of both which emotions will be experienced and the
valence of those emotions, accuracy will most likely be influenced by the emotion's
56. L. W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHIcs 131 (1996) ("[M]y preferences
about the future always represent my view now of how things will go then."); Roger Buehler &
Cathy McFarland, Intensity Bias in Affective Forecasting: The Role of Temporal Focus, 27
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1480, 1480 (2001); see infra notes 498-500 and
accompanying text.
57. Kahneman, supra note 55, at 107.
58. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 346 (collecting studies).
59. Id. at 346-47.
60. E.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble with Vronsky: Impact Bias in the
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING, supra note 28, at 114, 116
(Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); Michael D. Robinson & Gerald L. Clore,
Simulation, Scenarios, and Emotional Appraisal: Testing the Convergence of Real and
Imagined Reactions to Emotional Stimuli, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1520
(2001).
61. E.g., Robinson & Clore, supra note 60, at 1523-31.
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complexity or temporal proximity. That is, a prediction of how one will feel in
response to a relatively straightforward experience, or one that is relatively soon, is
generally more likely to be accurate than a prediction of a more complex event or one
far in the future. 62 In part this is due to our tendency to oversimplify our images or
63construals of what future events will be like. In part it is due to our tendency not to
recognize that emotions themselves are complex; the same event may evoke multiple
(even apparently incompatible) emotional reactions. 64
And yet, although people are relatively adept at knowing which emotion they will
experience and whether it will be positive or negative, people are surprisingly
inaccurate at predicting the intensity and the duration of those emotions. Moreover, this
is so even for relatively "straightforward" emotional experiences, such as winning the
lottery or suffering severe injuries. It is on such inaccuracies-in predictions of the
intensity and duration of future emotional experiences-that most of the affective
forecasting research has been focused.
Thus, what is perhaps the "most famous article in the psychological literature on
well-being" 66 compared the self-reported life satisfaction of accident victims
(paraplegics and quadriplegics) to that of both lottery winners and control subjects.67 In
a follow-up study, the authors also separately compared the self-reported life
satisfaction of additional lottery winners to additional controls. 68 Despite the intuition
that accident victims would be much unhappier (and lottery winners much happier)
than control subjects, the authors found only small differences among ratings of well-
62. But see infra text accompanying notes 98-99 (showing an example of mistaken
predictions even minutes before the experience).
63. E.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THINKING AND FEELING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN
SOCIAL COoNITION 178, 179-80 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) (noting tendency to imagine future
events generally and in the abstract); Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of Temporal Distance on
Level of Mental Construal, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 527-28 (2002)
(demonstrating that people's predictions of future emotional experiences are less complex for
upcoming events than for ones further in the future).
64. Jeff T. Larsen et al., The Agony of Victory and the Thrill of Defeat, 15 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 325 (2004) (showing possibility of experiencing positive and negative affect simultaneously
rather than sequentially); Jeff T. Larsen et al., Can People Feel Happy and Sad at the Same
Time?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 684 (2001) (showing concurrent existence of happy
and sad feelings); Ulrich Schimmack, Pleasure, Displeasure, and Mixed Feelings? Are
Semantic Opposites Mutually Exclusive?, 15 COGNITION & EMOTION 81 (2001) (showing
concurrent existence of pleasure and displeasure, in contrast to absence of concurrent feelings of
heat and cold); Scott H. Hemenover & Ulrich Schimmack, That's Disgusting! .... But Very
Amusing: Mixed Feelings of Amusement and Disgust (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (showing concurrent existence of disgust and amusement in response to "disgusting
humor").
65. See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
66. Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 340 (referring to Brickman et al., supra
note 65).
67. Brickman et al., supra note 65, at 920-21.
68. Id. at 922-23.
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being. 69 In particular, paraplegics rated their present happiness higher than expected,
and the pleasure they reported getting from "mundane" activities such as hearing a
funny joke, watching television, or talking with a friend was only marginally lower
than that reported by controls.
70
These early, counterintuitive findings have been corroborated. Individuals using
wheelchairs give positive reports of subjective well-being, for instance, recalling more
positive than negative events in their lives .71 Another study examining victims of spinal
cord injuries found that although anxiety was the predominant emotion one week after
the accident, happiness emerged as the predominant affect as soon as three weeks after
the accident, remaining so at a subsequent interview at eight weeks postaccident.72 And
these findings are mirrored in people's emotional reactions to other traumatic events,
such as the death of a loved one. Participants in one study, for example, reported that
the frequency with which they experienced positive affect essentially returned to
normal levels within a year following the death of a loved one.73 In another study,
bereaved spouses reported life satisfaction scores that were only "minimal[ly]" lower
than non-bereaved spouses' scores, two years after their spouses' deaths. 4 Indeed, the
same authors found that although bereaved spouses reported moderate levels of stress
in the first two years after a death, that stress was less than non-bereaved control
subjects anticipated.7 5 In brief, empirical evidence suggests that although any traumatic
experience is harrowing and painful-and I do not mean to belittle or minimize the loss
or emotional trauma experienced as a result-through a process of "hedonic
69. "The [Brickman et al.] article is famous because its results are deeply
counterintuitive." Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 340.
70. Brickman et al., supra note 65, at 921. Similarly, although lottery winners were
quite happy with their prize, "they took less pleasure than controls in a variety of ordinary
events" and, even more counterintuitively, "were not in general happier than controls." Id. at
923.
71. Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 181
(1996) (citing A. Allman, Subjective Well-Being of People with Disabilities: Measurement
Issues (1990) (unpublished master's thesis, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)).
72. Roxane Lee Silver, Coping with an Undesirable Life Event: A Study of Early
Reactions to Physical Disability 60 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) ("Anxiety appears as the dominant affect at 1 week post injury, followed by
happiness, depression, and anger. Unexpectedly, happiness emerges as the predominant affect at
both the 3- and 8-week assessments, as anxiety decreases in dominance. Anger is relatively rare
relative to anxiety, depression, and happiness at all three assessments.") (on file with author).
73. Eunkook Suh et al., Events and Subjective Well-Being: Only Recent Events Matter,
70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1095 (1996).
74. Dale A. Lund et al., Impact of Spousal Bereavement on the Subjective Well-Being of
Older Adults, in OLDER BEREAVED SPousEs: RESEARCH wrrH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 3, 8
(Dale A. Lund ed., 1989). "A general conclusion of this study is that the death of a spouse in
later life does impact the surviving spouse's subjective well-being but not to the extent that
many would expect ..." Id. at 12.
75. Michael S. Caserta & Dale A. Lund, Bereavement Stress and Coping Among Older




adaptation," victims of such negative experiences may be able to return to a more
normal experience of emotion sooner than might be expected.
76
There are additional examples of adaptation to presumably unpleasant events and
circumstances with implications for the legal system. Studies show that after an initially
difficult period, prisoners may be able to adapt reasonably well to incarceration.
Research from the 1980s and early 1990s demonstrated prisoners' generally successful
long-term adjustment to prison, which included improvements in attitude and decreases
in deviance, declines in mood problems, and even decreases in prisoners' boredom.
77
Even those placed in solitary confinement apparently managed to develop coping
mechanisms and adapt to such circumstances. 78 Below, I discuss this adaptation
phenomenon in the context of implications for capital punishment.79
Such studies find that some people's ability to adapt to unexpected traumas is not
what we might expect. But another important insight from the recent affective
forecasting literature is that people can be wrong in predicting their own emotional
states. Again, errors typically center on the third and fourth types of predictions, the
intensity or the duration of emotional experiences.
80
Such findings recur over a wide range of contexts, from the apparently trivial to the
fundamentally salient. People inaccurately predict how much they will enjoy eating a
bowl of ice cream or yogurt each day for a week;"1 how disappointed they will be if
they do not receive tenure;8 2 or, as discussed above, how they will feel upon the death
76. Camille B. Wortman & Roxane Cohen Silver, The Myths of Coping with Loss, 57 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 349 (1989) (noting mistaken assumptions about loss, such as
that depression is inevitable after loss); cf Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 85; Gilbert et al., supra
note 60, at 116-17 ("Many events-such as rape, divorce, or the death of a child-have
emotional consequences that may last for months, years, or even a lifetime, and it would be
perverse for anyone to suggest that such events do not matter. They most certainly do. But there
is considerable evidence to suggest that hedonic reactions to events--even truly tragic events-
are shorter-lived than one might expect, and that people typically return to their emotional
baselines sooner rather than later.").
77. See Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING,
supra note 54, at 302, 311-12 (reviewing studies).
78. E.g., Peter Suedfeld et al., Reactions and Attributes of Prisoners in Solitary
Confinement, 9 CRiM. JUsT. & BEcAv. 303 (1982); see Christine Rebman, Comment, The Eighth
Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological
Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 575 n.59 (1999) (noting similar studies); see also Ivan
Zinger & Cherami Wichmann, The Psychological Effects of 60 Days in Administrative
Segregation, 43 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 47 (2001) (noting that although segregated
offenders in a Canadian penitentiary had poorer psychological functioning compared to a
control group from the same penitentiary, there was "no evidence" that segregated offenders'
psychological functioning deteriorated over sixty days' administrative segregation). This
literature is controversial. See, e.g., Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the
Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SoC. CHANGE 477 (1997) (supplying data and arguing to the contrary).
79. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
80. See Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 116.
81. Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do People Know
What They Will Like?, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 187 (1992).
82. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 622-24.
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of a spouse.83 But we are also often wrong about how experiences connected with
fundamentally important issues will affect us: issues ranging from birth to death,
hunger to dating, personal to professional to political.
Early research into the accuracy of beliefs about future hedonic experiences focused
on the superficially trivial: predicting preferences for eating ice cream and low-fat
yogurt and for listening to familiar and unfamiliar pieces of music.84 In one pilot study,
subjects ate a serving of ice cream while listening to a piece of unfamiliar music, then
reported how much they anticipated enjoying that ice cream and that music upon
returning to the lab each day for a week for more.8 5 Although subjects were generally
accurate at predicting valence-that is, that their enjoyment would decrease over the
week's time-nevertheless, they were generally mistaken when predicting their level of
enjoyment over the subsequent week.86 A larger follow-up study yielded similar,
stronger results. Subjects were asked to eat plain, low-fat yogurt while listening to a
piece of music that they themselves chose. 87 Although subjects predicted either no
change or a decline in enjoyment for the yogurt, in fact, after a sharp drop in enjoyment
on the first day after the initial tasting, enjoyment ratings increased over the following
week.88 Overall, the authors came to the "conservative conclusion [that] subjects do not
show impressive ability to predict changes in their tastes. 8 9
That "conservative" conclusion has been borne out by research conducted,
primarily, over the last decade. College student football fans, for instance, tended to
substantially overestimate how happy they would be if their school's team won a game;
they also overestimated how unhappy they would be if the team lost.90 Two studies of
college students participating in a simulated dating game showed that students
overestimated how bad they would feel upon not being chosen by a potential dating
partner, as well as (to a substantially lesser degree) how good they would feel if they
were chosen.9' Students at two Midwestern universities who were asked how happy
someone like themselves would be if they lived in California reliably overpredicted
that person's overall satisfaction, as compared to self-ratings by students at California
schools.92 California students also believed that living in California would make
someone happier than reports actually indicated. 93
University students are not the only ones subject to such prediction errors. Gilbert
and colleagues interviewed tenure-track and tenured university professors, as well as
83. Caserta & Lund, supra note 75, at 38.
84. Kahneman & Snell, supra note 81.
85. Id. at 190-91.
86. Id. at 193.
87. Id. at 194.
88. Id. at 195.
89. Id. at 197.
90. Wilson et al., supra note 40, at 829.
91. Timothy D. Wilson et al., When to Fire: Anticipatory Versus PosteventReconstrual
of Uncontrollable Events, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 340, 344, 349 (2004). The
degree to which students overestimated how good they would feel was a smaller effect, reaching
statistical significance at the p =. 11 level. Id. at 344.
92. Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 343.
93. Id.
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those who experienced tenure decisions.94 Tenure-track professors (forecasters) were
asked to predict how they would feel upon learning they had been granted or denied
tenure and at various time periods after that decision. Those interviewees who had
already been granted or denied tenure (experiencers) reported their happiness, and
responses from the two groups were compared. Forecasters were inaccurate, at least in
the short term, about how both favorable and unfavorable tenure decisions made
people feel; in both cases recent experiencers felt less strongly than forecasters
predicted.95
Nor are such errors limited to those in the halls of academia generally. One classic
study demonstrated the changing attitudes and emotions of women in childbirth:
women who one month before giving birth strongly disapproved of the use of
anesthesia during delivery-and who repeated such preferences even during early
labor-nevertheless changed those attitudes during active labor and requested
anesthesia. 96 This result may surprise some people not at all. But the study's author
made an important point: to provide the most appropriate treatment, a physician must,
among other things, elicit and evaluate a patient's expressed preferences. Those
preferences, however, may not be indicative of the patient's true attitudes, especially
toward events she has never experienced.
97
In a related context, Mellers and colleagues asked women who were about to take a
pregnancy test at a clinic to predict their emotional responses upon hearing the test
results. 9s Despite making those predictions only ten minutes before hearing the results,
women consistently "overestimated the displeasure of unfavorable outcomes. Women
who received bad news from their pregnancy tests actually felt better than they
expected." 99 The same researchers also found that dieters who gained or failed to lose
weight felt better than they had expected; the authors found this surprising because
"most dieters are quite familiar with attempts to lose weight, and therefore should have
experience with their actual reactions to unsuccessful attempts."'
'
Other personally-relevant experiences show similar patterns. Researchers
consistently find overpredictions of pain, for instance, by patients about to visit a
dentist.to' More recently, researchers examined the anticipated enjoyment of people
94. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 622-24.
95. Id. at 624.
96. Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of
Patients' Values: Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47 (1984).
97. Id. Further complicating the assessment of patients' preferences is the finding that
expressed preferences returned to opposing the use of anesthesia when they were interviewed
one month after delivery. Id. at 53; see also infra Part II.B.3 (discussing informed consent).
98. Barbara A. Mellers & A. Peter McGraw, Anticipated Emotions as Guides to Choice,
10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHIOL. Sci. 210, 211 (2001).
99. Id. at 213. The authors do not there report, however, what test results-positive or
negative-were considered by their subjects to be "bad news" and whether that differed among
the women responding.
100. Id.
101. Arnoud Arntz et al., Predictions of Dental Pain: The Fear of Any Expected Evil is
Worse Than the Evil Itself, 28 BEHAV. REs. & THERAPY 29 (1990); see Gerry Kent, Memory of
Dental Pain, 21 PAIN 187 (1985); cf. Andrew S. Caplin & John V. Leahy, Psychological
Expected Utility and Anticipatory Feelings, 116 Q.J. EcoN. 55, 57 (2001) (citing RICHARD
LAZARUS, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS AND THE COPING PROCESS (1966) for a "survey of experiments
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about to take various vacations (e.g., a European vacation or a three-week bicycle trip
in California).'02 In each of three studies, the authors found similar results-before the
vacation and for some time afterward, people's beliefs about their enjoyment are more
positive than their actual experiences.' 03 In both the dental and the vacation contexts,
people's perceptions of their emotional responses both before and after an event were
more extreme than the actual experience. And as mentioned above, individuals
predicting the stress levels of older individuals experiencing the loss of a spouse
overpredicted those levels, as compared to self-reports from bereaved spouses.
104
Finally, people's predictions about their reactions to personally relevant world
events consistently show inaccuracies. Individuals asked to predict their emotional
responses to the victory or defeat of a candidate they supported in both gubernatorial'05
and presidential"'0 elections overpredicted how bad they would feel if their candidate
lost'0 7 and how good they would feel if their candidate won. 10
8
In summary, empirical evidence shows that errors in predicting future emotional
experiences are prevalent and consistent. Taking each study alone, of course, it is
possible to find methodological or theoretical flaws.' 0 9 And it might be tempting to
dismiss some of the studies as trivial based on their subject matter-ice cream, college
football games, or simulated dating games. But as the review above demonstrates, each
study is a piece of a substantial body of research. Indeed, the literature reviewed is only
a fraction of the recent work documenting and extending findings about the
phenomenon," 0 a body of research with quite counterintuitive findings. This substantial
body of work now demonstrates that what was once a "conservative" conclusion--that
people are "not impressive" in their ability to predict changes in their tastes, nor in
their ability-to predict how they will feel in response to a future event-is conservative
no longer. On average, we are poor at predicting important elements of future
emotional experiences, whether our own or another's, even minutes into the future.
B. Causes of Prediction Error
But why? Obviously, when one's basic happiness or unhappiness is involved,
accuracy at predicting one's emotional reactions to various events would seem of
demonstrating that certain forms of physical pain, such as pinpricks, do not produce measurable
psychological-stress reactions beyond those produced by the mere anticipation of such
conditions").
102. Terence R. Mitchell et al., Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The
"Rosy View, " 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 421 (1997).
103. Id. at 442.
104. Caserta & Lund, supra note 75.
105. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 624-26.
106. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 119-20.
107. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 625-26.
108. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 119-20.
109. Courts have dismissed some research using just such an approach. E.g., Lockhart
v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1997); see Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 2 n.10 (noting Supreme Court's rejection of research
in Lockhart); id. at 38-39 (noting Court's rejection of research in Lockhart and Joiner).
110. See e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 346; Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E. J.
Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 503 (2002).
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critical importance. There are at least two responses to this question, the
phenomenological and the teleological-that is, first, addressing what factors go into
erroneous predictions, and second, the possible purpose or function such
mispredictions might have.
1. Phenomenology
People err in predicting their future emotional states and their reaction to such states
for a number of reasons. The simplest, of course, is a lack of familiarity with the events
prompting the emotional experience. Regardless of the number of preliminary visits a
woman makes to the maternity ward, breathing exercises she learns, or pregnancy
planning books she reads, she only experiences her first labor and delivery once. As
Christensen-Szalanski demonstrated, anticipated reactions to that labor can differ
markedly from reactions during delivery."' Similarly, lottery winners ordinarily hit the
jackpot only once. When we imagine ourselves holding a hypothetical winning ticket,
we envision the material things we will buy and the donations to worthy causes we will
make once we cash the check. We fail, however, to consider the subsequent demands
of the sudden enrichment, including taxes or changes in existing relationships.1
2
Because we are unfamiliar with the future event that triggers our anticipated reaction,
we misconstrue that event and thus bias our prediction. 13
But this misconstrual can occur even when imagining events with which we are
more familiar. Recall the overprediction by football fans of their negative emotional
reaction to their team's loss--despite the unfortunate fact that for the teams in
question, such losses were not uncommon.1 14 This may stem from the application of
inaccurate theories about happiness. For instance, researchers asked subjects to plan a
menu of snacks to eat when they returned to the lab once a week for three weeks.
1 1 5
Planned menus included subjects' favorite snacks, but subjects apparently believed that
they would tire of only their favorite and sought to supplement the menu with lesser-
liked snacks. They were wrong, and they were thus less pleased than they expected
when they returned to eat those snacks.
Such misconstrual also stems from people's general inaccuracies in memories of
affective experience, because predictions of reactions to future events are often based
11. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96; cf. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 354
("When asked how she will feel at the birth of her first child, a woman might imagine a trouble-
free, natural delivery followed by a quiet period of intimate bonding with the baby. What
happens instead is 24 hours of painful labor, a Cesarean section, and intrusive visits from in-
laws armed with video cameras.").
112. Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 117; cf. Gavin McCormick, The Cash That's
Become a Curse: Pleas for Money are Taking a Toll on Lottery King, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec.
25, 2003, at 20.
113. Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 117.
114. Wilson et al., supra note 40.
115. Daniel Read & George Loewenstein, Diversification Bias: Explaining the
Discrepancy in Variety Seeking Between Combined and Separated Choices, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL




on inferences drawn from previous experiences. If we could accurately recall
emotional reactions to certain events, then our predictions about future reactions to the
same or similar events would be more accurate as well. Unfortunately, however, we
systematically misremember emotional experiences, 117 distorting our ability to predict
future ones. That is, when the memories or theories on which a prediction is based are
inaccurate, the prediction will be biased as well. 11
Importantly, our predictions about future events are also biased by failures to take
into account factors other than the direct and immediate event. This happens in two
ways; we neglect broader aspects of the event itself, but we also neglect aspects of both
ourselves and the outside world that, over time, tend to ameliorate the intensity and
duration of emotional reactions. Both phenomena fall under the notion of a "focalism"
effect 119 or a "focusing illusion."'
2 0
First, as a narrow matter, when asked (by ourselves or others) to imagine a future
event and predict our enjoyment, distaste, or other emotional reaction, we tend to
visualize specific examples of that event, forgetting that the event is, most likely, an
example of a broader class. 12 1 Research suggests that
when [people are] asked to make predictions about future events, they tend to
imagine a particular event while making little provision for the possibility that the
particular event they are imagining may not necessarily be the particular event
they will be experiencing. When our spouse asks us to attend "a party" on Friday
night, we instantly imagine a particular kind of party (e.g., a cocktail party in the
penthouse of a downtown hotel with waiters in black ties carrying silver trays of
hors d'oeuvres past a slightly bored harpist) and then estimate our reaction to that
imagined event (e.g., yawn). We generally fail to consider how many different
members constitute the class (e.g., birthday parties, orgies, wakes) and how
different our reactions would be to each. So we tell our spouse that we would
rather skip the party, our spouse naturally drags us along anyhow, and we have a
truly marvelous time. Why? Because the party involves cheap beer and hula hoops
rather than classical music and seaweed crackers . . . . [W]e like what we
previously did not want because the event we experienced (and liked) was not the
event we imagined (and wanted to avoid). 122
Second, more broadly, we fail to consider the multifold events that will occur
subsequent to the event we are predicting, events that will at the very least distract us
117. Sven-Ake Christianson & Martin A. Safer, Emotional Events and Emotions in
Autobiographical Memories, in REMEMBERING OUR PAST: STUDIES IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
MEMORY 218, 235 (David C. Rubin ed., 1996) ("There are apparently no published studies in
which a group of subjects has accurately recalled the intensity and/or frequency of their
previously recorded emotions."); Daniel Kahneman et al., When More Pain is Preferred to Less:
Adding a Better End, 4 PSYCHOL Sci. 401 (1993) (documenting subjects' tendency to
mistakenly remember a more painful experience as preferable to a less painful one).
118. See Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 618; Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 63, at 181;
Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 359.
119. Wilson et al., supra note 40, at 822.
120. Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 340.
121. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 63, at 180.
122. Id. (citations omitted).
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from ruminating about the trigger event and, at best, will assuage any negative feelings
we have resulting from it (of course, such events may reduce positive emotions as
well). 123 We should recognize-but apparently we do not-that events do not take
place in a vacuum; despite traumatic or joyous experiences, life demands that we
involve ourselves in, and attend to, other considerations. At times, when predictors'
attention is drawn to such surrounding events-for instance, by making a list of
activities they plan to do during the day after the predicted event-prediction errors are124.. .
attenuated. Usually, though, we fail to consider such events in predicting our
reactions, focusing instead on the trigger and predicting that the resulting emotional
reaction will be stable. That is, importantly, errors may stem from "evaluating an entire
extended outcome by evaluating the transition to it. For example, the mistake that most
people make in predicting the well-being of paraplegics may reflect their use of the
tragic event of becoming a paraplegic as a proxy in evaluating the long-term state of
being a paraplegic."' 125 These factors help explain, for instance, the overprediction of
stress and depression of older bereaved spouses described above; those making
predictions do not take into account the positive effect that social support networks,
remarriage, 127 various coping strategies, 12 or learning new skills 129 might have.
Not only do people fail to consider outside events that either distract them from, or
ameliorate, their emotional experience, but people also fail to consider the likelihood
. . .. .130
that they will rationalize or cope with negative events. The tendency to rationalize or
transform such events has long been documented, under various guises;13 ' the
important point is that people seem to possess-but not remember that they do-what
some have called a "psychological immune system-a system of cognitive mechanisms
123. Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 122-23.
124. E.g., Wilson et al., supra note 40.
125. Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility,
112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 396 (1997) (first emphasis added).
126. E.g., Alicia Duran et al., Social Support, Perceived Stress, and Depression
Following the Death of a Spouse in Later Life, in OLDER BEREAVED SpousEs: RESEARCH WITH
PRAC'ICAL APPLICATIONS 69 (Dale A. Lund ed., 1989).
127. Danielle S. Schneider et al., Dating and Remarriage over the First Two Years of
Widowhood, 8 ANNALS OF CUNICAL PSYCHTATRY 51 (1996) (suggesting that dating and
remarriage are common and appear to be highly adaptive behaviors among the recently
bereaved); Margaret Gentry & Arthur D. Shulman, Remarriage as a Coping Response for
Widowhood, 3 PSYCHOL. & AGING 191 (1988) (suggesting that remarried widows reported fewer
concerns than they had after spouses' deaths).
128. E.g., Kathleen A. Gass, Appraisal, Coping, and Resources: Markers Associated
with the Health ofAged Widows and Widowers, in OLDER BEREAVED SpousEs: RESEARCH WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 79, 91 (Dale A. Lund ed., 1989).
129. E.g., Dale A. Lund et al., Competencies, Tasks of Daily Living, andAdjustments to
Spousal Bereavement in Later Life, in OLDER BEREAVED SPOUsES: RESEARCH WrTH PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS135, 150 (Dale A. Lund ed., 1989).
130. Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 124.
131. E.g., Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 619 ("Ego defense, rationalization, dissonance
reduction, motivated reasoning, positive illusions, self-serving attribution, self-deception, self-
enhancement, self-affirmation, and self-justification are just some of the terms that psychologists




that transforms our mental representation of negative events so that they give rise to
more positive emotions."'
32
In summary, by failing to take into account the workings of our "psychological
immune system," by neglecting events surrounding that which we are predicting about,
by misconstruing the predicted event, and by focusing too much on specific factors of
those events, we tend to overestimate the intensity and the duration of future negative
emotions. 133 As discussed below, such errors have consequences for aspects of the
legal system.
2. Teleology
But there is an additional, more nebulous issue of why individuals are susceptible to
these prediction errors. That is, are such inaccuracies functional in some adaptive
sense?' 34 Scholars debate the adaptive nature and significance of emotions
generally; 135 whether it is adaptive not to be wholly "in touch" with one's emotions-
to the extent that predictive inaccuracies occur-is similarly unclear.'
36
For instance, prediction errors such as the over estimation of future negative
emotion may be functional because they prompt certain adaptive short-term behavior.
Predicting a severe emotional reaction to weight gain or to poor performance on a test
might lead a person to avoid the fattening snack food or the late-night party that might
lead to that negative experience, even where postevent emotion might not have been as
severe as predicted. Similarly, because of the pleasure derived from anticipating
positive emotional experiences, overpredicting the enjoyment of a future positive event
may yield greater utility before the event occurs.137
132. Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 124 (emphasis in original). In one sense it is
unsurprising that we neglect such tendencies, as a conscious effort to mitigate negative emotions
reduces the likelihood of that effort being successful. E.g., Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 634
("[A]cute awareness of one's immune system may have the paradoxical effect of suppressing
it.").
133. Recent evidence suggests that there may also be genetic factors that reduce the
impact of, or perhaps individuals' susceptibility to, negative events. Avshalom Caspi et al.,
Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a Polymorphism in the 5-HTT Gene, 301
SCIENCE 386 (2003).
134. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 399-401 (discussing the functional aspects
of prediction errors). Commentators are increasingly noting the relevance of evolutionary theory
to legal topics. See Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 1129
(2004); Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent
Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 Cm-KENT L. REv. 1055 (2004); Owen D. Jones,
Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 207 (2001);
Jones, supra note 27; Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997).
135. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAw 80,
83 & n.21 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (citing sources). For a good discussion of the adaptive
nature of integrated emotion and cognition, see Gray, supra note 38.
136. E.g., Gilbert et al., supra note 60, at 137 (noting issue of adaptive utility of such
errors).
137. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 399. Of course, postevent disappointment may
balance or even outweigh that enjoyment.
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However, as Wilson and Gilbert point out, short-term behavior is less likely to be
influenced when the future event is one over which the individual has little or no
control. Just as overpredicting enjoyment creates "unwarranted" utility, overpredicting
a negative emotional experience that results from an uncontrollable event can cause
unwarranted anxiety. Other than the possibility of less displeasure after the event, it is
not clear that such overprediction or exaggeration is functional.' 38 And even in the
situation of an exam, a diet, or some other controllable event, it would seem more
beneficial for people to have accurate ideas of the pleasure or displeasure to be
derived. Further, as discussed in Part II.A below, accurate knowledge of what will
make someone happy (of one's own endogenous preferences) is not only essential for
leading a happy life, but is fundamental to theories of what it means to do so, and of
what role the state should have in encouraging (or even forcing) people to do what is
good for them.
Few data exist that address the adaptive significance of such affective prediction
errors. t 39 Thus, until the relevant research is conducted, the teleological "why" must
remain "an open question."'
140
C. Caveats
A substantial body of empirical research now demonstrates people's tendency to
inaccurately predict future affective experiences. As with many bodies of research,
however, there are caveats in its application, and there is further research that should
be conducted. Although none of the caveats I discuss below is fatal to the practical
application of affective forecasting research, each poses an issue that may need to be
addressed as calls for such application increase.
1. Self-Report Biases
One criticism sometimes levied against social science research in the laboratory is
its dependence on subjects' self-reports for data.'41 Such criticism is likely less tenable
in the context of affective forecasting research, however, even though many emotion
studies (including ones of affective forecasting) make use of self-report data. This is so
138. See id. at 400.
139. See id.
140. Id. (noting that the adaptive utility of such errors is "an open question"); Gilbert et
al., supra note 60, at 137 (noting intuition that improving accuracy would be beneficial, but also
noting possibility that "when the errors we study in isolation are embedded in the complex web
of ordinary events, they may serve some larger purpose of which we are unaware").
141. Margaret S. Stockdale & Maureen O'Connor, The Relationship Between Prior
Sexual Abuse and Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 8 PsYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 64, 80 (2002)
(noting concerns over self-report biases in empirical research); David Hemenway et al.,
Firearms and Community Feelings of Safety, 86 J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 123-24
(1995) ("ISlelf-report data may be subject to inaccuracies because of social desirability
responses, recall bias, intentional distortions or noncandid responses."); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1214 & n.241 (1995) (citing
experiments acknowledging and addressing issue of self-report biases).
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for both logical and methodological reasons. First, "social desirability responses"' 14 2 or
other simulated positive responses are probably absent in these studies, as it is unclear
what social utility might be derived from a subject's admission that she feels less
positive than she had predicted-that she was wrong about her own emotions.
143
Second, more objectively, self-reports of general emotions are found to have good
statistical reliability and correlate well with more specific or multi-item inventories.
144
Third, in an innovative methodological twist to one of the affective forecasting
studies (the simulated dating game), Wilson and colleagues included a behavioral
• 145
check on subjects' self-reported data. Again, forecasters were asked to predict how
they would feel if they were not chosen by the hypothetical dating partner. But they
were also told of a (fictitious) pilot study organized by the University's "Experimental
Review Committee" designed "to ensure that participants left psychology studies in the
same frame of mind as when they first arrived."' 146 Forecasters were asked to select the
dosage of a mood-enhancing drug they would take if they found out that they were not
chosen for a date; similarly, "experiencers" were given the oportunity to select a drug
• ~~~ , 4
dosage after they learned of the potential partner's decision. Consistent with the self-
report data, those subjects asked to forecast the dosage they would take upon rejection
chose a significantly higher dosage than those who actually experienced a rejection.148
This behavioral measure corroborated psychological responses, lending further
credence to the self-report data.
2. Predicting One's Own Versus Others' Experiences
Many, but not all, of the numerous studies demonstrating errors in affective
forecasting rely on "between-subjects" designs (comparing the predictions of one
group of subjects to the reported experiences of another group) rather than "within-
subjects" designs (comparing the predictions and experiences of the same group of
people). 149 To this extent, researchers were arguably comparing different things,
potentially casting doubt on the studies' results. 
IC
There are a number of responses to this criticism, however. First, of course, not all
studies are designed as between-subjects. Some do request the same subjects to both
predict and react to particular events,'15 and these studies' findings are wholly
consistent with the results of the between-subjects studies. Second, even in between-
142. Hemenway et al., supra note 141, at 123.
143. E.g., Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 352.
144. See id.
145. See Wilson et al., supra note 91, at 343.
146. Id. at 348. In fact, no such study existed. Id.
147. The "drug" was in fact a vitamin C pill, and the researchers did not actually allow
any participant to take a pill. Id. at 349.
148. Id.
149. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 363-64.
150. Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 77, at 310 (suggesting that between-subjects
or "[clross-sectional ... studies suffer from the difficulty of matching the exposed and
nonexposed subgroups") (emphasis in original).
151. E.g., Wilson et al., supra note 40, at 826-29 (Study 3); Kahneman & Snell, supra
note 81.
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subjects studies, "predictors" and "experiencers" are randomly assigned to each group,
avoiding potential confounds associated with membership in one condition or the
other. Third, not only are the results of between- and within-subject studies consistent,
but the data from between-subject studies themselves are internally consistent; that is,
the studies all demonstrate people's mispredictions of future emotional states.1
52
Fourth, as a methodological matter, it is possible that forecasts made shortly before
experiences may in fact inappropriately "contaminate" either subjects' actual
experience or their report of that experience.'5 3 Some data suggest that this is not such
a danger, such as Mellers' and colleagues' findings that women mispredicted their
emotional reactions even ten minutes before finding out results of a pregnancy test.1
54
In any event, a between-subject design avoids such potential contamination.
Finally, given other human biases it may be that predicting another person's
emotional experience is in fact similar to predicting one's own. In other contexts, such
as making judgments about the thoughts, behaviors, or attitudes of others, people can
be subject to a "false consensus effect," in which they over estimate the concordance of
others' beliefs with their own.155 To that extent, ostensibly forecasting about someone
else may in fact be more similar than expected to forecasting about oneself. The
forecaster's thought, perhaps, is something along the lines of, "The person
experiencing this emotion would feel as I think I would, because that is how it makes
sense to feel."' 156 Recent evidence suggests that this might be the case: in an
152. Of course, it is conceivable that the studies all turn out similarly because they all
have the same "defect" of between-subject design. It seems more likely, however, that any
putative methodological confounds introduced by such designs would lead to more divergent
results across the large body of research that has been conducted.
153. Cf Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 364.
154. See Mellers & McGraw, supra note 98, at 211, 213.
155. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, andLaw, 81 VA. L. REv. 853,859
(1995) (The false consensus effect is "the belief that others share one's own attitudes and
behaviors to a greater extent than they really do."); e.g., Leandre R. Fabrigar & Jon A. Krasnick,
Attitude Importance and the False Consensus Effect, 21 PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
468 (1995) (demonstrating effect in context of attitudes and identifying potential mechanisms
for the effect); Sandy Wolfson, Students' Estimates of the Prevalence of Drug Use: Evidence for
a False-Consensus Effect, 14 PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVEBEHAVS. 295 (2000) (noting overestimates
by college-age drug users of degree of other students' drug use); see generally Mark D. Alicke
& Edward Largo, The Role of the Self in the False Consensus Effect, 31 J. EXPREMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 28, 28-29 (1995) (discussing background of false consensus effect); Gary Marks &
Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False Consensus Effect: An Empirical and
Theoretical Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 72 (1987).
156. Cf Sabini et al., supra note 40, at 228 ("[OJur participants did use themselves as a
guide to others' emotions; indeed they overused themselves."). This relates to commentators'
notion of "multiple selves"--that is, although an individual's prediction at Time, of her
emotions at Time2 are, intuitively, by and for the same person, there is also a sense in which she
is a qualitatively different person at Time2, and in that sense she is predicting about another
person. For comments about this sense of different selves, see, for example, Carl H. Coleman,
Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen
Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 92 (1999) (raising issue of "which phase of an
individual's evolving personality has priority when her wishes [at Time] differ from those [at
TimeJ]") (emphasis in original); Kahneman, supra note 55, at 120 ("The history of an individual
through time can be described as a succession of separate selves, which may have incompatible
2005]
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investigation of the endowment effect, researchers found that study participants
underestimated the magnitude of the effect. 157 In a series of experiments they
demonstrated that such errors were due to "egocentric empathy gaps," in which
participants' perceptions of how others valued the property to be bought or sold was
driven by their own valuation.
158
In sum, although the between-subject methodology, when used, may provide a
potential source of criticism for the affective forecasting research, the criticism is likely
not serious and certainly not fatal.
3. Individual Differences
A final interesting area to be developed in the context of affective forecasting
research is that of individual differences. 9That is, research demonstrates that, overall,
people inaccurately predict future emotional states, but differences in forecasting
accuracy may exist among identifiable groups (e.g., men vs. women, older people vs.
younger, more vs. less intelligent).
Indeed, individual differences may exist in a number of contexts. First, there may be
differences in susceptibility to the stress of negative events in the first place, and in the
ability to cope with such events after they occur. As alluded to earlier, there are
apparently genetic factors that predispose individuals to such stress as well.1  Second,
a moment's reflection suggests that people differ in the actual experience of emotion,
. .. .. 161
and substantial evidence supports that intuition. Third, there seem to be identifiable
preferences .... Which of these selves should be granted authority... ?"); Kronman, supra note
30, at 781 (discussing individuals' attempts "to empathize with the selves we once were").
157. Leaf D. Van Boven et al., Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers:
Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 66, 68, 74
(2000). The endowment effect refers to the "established [concept] that owners value things more
than buyers do simply because they own them." Id. at 66 (citing Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1325
(1990)).
158. Id. at 66.
159. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 87-88 (noting lack of research on
individual differences in affective forecasting); Neal Feigenson, "Another Thing Needful":
Exploring Emotions in Law, 18 CONST. COMM. 445, 460 (2001) (noting the importance of
examining individual differences in the phenomenology of emotion) (reviewing THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra note 31).
160. See Caspi et al., supra note 133, at 386.
161. Notable in this area is the work of Carol Gohm and colleagues. Carol L. Gohm,
Mood Regulation and Emotional Intelligence: Individual Differences, 84 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 594 (2003) (identifying a "type" of emotional experiencer who was more
reactive to emotional experiences than others); Carol L. Gohm & Gerald L. Clore, Affect as
Information: An Individual-Differences Approach, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING, supra note 28, at
89 (2002) [hereinafter Affect as Information]; Carol L. Gohm & Gerald L. Clore, Four Latent
Traits of Emotional Experience and Their Involvement in Well-Being, Coping, and Attributional
Style, 16 COGNrrION & EMOTION 495 (2002) (identifying four traits distinguishing individuals'
experience of emotions); Carol L. Gohm & Gerald L. Clore, Individual Differences in
Emotional Experience: Mapping Available Scales to Processes, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 679 (2000) (identifying similar structure of individual differences in emotional
experience); see also, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett, Discrete Emotions or Dimensions? The Role
of Valence Focus and Arousal Focus, 12 COGNITION & EMOTION 579 (1998); Susan Nolen-
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differences across some groups in forecasting accuracy: some preliminary data seem to
show that older individuals know that a return to an emotional baseline occurs
relatively quickly.162 Other recent data suggest that forecasting errors are stronger in•163 . ...
men than in women. Finally, individual differences in the construct of emotional
intelligence164 might be relevant. Some data indicate that people reporting higher
emotional intelligence (though not necessarily people scoring higher on emotional
intelligence inventories) were more likely to engage in helpful coping behaviors in
response to stressors.16 5 To the extent that emotional intelligence reflects the accurate
identification, processing, and expression of people's emotions, those more
"emotionally intelligent" may be more accurate at predicting such emotional
experiences.
Tension between applying aggregate and individual data recurs in the legal system,
so in a sense this issue is nothing new. Moreover, it is not immediately obvious what
the practical implications of such individual differences might be. I return briefly to
this question in Part II.C. l infra.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF INACCURATE AFFECTIVE FORECASTING FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM
In the Introduction, I suggested somewhat broadly that an inability to accurately
predict future feelings had important ramifications for policy debates and for certain
aspects of the legal system. I address the broader policy questions in Part III, turning
here to specific aspects of the legal system that may be affected by a violation of the
standard assumptions that people can forecast well how they, or others, will feel. Parts
II.A and II.B describe some of these aspects, both in and out of the courtroom; in Part
II.C, I nevertheless note certain caveats in the immediate and wholesale application of
the affective forecasting research to these areas.
Hoeksema & Cheryl L. Rusting, Gender Differences in Well-Being, in WELL-BEING, supra note
54, at 330; Kathy A. Winter & Nicholas A. Kuiper, Individual Differences in the Experience of
Emotions, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 791 (1997) (examining the relationship between
personality characteristics and individuals' experience of emotions). Cf Rachel F. Moran, Fear
Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN U. 1, 10 (2002) ("Individual
differences in the expression of feelings like fear and distress can be observed at an early age
and remain fairly constant throughout a person's lifetime.") (citing Jerome Kagan & Nancy
Snidman, Temperamental Factors in Human Development, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 856 (1991)).
162. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40, at 397-98.
163. Wilson et al., supra note 91, at 349.
164. Peter Salovey & John D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence, 9 IMAGINATION
COGNITION & PERSONALITY 185 (1990); see also DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
(1995).
165. Gohm & Clore, Affect as Information, supra note 161, at 100.
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A. Applications Inside the Courtroom
1. Civil Damage Awards
a. Implications for Civil Damage Awards
An inability to accurately predict future emotional states implicates a fundamental
aspect of the civil jury system-the assessment of damage awards for noneconomic
losses. 166 Such losses typically encompass various categories of "emotional
distress,"'167 defined most broadly as "any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as
extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, and
nausea, ,168 but more generally seen as including "pain and suffering,' ' 169 "mental
anguish,"' 170 or "loss of [or "lost"] enjoyment of life."
'1 71
Of course, damage awards for such losses are designed to compensate the victim of
a tortious injury for the harm experienced, with the goal of placing her in a position
equivalent to that before the tort occurred. 172 Although this functions retrospectively,
prospective damages may also be awarded in order to compensate a tort victim for the
distress she is reasonably anticipated to suffer in the future.
173
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DAMAGES § 910 (1979) ("One injured by
the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present and
prospective, legally caused by the tort.").
167. Id. § 905(b) ("Compensatory damages that may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss include compensation... for emotional distress.").
168. Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 743,779 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Capelouto
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (including, under the "unitary concept"
of pain and suffering, "fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock,
humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal"); see Mark Geistfeld,
Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages
for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 781 (1995) (noting various elements of "pain
and suffering" damages, including "intangible[s] such as fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, or
indignity").
169. E.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (6th ed. 1990) (defining term as including
"mental and emotional trauma which are recoverable as elements of damage in torts").
170. E.g., McClain v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 665 N.W.2d 484,488 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003) ("Emotional damages are not necessarily limited to 'emotional distress,' but may
also encompass mental anguish.").
171. E.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374, 381 (Miss. 2001); Bennett v.
Lembo, 761 A.2d 494, 497 (N.H. 2000); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989);
Susan Poser et al., Measuring Damages for Lost Enjoyment of Life: The View from the Bench
and the Jury Box, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHIAv. 53, 54 (2003) (describing "loss of enjoyment of life"
or "hedonic damages"); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder
Rationale, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 142 (1996) (including as an aspect of pain and
suffering awards, "the enduring loss of enjoyment of life by the accident victim who is denied
the pleasures of normal personal and social activities") (quoting 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199-200 (1991)).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DAMAGES § 901 cmt. a (1979); id. § 903.
173. See id. § 910. Such prospective damages should be reasonably certain and not
speculative. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.23
(future damage must be "reasonably certain to occur"); Pribil v. Koinzan, 665 N.W.2d 567,
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Research documenting forecasting errors, however, suggests a number of problems
in the determination of such prospective damages for emotional distress. 7 4 Most
broadly, if the basic goal of granting such awards is to compensate for a victim's future
suffering, then that suffering needs to be determined accurately. If jurors consistently
overpredict the degree of emotional distress a victim will suffer, damage awards will be
inflated and victims will be overcompensated. Moreover, defendants may be
overdeterred, as the degree of caution that will become necessary to balance
compensation will rise to an inefficient level.
In fact, the Second Restatement of Torts explicitly focuses on those aspects of
emotional distress that, according to the affective forecasting research, are most
vulnerable to predictive mistakes. Under the Restatement, the duration of the emotional
injury and its intensity are explicitly to be considered in determining the damage
award. 175 As outlined above, these are precisely the factors (as opposed to the valence
of an experience, for instance) that most people have the most difficulty predicting.
1 7 6
Basing damage awards directly on the factors that are so difficult for people may be
quite problematic.
These factors are important not only in theory, but also in practice. Experimental
evidence suggests that the perceived amount and duration of a victim's mental
suffering are indeed primary factors in determining mock jurors' damage awards. 77 In
reviewing this research, Professors Greene and Bornstein have stated that "the greater
the plaintiffs disability and mental suffering, the larger the plaintiffs pain and
573-74 (Neb. 2003) ("[T]he jury is to award such damages only where the evidence shows that
the future earnings or pain and suffering for which recovery is sought are 'reasonably certain' to
occur."). At least one state allows compensation for a future (physical) injury that is not
reasonably certain to occur because of the increased risk of future injury. See Dillon v. Evanston
Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002). The court apparently suggested that the compensation should
be proportional to the injury's likelihood. Id. at 370. See generally Kira Elert, Note, Dillon v.
Evanston Hospital: Illinois Adopts the New Increased Risk Doctrine Governing Recovery for
Future Injury, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 685 (2003).
174. Of course, there are debates over many more aspects of the civil jury system, most
of which are outside the scope of this Article. For references, see, for example, EDIE GREENE &
BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003)
(reviewing issues concerning jury comprehension of instructions); VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS
ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSrnILrrY (2000) (addressing debate over
whether juries are biased against corporations); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie L. Albertson,
Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1497 (2003) (reviewing
research relating to jury reform generally); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker,
Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 353 (1999) (discussing possibility of caps on juries' punitive damage awards); Franklin
D. Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. Rev. 49,50 n.2
(1997) (citing articles on appropriateness of ensuring juries that can comprehend "complex"
litigation).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DAMAGES § 905 cmt. i (1979) ("The length of
time during which pain or other harm to the feelings has been or probably will be experienced
and the intensity of the distress are factors to be considered in assessing the amount of
damages."); Bean v. Best, 93 N.W.2d 403,408 (S.D. 1958) (quoting Restatement approvingly).
176. See supra notes 65-133 and accompanying text.
177. E.g., Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role
ofinjury Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 181, 189-90 (1997).
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suffering award."' 78 They continue, "It follows, then, that injuries that are very painful
but that do not produce long-lasting suffering or disability-such as some acute
fractures or burns-should lead to relatively low compensation awards."' 179 Although it
is not clear whether their "should" is normative or descriptive, Greene and Bornstein
implicitly identified the crux of the problem: to the extent that damage awards should
compensate for suffering, and should thus correlate with that suffering, injuries that
result in less suffering should as a normative matter be compensated at a rate lower
than injuries causing more harm. But where predictions about that harm are based on
jurors' perceptions of how severe and for how long a victim will suffer as a result of
that harm, forecasting errors may bias those predictions. The resulting overestimate of
harm may in turn yield excessive awards.
This may especially be so for so-called "hedonic damages," which focus on
compensation for the "loss of life's pleasure[s]."'9 0 Such pleasures include the "daily
life activities that are common to most people . . . [such as] going on a first date,
reading, debating politics, the sense of taste, recreational activities, and family
activities."'' 81 The goal of such damages is to compensate the tort victim for "the
deprivation of certain pleasurable sensations and enjoyment through impairment or• . . .. • 182
destruction of the capacity to engage in activities formerly enjoyed ...... Though
such losses may be "beyond dispute" t3-it would be hard to question the idea that
someone who once enjoyed hunting, fishing, or yard work, but suffered brain injury
and a cracked pelvis and has a permanently damaged wrist and crooked finger 184 can
no longer derive as much enjoyment from such activities-nevertheless, the affective
forecasting literature suggests that it is possible to adapt even to such traumatic
circumstances. Although such a tort victim indisputably suffers an inability to enjoy
life the way he once did, and therefore indisputably deserves some compensatory
award, research such as the paraplegic study at least makes us think twice about the
extent of that award.
8 5
The affective forecasting literature highlights other tensions in trying to determine
the appropriate levels of pain and suffering awards. For instance, some courts hold that
if the fear or anxiety underlying a victim's mental anguish is not based on something
real (i.e., if there is no "real" reason for the anguish) then recovery may be
disallowed. 186 Such cases often involve objectively ascertainable circumstances. In
178. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 174, at 113.
179. Id.
180. Geistfeld, supra note 168, at 782; EADES, supra note 173, § 6.06[1] ("In
considering your award of damages, if you have occasion to do so, it is proper for you to
consider any evidence tending to show that, as a result of the occurrence of the subject of this
action, the plaintiff's capacity to enjoy life has been diminished."). See sources cited supra note
171.
181. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374, 381 (Miss. 2001).
182. Bennett v. Lembo, 761 A.2d 494,498 (N.H. 2000) (quoting Fantozzi v. Sandusky
Cement Prods., 597 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1992)).
183. Id.
184. Johnson, 798 So.2d at 381.
185. See Brickman et al., supra note 65, at 921.
186. E.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. McKenzie, 131 S.W. 684,685 (Ark. 1910) (noting that
"mental anguish for which a recovery can be had must not consist simply of annoyance or
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Western Union Telegraph Co. v. McKenzie, 187 for example, a telegraph company
negligently failed to deliver a telegram from a husband responding to his wife who had
just given birth, saying that he was on his way home from out-of-state. Because as far
as she knew her husband had failed to respond, the wife experienced severe emotional
distress, worrying that he had been harmed on his way home. However, the court found
that the husband was never objectively in danger, even though his wife worried about
him; thus, there was no objective cause for anguish and thus no recovery. 1sg Similarly,
in K.A.C. v. Benson, patients whose doctor conducted pelvic examinations despite
being HIV-positive and having open lesions on his arms could not recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress upon learning the doctor's condition. 189 The
court held that plaintiffs had to demonstrate actual exposure to HIV to recover. It
reasoned that because the risk of transmission was remote (according to Center for
Disease Control estimates), no "real" exposure occurred and thus there was no
injury.190 The patients' "real" distress became irrelevant, as there was no "real" danger.
These cases address whether the anguish sprang from real conditions, but not
whether there was real anguish. 19 1 Analogously, although there is an effort to evaluate
future pain at the time of trial, the affective forecasting literature suggests that that
future pain may be overestimated and thus not be based on "real" conditions, because
those conditions and circumstances will change.
The problem may be even worse. Courts and commentators fully recognize the
speculative nature of assessing even reasonably certain intangible damages.
192
Nevertheless (or, perhaps, therefore), such decisions are left to the jury.193 Precisely
because the task is so speculative, however, the guidance given to the jury in making
such decisions is vague. Jurors might be instructed that although there is no "formula"
by which loss of enjoyment of life may be measured, given their "sound discretion"
and "common experience," "the law can provide no better yardstick for.. . guidance
than [jurors'] own impartial judgment and experience."'' 9 4 Or, they may be told,
"damages for personal injury cannot be assessed by any fixed rule, but you are the sole
judges as to the measure of damages" via a "reasonabl[e], intelligent[]" exercise of
disappointment or a suffering of the mind growing out of some imaginary situation, but it must
be some actual distress of mind flowing 'from the real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life"'); Heiner
v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664,670 (Ohio 1995) (noting that there is no recovery for emotional
distress where negligent diagnosis never placed plaintiff in "actual physical peril").
187. 131 S.W. 684 (Ark. 1910).
188. Id. at 685-86.
189. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
190. Id. at 557-60.
191. The McKenzie court, though, went even further, implying that the wife's mental
anguish itself was not real. 131 S.W. at 685 ("There was no real sorrow or grief that came to her
through any real condition or action of her husband.").
192. EADES, supra note 173, at § 7.01 [3] ("Trying to define the idea of 'mental anguish'
or instruct the jury sufficiently to allow the jury to determine whether such an injury has
occurred is, of course, difficult."); Geistfeld, supra note 168, at 781-82.
193. Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (stating "the
issue generally must be resolved by the impartial conscience and judgment ofjurors who may be
expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).




discretion. 195 In Massachusetts, "common sense," "conscience," the jurors' "wisdom
and judgment" and their "sense of basic justice" are to be used, as there is "no special
formula under the law" to assess damages. 196 And the new California jury instructions
note that "[n]o fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of... damages. You must
use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the evidence and your
common sense."'
9 7 Supreme Court Justices have bemoaned such guidance in the
context of punitive damages as "vague and amorphous"' 19 8 and "skeletal."' 19 9 But
clearly, jury instructions for compensatory damages also lack "well-defined
standards" 2 00 and are just as nebulous.
201
Although the exercise of jurors' discretion is laudable in reflecting the conscience of
the community as to appropriate damage awards, appeals to "common sense"
potentially exacerbate jurors' likely tendencies to overestimate pain and suffering,
mental anguish, and future negative emotional reactions. With only vague guidance as
to how to approach the issue of forecasting future suffering, jurors may apply default
judgments that inaccurately predict the intensity and duration of that suffering, with the
potential to overcompensate tort victims.
202
195. MIssIssIPPI JUDICIAL COLL., MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 11.3
(2003).
196. MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., MASSACHUSETrS SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1.13 (2001).
197. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3905A (2003).
198. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliances Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,474 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
199. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
200. Geistfeld, supra note 168, at 776.
201. See Haines v. Raven Arms, 640 A.2d 367, 369 (Pa. 1994) (noting that the lower
court had thought it difficult "[for] a lay jury to fix a figure in a case like this with no experience
and precious little guidance"); Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury
Instruction on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 743 (2000) (reviewing jury
instructions for damage awards); see generally GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 174
(reviewing juror comprehension of civil damage instructions).
202. Two final points. First, to the extent pain and suffering awards can be well
delineated, perhaps it is plausible to move to a periodic payment arrangement, in which a
victim's contemporaneous pain and suffering is reevaluated from time to time. E.g., Roger C.
Henderson, Designing a Responsible Periodic-Payment System for Tort Awards: Arizona
Enacts a Prototype, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 21 (1990). This approach might allow more accurate
determination of a victim's ongoing emotional distress, given the potential for bias in a jury's
initial predictions of that distress. Of course, the administrative costs in doing so could easily
become prohibitive, and issues of malingering become problematic as well. MARC A. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 613-14 (6th ed.
1996).
Second, although the affective forecasting research suggests the possibility of
overcompensation for some tort victims, I do not think that possibility need lead ineluctably to
calls for tort reform-such as damage caps-that respond to deliberately elevated awards by
civil juries. That is, the research documents an unconscious bias that, under some circumstances,
can be corrected. This is different from a civil jury's conscious decision to give substantial
monetary awards.
[Vol. 80:155
LAW AND THE EMOTIONS
b. Potential Remedies
One way to address some of these concerns would be to admit expert evidence on
affective forecasting research, as well as coping mechanisms more generally, during
the damages phase of civil trials that involve damages for emotional distress. To an
extent this is not an unusual suggestion: tort victims have been allowed to present
expert testimony about "stages of," or "patterns of responses to grief,''2°3 or to supply
specialized testimony about particular victims' coping or grieving processes from a
treating psychologist.2 04 However, some courts are hesitant to admit such testimony,
stating that it in fact invades the province of the jury to provide expert evidence that
was either better provided by the victims or their family members, 205 or that the jury
could evaluate on its own because the experience of such grief was within jurors'
experience.
206
It is certainly true that evidence as to the impact of losing a family member has
often been seen as the province of the jury. But where such testimony can in fact help
the jury, it typically should be admitted. The counterintuitive nature of the affective
forecasting literature demonstrates its potential utility and thus, at least on helpfulness
grounds, its admissibility. In light of the research, it is likely that even when jurors do
have insight or experience with grief, they may nevertheless not apply it accurately,
especially when trying to apply it to the experience of others. Accordingly, expert
testimony about affective forecasting may be useful in helping jurors apply their
experience, or in helping those without such experience to more accurately predict
victims' future emotional experiences.
I should make one point explicit. I do not intend by any of this discussion to imply
that tort victims do not deserve compensation for their injuries, even intangible ones, or
should not be awarded damages for future pain and suffering or emotional distress. At
least four reasons militate against such an inference. First, I share the entirely plausible
and legitimate intuition, reified by the legal system, that when an individual is injured,
and is reasonably certain to experience harm from that injury in the future, that
individual deserves recompense.
Second, the affective forecasting literature does not show that such an individual
will not experience such future harm, nor does it show that people are incorrect to hold
203. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
204. E.g., Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865,868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Forother
cases addressing the admissibility of "grief experts," see, for example, El-Meswari v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 785 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1986); Dawson v. Fulton, 745 S.W.2d
617 (Ark. 1988); Angrand v. Key, 657 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1995); Sharp v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
649 N.E.2d 1219 (Ohio 1995). None of these cases involved an expert testifying about affective
forecasting.
205. Angrand, 657 So.2d at 1149; Robles v. Chi. Transit Auth., 527 N.E.2d 361, 367
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
206. E.g., EI-Meswari, 785 F.2d at 487; cf. Dawson, 745 S.W.2d at 620 (stating "jurors
may be familiar with grief expressed upon loss of a family member"); see also Douglas L. Price,
Hedonic Damages: To Value a Life or Not to Value a Life?, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 1055, 1075
(1993).




that intuition. Recall that people are generally quite accurate at predicting the valence
of their future emotions, that is, whether they will experience positive or negative
emotion in response to some event.208 What people have difficulty with is the
prediction of the intensity and duration of those responses. As such, victims are
probably correct that they will experience some lasting emotional harm from an injury;
at issue is the determination of how much.
Third, as discussed above, the affective forecasting literature is just beginning to
develop. Although the phenomena that it documents have been demonstrated for more
than ten years, only recently has the first full-scale theoretical review appeared,20 and
no quantitative or meta-analytic summary has been conducted. 2 1 More research will be
useful before the affective forecasting literature can be applied without reservation.
211
If, indeed, it should be applied. A fourth reason not to infer that I mean victims
should not be recompensed is our commitment to values other than the application of
212data. Although social science data should certainly be applied in the legal system,
there are times when other principles valued by the law, such as finality, fairness,
process, or constitutional principles, should be elevated over what those data might
show.2 13 Here, we value the compensation of tort victims, and may continue to do so
even in the face of contradictory evidence. For instance, we might decide that although
an award may be potentially too high (because of overprediction of harm), that award
is nevertheless still within a range we are comfortable with, and does not "shock the
conscience." Similarly, as noted above, there are individual differences in people's
susceptibility to stressors, in their abilities to cope with such stress, and the
mechanisms they use to do so. I do not imply that we should punish someone with an
optimistic personality, simply because after an accident she continues to view the
world in a sanguine way. Finally, we may accept a jury's award as compensating the
suffering that we believe a tort victim would reasonably be entitled to feel, even if
subsequent events show that suffering to be less than expected. I discuss the "other
values" point in more detail in Part 111.214
208. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
209. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 40.
210. See Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 38-46 (discussing the importance of meta-
analysis in developing theory that can be applied to law); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The
Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of
Sexual Harassment, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 48-51 (1998) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Mete-
Analytic Review]; David Lubinski, Applied Individual Differences Research and its Quantitative
Methods, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 187, 196 (1996) ("[Meta-analytic strategies are not a
methodological fad. They are powerful tools for uncovering the nature and strength of
functional relationships. They will be and should be used more in future research.").
211. See infra Part H.C.1.
212. See infra Part H.C.2; Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 48-51 (discussing different
value systems of law and social science and implications for the use of data in the legal system).
213. See infra Part II.C.2.
214. See also Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 48-51.
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2. Capital Punishment
Affective forecasting findings are not only relevant in the civil context, but in the
criminal context as well. In particular, the literature raises important questions on both
sides of the debate over the administration of capital punishment.
a. Victim Impact Statements
(1) Implications for Capital Sentencing Juries
One criminal context, related to civil jury damage awards is the use of victim impact
testimony at capital sentencing.2 15 Capital juries are sometimes permitted to hear from
a victim's family members about the impact the defendant's crime has had on them.
The justification is that such victim impact statements ("VIS") will help the sentencing
jury make a more fully informed decision, helping to quantify the harm a defendant
caused by understanding the emotional pain that family members feel in the present
and will feel in the future. 2 16 Although the capital jury's decisionmaking is reminiscent
of the civil jury's as to damages for pain and suffering and other emotional harms,2 1 7
the primary and most obvious difference is the dichotomous choice to which such
statements lead in the capital context-life or death for the defendant.
The VIS literature, mostly critical, is large.2 18 Most criticism involves arguments
either that such testimony is irrelevant to assessing the amount of harm caused by a
particular crime, 2 19 or that it evokes in the jury improper or inappropriate emotional
reactions that will lead to capricious decisionmaking and the overimposition of death
sentences. 2 2 Proponents (and the governing law) respond that the impact of a murder
215. Such testimony is permitted under Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)
(holding that the use of victim impact statements during capital sentencing was not per se
unconstitutional).
216. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra note 31, at 309, 325 ("much victim impact evidence concerns the effect of the
victim's death on the victim's survivors"); cf. Susan A. Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We
Know About Victim Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 545, 551 (noting that in capital
cases, "the term 'victim impact statement' is a misnomer, since the statements are not those of
the victim, but are given by family members, friends, and other survivors.").
217. See supra Part H.A.1.
218. See Jean M. Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Trials: A Selected
Bibliography, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 569 (2003) (collecting citations to materials discussing the
effect of victim impact statements).
219. E.g., Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937,
987-92 (1985) (discussing the relevance of victims' testimony to some of the justifications for
criminal sanction); Justin D. Flamm, Note, Due Process on the "Uncharted Seas of
Irrelevance": Limiting the Presence of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing After
Payne v. Tennessee, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 295, 322 (1999) (arguing that victim impact
evidence is irrelevant because it has no tendency to make the existence of facts necessary for
capital murder more or less likely).
220. E.g., Bandes, supra note 31, at 365 ("[V]ictim impact statements... should be
suppressed because they evoke emotions inappropriate in the context of criminal sentencing.").
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on the victim's family is in fact profoundly relevant to evaluating the amount of harm
caused by the defendant, and thus to the punishment the defendant deserves. 221 1 have
briefly reviewed these and other arguments for and against VIS elsewhere, 222 and will
focus here on the implications of the affective forecasting research for the debate.
Under current case law, a capital defendant's punishment depends in part on the
amount of harm caused by his actions.22 3 To the extent this is so, of course, it is
essential that that harm is accurately assessed. If the amount of harm is overestimated,
defendants may receive a more severe sentence than they deserve. If the amount of
harm is underestimated, defendants' sentences may be lighter than their crime warrants.
In turn, when such estimates are based on VIS, then the statements should
accurately reflect the harm that family members experience, both before and after the
trial. Errors in the prediction of such future harm may tend to inflate estimates, leading
to potentially more severe sentences, all else being equal. Based on the data reviewed
above, such overestimates seem more likely than underestimates.
Exacerbating such concerns is the problem of jurors trying to estimate another's
future emotional state. Of course, that is what VIS are for, to educate a sentencing jury
about the harm that each family member anticipates as a result of a murderer's crime.
Nevertheless, the research suggests not only that such predictions can be mistaken, but
that predictions regarding others may be even less accurate.2 25 On the one hand,
outsiders may be more free from biases that focus self-predictions on the personally
salient events that lead to overestimates; on the other hand, recent data sugest that an
outsider's affective predictions can be even less accurate than one's own. 2 Other data
suggest that the more different an outsider is from the target of a prediction, the less
accurate predictions will be.
227
Such difficulties highlight the fact that the affective forecasting literature in fact
points both ways for VIS. On the one hand, the research suggests at least the potential
This was also a basis for the earlier case law prohibiting such testimony. See Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987).
221. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819, 827 (1991).
222. See Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 73-79.
223. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 819 (stating that such harm is "an important concern" in
determining what punishment a defendant deserves).
224. See Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 84.
225. Eric Igou & Herbert Bless, My Future Emotions Versus Your Future Emotions:
The Self-Other Effect in Affective Forecasting (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) (demonstrating that outsiders' affective forecasting is even less accurate than one's
own); cf Kahneman, supra note 55, at 116 (asking whether paternalistic actions are warranted
where "an outsider can ... predict an individual's future utility far better than the individual
can"). But see Timothy D. Wilson et al., Judging the Predictors of One's Own Mood: Accuracy
and the Use of Shared Theories, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 537,553 (1982) (finding
that observers' judgments of the predictors of experiencers' moods were as accurate as the
experiencers' judgments). More experimental research would be useful comparing one's own
versus others' judgments of emotional states.
226. See Igou & Bless, supra note 225.
227. See Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 340 (showing that predictions of
paraplegics' self-reported well-being were more accurate when the predicter knew someone who
had suffered paraplegia).
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for overestimating the harm consequent on a capital defendant's crime.22 8 This
potential militates against the use of VIS at capital sentencing. On the other hand,
without such VIS-which may be relatively more accurate than outsiders'• 229
estimates ---capital sentencers would be left to guess as to the future impact of that
crime on family members, and it would be unclear whether overestimates or
underestimates would result.
Another concern stems from the fact that criminal cases do not go immediately to
trial. Sentencing, the phase at which VIS become relevant, takes places even further in
time from the crime. This raises the possibility that victims' family members will
have already begun their "recovery" by the time they give VIS. Of course, the
commencement of any coping activity is a positive sign. From the perspective of a
capital sentencing system, however, such a decrease in the perceived harm may lead to
the underestimates described above. To the extent that (1) an individual has begun to
return to "baseline," (2) her VIS predictions of future negative emotional states are an
extrapolation from her current emotional state, and (3) future experiences involve
fluctuations in grief and suffering, such VIS may in fact underpredict the amount of
harm that a witness may in fact experience. This may in turn lead to a more lenient
punishment than a capital defendant otherwise deserves.
231
(2) Educating Capital Sentencing Juries
For capital sentencing based on VIS, jury education may alleviate some potential
for over- or underpredictions. 232 As Wilson and colleagues showed, reminding
predictors (i.e., jurors) that events will likely occur that will at the very least distract
them from the emotional state on which they are overly focused, may help make
predictions more accurate. 233 Such suggestions help predictors take into account
factors that might assuage or influence certain future emotional states, helping people
understand at Timeo that certain events they may not be thinking about will almost
certainly occur between Timeo and Time, or Time2 that will influence their emotional
states at Time, or Time2. This may suggest that capital defense counsel should educate
the sentencing body in such a manner: defense counsel could tell the capital jury, for
instance, that yes, this murder is a tragedy, but nevertheless, events take place that help
individuals now suffering from the tragedy to cope; although people do not recognize
228. See Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 86; cf. id. at 84 n. 148 (noting that further "data
about inaccuracies in producing judgments about future emotional experiences, and the related
potential for unreliability in testimony about those judgments, would be important in the context
of VIS").
229. See Igou & Bless, supra note 225.
230. See Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 85 n.163.
231. Militating against this concern, however, is the "focusing illusion," where simply
asking respondents about an event or emotion temporarily raises its prominence. See supra notes
119-120 and accompanying text; Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 77, at 310 (noting this
tendency).
232. Again, of course, such education might also help with the concerns raised above
about civil damage awards. See supra Part I.A. 1.
233. Wilson et al., supra note 40, at 844.
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it, their psychological immune system more often than not functions to help them deal
with such traumatic events.
It is hard to imagine, of course, any capital defense counsel wanting to be the first to
try this approach-indeed, I'm sure that most attorneys (and most readers) cringe at the
thought of standing before a capital jury and cross-examining a murder victim's family
member with the words, "You'll get over this, won't you?" But first, of course, it is any
defense counsel's obligation to present any argument she feels might be helpful to her
client. Second, counsel might present the information about hedonic adaptation during
a closing argument, rather than as cross-examination of VIS witnesses. Third, an
alternative might be to place such instruction in the judge's hands-perhaps some
information about the potential for overprediction of negative emotions could be made
234part of a capital jury's instructions. This last alternative would be a large step to take
and, in fact, might give too much credit to the affective forecasting literature as it
stands now. I raise the possibility less as a step I would advocate than as a suggestion
for further empirical research: a useful experiment might present mock capital juries
with a standard capital defendant, and present different conditions involving (1) no VIS
(as a control); (2) VIS presented in the "ordinary" way, with no information about the
affective forecasting literature; (3) information presented by defense counsel (either
through cross-examination or, more plausibly, during a closing argument); and (4)
information presented through judicial instruction. Such an experiment could help
address whether such information would be influential and in what format. Discussion
could then proceed, on a more informed basis, to whether such information should be
used.
b. Affective Forecasting and the "Death Row Phenomenon"
A yet more controversial application of the affective forecasting literature to capital
punishment involves its implications for prisoners' experiences on death row, and the
viability of so-called "Lackey claims" regarding the constitutionality of execution after
long waits in prison. Lackey claims are named for the death row inmate who argued
that execution of an inmate after a "lengthy" wait on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments., 235 Although international
courts have been receptive to such claims,
236 U.S. courts have been less receptive, 237
234. The propriety of such instruction may depend on whether any such evidence was
presented during the proceedings in the first place.
235. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); see also Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). Courts had been presented with this argument before. See Dwight Aarons, Can
Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 29 SErON HALL L. REV. 147, 170-76 (1998) (discussing cases prior to Lackey).
236. E.g., Pratt v. Att'y Gen. for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769, 771 (P.C. 1993) (en banc).
237. Compare Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990,992-93 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (reviewing lower courts' treatment of Lackey claims and stating that those
"courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless"), with id. at 998 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (taking different view of lower courts' treatment).
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typically holding that the claims were procedurally barred238 or that the inmate had so
abused the process that much or most of the delay should be attributed to him.
239
Academic commentary has taken up the argument, however, 4 asserting that such
delay constitutes "psychological torture" 241 and is unconstitutional. Such commentary
asserts the horrors of being on death row through citation to court opinions,242 lay
opinions,243 some scientific data,24 4 and a near-obligatory reference to the philosopher
Albert Camus.2 45 Lackey claims as a general matter, of course, turn on just this
question: Can a delay between the imposition and the carrying-out of a death sentence
can constitute such psychological suffering as to be cruel and unusual punishment.
Inmates and commentators have argued that it can and does, and that inordinate delay
is thus per se unconstitutional.
Of course, some delay between sentence and execution is inevitable. Capital
punishment states ordinarily have mandatory appellate review of death sentences, 24 6
238. Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When
Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 187,
193-94 & n.67 (1999) (collecting cases). But see Dist. Att'y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411
N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (ruling capital punishment unconstitutional, in part based on
impact of delays on death row); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (same).
239. E.g., Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1995).
240. See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762 n.291 (2002) (collecting
academic literature).
241. Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court's Refusal to Hear
a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 577, 590 (2001).
242. E.g., id. (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)); see id. at
601-02 & nn.163-67.
243. Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The "Agony of Suspense": How Protracted Death Row
Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291, 298 n.36 (1997) (citing former prison warden). Ms. Flynn's actual
quotation from the warden is that: "'One night on death row is too long, and the length of time
spent there by [some inmates] constitutes cruelty that defies the imagination. It has always been
a source of wonder to me that they didn't all go stark, raving mad."' Id. (quoting CLINTON T.
DuFFY, EIGrrY-Eioirr MEN AND Two WOMEN 254 (1962)) (alteration in original).
244. E.g., id. at 298 n.37 (quoting Harvey Bluestone & Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to
Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393,393 (1962)). The
quotation Ms. Flynn selected, that a death sentence inflicts "the greatest of stresses," is
somewhat misleading, as these authors in fact found less psychological dysfunction than they
expected. See infra notes 255-259 and accompanying text.
245. Camus wrote that "[tihe devastating, degrading fear that is imposed on the
condemned for months or years is a punishment more terrible than death." Albert Camus,
Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 131,152 (Justin O'Brien
trans., Modem Library ed. 1963). "As a general rule, a man is undone by waiting for capital
punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first being worse than the
second.... Id. at 156.
246. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 14 HUM. RTs. 14, 16 (Winter 1987); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice:




and prisoners typically seek federal habeas review as well.2 47 The Lackey question then
must become not only whether delay is cruel and unusual punishment, but also what
length of delay qualifies. 248 Commentators have suggested ten years' time (the national
average for being on death row), or twice the national average, as points at which an
inordinate delay claim should be ripe for review.
249
In at least two ways, the affective forecasting data may prompt a rethinking of
courts' and commentators' assumptions that life on death row must be "psychological
torture."
First, recall that one reason affective forecasting is inaccurate is that people fail to
consider their psychological immune system; that is, they neglect the possibility of
247. See generally Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLrtM. L. REV. 1665 (1990)
(examining death sentences in federal habeas review sought by prisoners).
248. See Aarons, supra note 235, at 206 ("Then the question arises: How long a delay is
inordinate?").
249. Id. at 207 (suggesting twice the national average); Feldman, supra note 238, at 213
(suggesting ten years). As Professor Aarons indicates, however, this should not be the point at
which delay becomes unconstitutional-that is, a death row inmate would not be removed from
death row upon the twentieth, or twenty-second, anniversary of his sentence (those being
approximately double the national average). Aarons, supra note 235, at 207-08. Rather, it is the
point (for Aarons) at which such delay plausibly would be inordinate and at which a prisoner's
claim might be ripe for review. id. at 207.
Ms. Feldman seems to take a stricter approach, implying that upon spending ten years
that can be attributed to the State on death row, an inmate should automatically be removed.
Feldman, supra note 238, at 213-15. Under her approach, the entire time a prisoner spends
pursuing direct and collateral appeals should be attributed to the State, whether or not
meritorious issues are raised. id. at 215. Her rationale is three-fold: first, for direct appeals, "a
prisoner has no option to forgo the mandatory appeals." Second, similarly, courts should not
punish prisoners for pursuing their "Fourteenth Amendment right to appeal their sentences." Id.
at 207-08 & n. 189; id. at 216 ("A petitioner has a constitutional right to pursue his collateral
appeals."). Third, courts should not require a prisoner to forgo collateral appeals, nor can courts
"expect a prisoner to forgo his chance at life if he thinks he may have the slightest chance at a
meritorious claim." Id. Ms. Feldman may be justified in suggesting a specific ten-year cutoff
point; however, she is wrong on at least her first and second rationales. There is no Fourteenth
Amendment or other constitutional right to appeal, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983), though some sort of "meaningful appellate review" is essential in capital cases. Murray
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Generally there is no
constitutional right to appeal a conviction."); id. at 17-18 (noting the "absence of a
constitutional right to appeal"). Ms. Feldman notes the existence of statutorily-mandated
appellate review in most capital states, Feldman, supra note 238, at 190, but seems to conflate
this with a constitutional right to appeal. Of course, even absent a "per se constitutional right to
appeal .... once a State [sic] establishes an appellate forum it must assure access to it upon
terms and conditions equally applicable and available to all." Chaffin v. Stincheombe, 412 U.S.
17, 24-25 n. 11 (1973). Regarding the third rationale, though it seems plausible that a prisoner
should not be "charged" with pursuing meritorious appellate claims, Ms. Feldman's argument
misses the question whether time spent on nonmeritorious claims should be attributed to him.
Further, it is at least possible that a prisoner's thought that "he may have the slightest chance at
a meritorious claim" tempers the offensive conditions on death row.
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hedonic adaptation.2 50 People overestimate how unhappy a paraplegic or a bereaved
spouse will be because they do not take into account the social and physical support the
person may have, the passage of time, and other factors that combine to lessen the
impact of negative physical and emotional events.2 5' Likewise, it is conceivable that
death row inmates experience a similar sort of hedonic adaptation, engaging in
psychological coping mechanisms that help them adapt to clearly unnatural
circumstances.
Obviously, the best way to address whether they do is to study death row inmates'
experiences. Existing data about such experiences, however, are limited 252 and
inconclusive. But given such strong claims that life on death row must be
"psychological torture, 253 or that such torture is an "immutable characteristic" of the
death row phenomenon,254 a focus on empirical study of the phenomenon is essential.
One of the first empirical studies of inmates' adjustment to death row involved
interviews with nineteen New York death row inmates (eighteen men, one woman).
255
Prisoners were given projective tests that were interpreted by a trained examiner.
256
The authors expected to find evidence of some severe psychological dysfunction such
as anxiety or depression; however, such symptoms were "conspicuously absent.,
257
Instead, the authors found that inmates used various defense mechanisms to protect
against the psychological stress of death row; consciously or unconsciously, they
250. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 77 (discussing hedonic adaptation);
Gilbert et al., supra note 132, at 124 (discussing psychological immune system).
251. See supra notes 66-75.
252. Focusing on quantitative, rather than anecdotal or descriptive evidence, Bonta and
Gendreau noted in 1990 that "[viery little evidence is available on how inmates adjust to death
row." James Bonta & Paul Gendreau, Reexamining the Cruel and Unusual Punishment of
Prison Life, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 363 (1990). The existing empirical literature-as
opposed to academic writing generally-has not grown much since. One commentator on the
psychological effects of imprisonment, however, has suggested that where studies focus
overmuch on quantitative measures, "more subtle" information is lost. Craig Haney, Psychology
and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3
PSYC-OL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 532 (1997). Methodology can become a serious issue in such
research, whether concerns are raised over quantitative versus qualitative data, over the
measures used, over the existence or type of control groups, or over the representativeness of the
sample chosen. For instance, Otnow Lewis and colleagues, studying death row inmates' mental
health, noted that their interview sample was chosen because of the imminence of prisoners'
execution date and the desire to find mitigating factors, rather than any apparent
psychopathology on the prisoners' part. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological,
and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 839 (1986). Without further explanation, the researchers suggested that this
approach identified inmates who were "representative of the inmates awaiting execution in this
country." Id.
253. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972).
254. Hedges, supra note 241, at 603.
255. Bluestone & McGahee, supra note 244, at 393.
256. ld.
257. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14
FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 35, 39 (1986). More precisely, the authors noted that "neither [severe
depression nor devastating anxiety] was conspicuous among these doomed 19 persons."
Bluestone & McGahee, supra note 244, at 393.
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exercised some sort of psychological immune system to help them deal with those
rigors. Of course, those mechanisms may have been healthy or unhealthy: some
developed obsessive ruminations, some developed delusions, and others denied their
situation.2 5s Yet others maintained hope for successful appeals, believing that at some
point they would in fact be removed from death row. 259 Such beliefs have been found
in other research as well. Robert Johnson, for instance, noted that "inmates currently
facing a death sentence may operate under the assumption that executions are unlikely;
as a consequence, they may view death row confinement as a temporary phase of their
prison careers.,, 260 In fact, this is far from an unreasonable or unhealthy expectation,
given recent evidence about the rates at which death sentences are overturned.261
A subsequent study in North Carolina used a smaller sample (eight men), but
followed those subjects for a longer period of time, generally at least two years after
admission to death row. 262 The authors conducted intelligence and personality tests
with the inmates, as well as psychiatric interviews and psychological testing. The
authors found that five of the inmates showed no observable deterioration, apparently
adjusting over time; three, however, exhibited psychological dysfunction.263 Inmates
reported less anxiety over time, in some cases reporting a sort of "acceptance" of their
situation. 264 A later study by one of the authors compared personality inventory scores
of thirty-four death row prisoners with those of a large sample of non-death row
prisoners. 265 Death row inmates in that study reported higher levels of hopelessness and
depression, but did not report substantially higher levels of intense dysfunction such as
psychosis.26
258. See George E. Vaillant, Adaptive Mental Mechanisms: Their Role in a Positive
Psychology, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 89, 93 tbl. 1 (2000) (describing adaptive hierarchy of defensive
mechanisms ranging from, for example, projection or psychosis to suppression or humor).
259. Bluestone & McGahee, supra note 244, at 393 (noting inmate who "maintained a
calm conviction that he would ultimately be pardoned"); see also ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG &
JoHN P. CONRAD, Tan DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 257 (1983) ("When questioned, most life
prisoners will tell you that they expect to escape"-presumably through legal or illegal means).
260. Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row
Confinement, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 145 (1979) (citing Peter W. Lewis, Killing the
Killers: A Post-Furman Profile of Florida's Condemned, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 200
(1979)). A subsequent book, Robert Johnson's, Condemned to Die: Life Under Sentence of
Death (1981), is an expanded account of Johnson's 1979 article and the interviews reported
there. See also Julius Debro et al., Death Row Inmates: A Comparison of Georgia and Florida
Profiles, 12 CRIM. JUST. REV. 41, 43 (1987) ("Most of the inmates (95%) did not believe that
they would ever be executed and expressed the view that some nonspecified intervention would
occur in their behalf.").
261. E.g., James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000).
262. Johnnie L. Gallemore & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death
Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167 (1972).
263. Id. at 168.
264. Id. at 170.
265. James H. Panton, Personality Characteristics ofDeath Row Prison Inmates, 32 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 306 (1976).
266. Id.
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Robert Johnson also conducted a number of interviews with death row inmates,
these in Alabama, providing vivid narrative accounts in the prisoners' own words.
26 7
He documented feelings of lack of power, "despair," and "suppressed, directionless
anger, ' ' 68 and prisoners who felt "emotionally drained." 269 In all, Johnson suggested,
these feelings of powerlessness, fear, and emotional emptiness combined to give death
row inmates a feeling of experiencing a "living death.,
270
Other interviews of death row inmates were prompted by observations that such
prisoners often revealed no psychopathology upon admittance to death row, and were
referred only infrequently for psychiatric attention. 27' These observations led
researchers to hypothesize that such inmates had strong psychological defense
mechanisms. 272 Interviewing thirty-four North Carolina death row inmates, Smith and
Felix found denial or suppression to be "highly prevalent" defense mechanisms.
Prisoners often refused to discuss their offenses;273 when they did, several maintained
their innocence, claiming that they were framed, that they were the subject of racial
animus during trial, or that the victim was at fault.274 Seven of thirty-four prisoners
exhibited depression, helpless feelings or hopelessness, or anxiety.27 Only two
prisoners expressed guilt or remorse, one suggesting that because of the guilt he was
experiencing "he did not need additional punishment., 276 The authors did not observe
other unconscious defense mechanisms such as sublimation, repression, or others.
277
In a study of twenty-five Georgia death row inmates, Debro, et al. also failed to find
severe psychological dysfunction. 278 Inmates in their study had a "general sense of
well-being" and "slept well every night. '279 The authors attributed this well-being to
the observed absence of executions in the previous twenty years, and the fact that no
execution date had been set while the interview sample had been on death row; but
267. Robert Johnson, Life Under Sentence of Death, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT
129 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982); Johnson, supra note 260.
268. Johnson, supra note 260, at 178. Reflecting the hedonic adaptation discussion
here, Johnson noted that such anger may in fact "represent the principal sign of psychological
survival and emotional life on death row." Id.
269. Id. at 180.
270. Id. at 155 fig. 1; ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED To DIE 99-118 (1981).
271. See Charles E. Smith & Richard Reid Felix, Beyond Deterrence: A Study of
Defenses on Death Row, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1986, at 55.
272. Id.
273. Of course, as the authors noted, a prisoner can do himself a substantial disservice
by discussing aspects of his crime in detail while his conviction or sentence is on appeal. Id. at
58-59. In turn, this understandable reticence may "facilitate the development and hardening of
internal defense mechanisms." Id. at 59.
274. Id. at 58. This is not an unusual response; Debro et al. found that a majority of
their respondents claimed they were innocent, did not receive a fair trial, or were the subject of
racial discrimination. Debro et al., supra note 260, at 42-43.
275. Smith & Felix, supra note 271, at 56.
276. Id. at 58. Similarly, in Debro et al.'s study, only two of twenty-five expressed
remorse for the victim or the victim's family. Debro et al., supra note 260, at 42.
277. See Smith & Felix, supra note 271, at 58.
278. Debro et al., supra note 260.
279. Id. at 43.
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they also suggested that inmates may have resolved their "grief' during their time on
death row.28 °
In apparent contrast, Craig Haney's extensive work on "supermax" confinement
suggests quite real and substantial psychological dysfunction among prisoners
undergoing long periods of solitary or supermax confinement. 28 ' Although not
explicitly examining death row prisoners, Haney has studied inmates held for long
periods under "super maximum" prison conditions, conditions often similar to death
row.282 Studying inmates at California's Pelican Bay supermax unit, Haney found not
only prevalent psychological trauma such as depression, anxiety, and other indications
of "misery"-negative psychological effects that most prisoners, whether or not on
death row, suffer 283 -- but also arguably more severe psychopathologies such as violent
fantasies, "overall deterioration," social withdrawal, and chronic depression.284 On the
one hand, this research shows the very real negative consequences of death row-like
conditions on inmates' mental health. On the other hand, however, such research may
undercut Lackey-type claims by demonstrating that such problems are not unique to
death row. In fact, any inmates undergoing supermax confinement may be subject to
the effects that Haney documents.
285
Another study focusing on condemned prisoners' mental health (though not directly
addressing the "death row phenomenon") did find substantial evidence of chronic
psychoses in six of fifteen subjects studied, with three additional inmates displaying
episodic psychosis.8 6 After reviewing the prisoners' histories, however, the authors
noted that the psychotic symptoms apparently predated the prisoners' offenses, and
"thus probably were not the result of incarceration." 287 Interviews by these researchers
of fourteen juveniles on death row yielded similar results. All demonstrated
pathological psychiatric symptoms. 28 8 Seven of the fourteen were psychotic at
evaluation or had previously been so diagnosed; four had histories consistent with
mood disorders, and the other three exhibited period psychosis. Half of the fourteen
inmates interviewed first manifested psychiatric disturbances in early or middle
childhood.289
280. Id.
281. E.g., Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax"
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124 (2003).
282. Id.; Haney, supra note 252.
283. Norman L. Greene et al., Dying Twice: Incarceration on Death Row, 31 CAP. U. L.
REv. 853, 868-70 (2003) (remarks of Craig Haney).
284. Haney, supra note 281, at 133-34 tbls. 1 & 2.
285. Cf. Paul von Zielbauer, Report on State Prisons Cites Inmates' Mental Illness,
N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 22, 2003, at B 1 (reporting on study by the Correctional Association of New
York suggesting that 25% of New York inmates kept in punitive segregation "are mentally ill").
286. See Otnow Lewis et al., supra note 252, at 840. Again, these inmates were not
studied because of any previously observed psychopathology, but rather based on scheduled
execution dates and efforts to find mitigating factors. Id. at 839.
287. See Otnow Lewis et al., supra note 252, at 841 (emphasis added).
288. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational and Family
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 584, 585 (1988); id. at 587 tbl. 3.
289. Id. at 585.
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Why are intuitions about the horror of life on death row not borne out more strongly
by the existing data? One researcher pointed to the importance of family or social
support in maintaining prisoners' mental health, but also pointed out how often such
support is lacking in this population. 29 0 Another notes the important distinction
between a general "misery" (as defined above) and even more serious psychological
dysfunction.291 But another tentative explanation is the hedonic adaptation described in
the affective forecasting literature, the very process that people often neglect when
evaluating their own and others' psychological reactions to emotional events. Johnson,
despite arguing forcefully for the common death row reaction of hopelessness and
helplessness, noted that "[a]daptation in this unstable world is possible .... In the final
analysis, [death row inmates] exercise what may amount to a kind of existential
detachment."'292 Indeed, in an unconscious echo of the Brickman study, 93 one staunch
abolitionist noted that death row inmates adapt to their situation and "communicate
with each other by shouts, notes, and hand-held mirrors, all with a casual dexterity that
handicapped people acquire over time.''294 In their review of the research extant as of
1990, Bonta and Gendreau suggested that these "limited data are a testimony to the
ability of men to cope with the worst of consequences. 2 95 Obviously, more research is
crucial in resolving whether such adaptation may occur on death row, and, if so, what it
might suggest for Lackey claims. What the research does suggest so far is that delay
before execution does not necessarily lead to psychological dysfunction. It is essential,
as with most research on such functioning, to consider the interaction between the
individual in question and the situation in which he finds himself.
296
Note that these points are also relevant to the claims of some abolitionists that life
on death row is so unpleasant that it is in fact a more appropriate and severe
punishment than execution. That is, some subscribe to the idea that murderers should
be kept alive so that they can reflect on their actions for the rest of their lives.
290. Johnson, supra note 260, at 159-61 (describing substantial value to death row
inmates of family visits); id. at 147 (noting typical absence of such support).
291. See Greene et al., supra note 283, at 868-70 (remarks of Craig Haney).
292. Johnson, supra note 260, at 170.
293. Brickman et al., supra note 65.
294. David Bruck, Condemned to Death: The Capital Punishment Lottery, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18 (emphasis added). The analogy to the handicapped-or, as is
sometimes made, to the terminally ill-may be imperfect. See Johnson, supra note 260, at 145-
47. As Johnson points out, terminally ill patients may have more social and institutional support
than do death row inmates. Id. at 147. But see id. at 159-61 (describing importance of, and
support from, spousal visits). One commentator suggested, however, that the comparison may be
apt, noting that a "hospital death [may be] no more barren of pain or of undignified details" than
is an execution. VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 259, at 16.
295. Bonta & Gendreau, supra note 252, at 364; see also Haney, supra note 281, at 138
("[I]n the course of adjusting and adapting to the painful and distressing conditions of
[supermax] confinement, many prisoners will strive to essentially 'get used to it,' adapting and
accommodating to make their day-to-day misery seem more manageable"); supra notes 77-78
and accompanying text.
296. Bonta & Gendreau, supra note 252, at 364-65 (stating that "interactions between
certain types of individual differences and situational components explained a meaningful
percentage of the variance" in psychological dysfunction).
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However, finding strong defense mechanisms29 7 and, possibly, other hedonic
adaptation, suggests that execution might in fact be a more severe punishment than
either death row or life imprisonment without parole. 298 Though it does not resolve the
question, a final set of data in this regard comes from a study of a sample of 115 North
299Carolina death row inmates whose sentences had been commuted to life in prison.
This study showed that almost half (42%) of the inmates in the sample showed no
change in psychological functioning as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI). 3°° Twice as many prisoners "improved"
psychologically on that measure as "deteriorated" (eighteen versus nine), after having
been moved from death row to life imprisonment.
30 1
The fact that our intuitions about life on death row are not borne out by the data also
reflects findings from the affective forecasting literature. Thus, the second relevant
connection between that literature and the death row phenomenon also reflects the need
for better data. Few who write about the issue have first-hand knowledge or experience
of life on death row. As outlined above, the affective forecasting literature shows the
potential for discrepancies between predictions of our own reactions and those of
others. Thus, we are likely to make inaccurate evaluations of what life on death row
"must be like." Despite our intuitions about the horrors of life on death row, and
despite the ease with which terms like "psychological torture" can be used, it is crucial
to obtain data on the issue so that our evaluations of such life are accurate.
Again, let me be explicit. I do not suggest that death row is pleasant, or that hedonic
adaptation means that inmates somehow begin to enjoy their confinement. Physical
problems such as crowding, poor food, lack of physical exercise, and others, 0 2 all
serve to exacerbate psychological problems. Further, psychological and physical abuse
by guards certainly leads to problems, may be grounds for § 1983 claims, and should
be stopped. 30 3 But it is clear that few data exist on death row prisoners' psychology and
297. See, e.g., Smith & Felix, supra note 27 1.
298. Cf People ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 133 N.Y. 179, 182 (1909) (comparing execution
to life imprisonment and noting that "[i]t is the common judgment of man that to deprive the
criminal of his life is the greatest punishment known to modem times"); id. at 183 ("punishment
which leaves life is less than that which ends it").
299. W. Grant Dahlstrom et al., Utility of the Megargee-Bohn MMPI Typological
Assignments: Study with a Sample of Death Row Inmates, 13 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5 (1986). In
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that North
Carolina's mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder was unconstitutional.
300. Dahlstrom et al., supra note 299, at 14 tbl. 1.
301. Id. at 15. "Improvement" or "deterioration" involved a shift between typological
categories of psychological functioning. The authors qualified the finding, though, pointing out
that such shifts between categories are not uncommon and that some shifts took place between
relatively similar typologies. Id. at 12-14.
302.Ward, supra note 257, at 38-39 ("Death row residents typically experience a lack
of exercise, poor diet, close quarters, social isolation, no educational or work programs, strained
family relations, and family visits which are infrequent and burdened with security restrictions.
These conditions are sufficiently different from those in the general prison population to warrant
civil rights litigation challenging prison conditions peculiar to death row.") (footnote omitted).
303. See Bonta & Gendreau, supra note 252, at 361 ("When inmates are dealt with
capriciously by management or individual custodial officers, psychological stress can be created
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their adaptability, and this approach may be a useful opportunity to address that dearth.
Simply having a court or commentator (or Camus) say that prisoners suffer
"psychological torture" does not make it so. Indeed, that is in part what the affective
forecasting literature shows, that our intuitions about our own and others' emotional
reactions and experiences are not always correct. Equally, of course, simply alluding to
the hedonic adaptation phenomenon does not mean that we can ignore physical
problems and psychological dysfunction on death row when they occur. What the data
that do exist suggest is that courts should not simply say that the death environment
itself is per se "psychological torture," or that it will invariably lead to some sort of
psychological dysfunction. 304 These are far from being "immutable characteristic [s]" of
life on death row.
305
Indeed, this is what Justice Stevens emphasized in his Lackey dissent, the
importance of obtaining helpful data.3° In his view, such data would come from the
analyses of lower state and federal courts.307 Given the importance of, and the
controversy over, this topic, I would also suggest more empirical research into the
experience of prisoners on death row.
308
3. Judgments Regarding Sexual Harassment
The previous sections outlined some applications of the affective forecasting
literature to civil damage awards and to judgments of "death-worthiness." The findings
are also relevant, however, in the narrower context of culpability, particularly in the
area of certain sexual harassment judgments, such as whether a company should be
excused from liability because an alleged victim did not make use of some grievance
procedure that the company provides.
For instance, a plaintiffs delay in reporting harassment sometimes leads to a
judgment that her delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, or even that no
even in the most humane of prison environments."); Johnson, supra note 260, at 163-70
(detailing tensions between prisoners and guards).
304. Cf. Haney, supra note 281, at 132 ("[B]etter-run and relatively more benign
supermax prisons will produce comparatively fewer.. . negative psychological effects, and the
worse run facilities will produce comparatively more.").
305. Hedges, supra note 241, at 603.
306. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) ("Petitioner's claim, with its legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching
consequences, seems an ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study.").
307. Id. (encouraging "state and federal courts to serve as laboratories in which the
issue receives further study before it is addressed by [the Supreme] Court") (citation and
quotation marks omitted). The focus on "data" that come from courts is similar to a statement by
Justice Blackmun in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(noting that an "empirical judgment... necessarily is a provisional one.... If it should emerge
from experience that ...the good faith exception results in a material change in police
compliance ... [then] we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a
decision that rests on untested predictions... demands no less.") (emphasis added).
308. Comparisons with matched inmates sentenced to life imprisonment could only aid
such analysis. Cf. Otnow Lewis et al., supra note 252, at 839 (noting desirability of studying "a
group of murderers found guilty of similar crimes but not condemned to death"); id. at 844
(noting question "whether death row inmates differ clinically or in other ways from similarly
violent individuals who receive less harsh sentences").
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harassment occurred. In some circumstances, such a finding may qualify as a defense
to vicarious liability for an employer.3 09 Specifically, this Faragher affirmative defense
is available where an employer has taken no tangible employment action, and has
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior." 310 Successfully pleading such an affirmative defense will lead to a grant of
summary judgment in the defendant's favor. 31 A plaintiff may thus be unsuccessful
because of the court's perception that she unreasonably failed to take advantage of
complaint procedures or other provisions in a company's established antiharassment
policy.
3 12
This perception, however (and the ensuing judgment that as a matter of law
harassment did not occur) may be based on a failure to consider alternative reasons
why women might not make use of such procedures when they are afforded. 313 Thus,
conventional understandings of how someone subjected to alleged harassment "should"
or "would" react often form the basis for the ensuing legal judgments about the merits
of that person's allegations.314 This is so for public opinion as well; commentators
often point to the Anita Hill hearings to illustrate how the public treats questions about
the responses of women subjected to harassing behavior.
How does this connect with the affective forecasting literature? in a perceptive
study, Professors Woodzicka and LaFrance compared women's predictions of how
they would respond to sexual harassment during an interview with women's actual• •316
emotions and behaviors when they experienced that harassment. First, women were
asked to imagine their emotional and behavioral responses to a hypothetical job
interview at which a male interviewer asked improper, allegedly sexually harassing
questions. 317 Approximately two-thirds of the women in the study (Study 1) reported
309. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
310. Id. at 807-08.
311. Cf. Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 331 (2001) (noting that many Title VII cases, not only ones
involving vicarious liability, are resolved on summary judgment).
312. Beiner, supra note 311, at 286-88 (reviewing cases).
313. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 51-52 & nn. 291-301
(2003) (reviewing such alternative reasons, such as retaliation, ostracization, or self-blame);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment-Normative, Descriptive,
and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LrrrLE
ROCKL. REV. 169, 191-92 (2001) (reviewing such alternative reasons, such as humiliation or
fear of retaliation); cf Deborah L. Rhode, Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1461
(1992) (suggesting that "the failure to complain is often taken as evidence that the abusive
conduct didn't happen").
314. E.g., Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2001)
("As a matter of law. .. [a]reasonable woman experiencing the type of harassment complained
of... would not have felt compelled to resign.").
315. See Beiner, supra note 311, at 273-75.
316. Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender
Harassment, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 15 (2001).
317. Id. at 20-21. The questions were as follows: "(1) Do you have aboyfriend? (2) Do
people find you desirable? (3) Do you think it is important for women to wear bras to work?" Id.
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that they would confront the interviewer as to the impropriety of his questions (62%).
Approximately two-thirds of the women reported that they would refuse to answer at
least one question (68%).318About a quarter of respondents (27%) said that they would
feel angry in response to the questions; only 2% imagined feeling afraid as a result.
319
The authors then conducted a second study in which fifty women in fact
experienced a research assistant job interview involving such improper questions,
interspersed with thirteen more standard questions (e.g., "What do you like about
research?" and "What jobs or volunteer experience have you had?"). 320 These
women's emotional and behavioral reactions were compared to those predicted by the
respondents from Study 1.
In hindsight, the study's results will not be surprising. None of the fifty women in
Study 2 refused to answer; none reported the question to the interviewer's supervisor;
none left the interview; none responded that such a question was not the interviewer's
• 321
business. Most of the women simply responded to the questions. More directly
relevant for present purposes, 40% of respondents reported feeling some level of fear
(compared to 2% of predictors), while only 16% reported feeling angry (compared to
The authors actually did not examine whether the questions asked satisfied a legal definition of
harassment. Rather, in pre-testing questions the authors asked a pilot sample (thirty-nine
women) to rate the degree to which they perceived the question as sexual harassing and the
degree to which they perceived the question simply as surprising to find in ajob interview). Id.
at 22.
In fact, it is not clear that the questions legally qualified as sexual harassment. Certainly,
federal law (Title VII) prohibits discrimination based on gender, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e-2) (2000 &
Supp I. 2004), and sexual harassment is a form of such sex discrimination. Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Under Meritor, "a plaintiff may establish a violation
of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment." Id. at 66. Such harassment must be so "severe or pervasive" as to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment. Id. at 67. The case law is not clear whether such
interview questions alone may constitute such severe or pervasive harassment that it creates the
necessary "hostile working environment." Compare Shaver v. Dixie Trucking Co., No. 97-1954,
1999 WL 321388 (4th Cir. May 21, 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant,
agreeing that supervisor's placing his hand on plaintiffs knee during job interview, along with
other "obviously unpleasant" and "inappropriate" conduct such as hugs, did not rise to the
"severe or pervasive" level), with Cuesta v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 805 F. Supp. 451,
458 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (awarding nominal damages to plaintiff and attributing knowledge to
parole board for supervisor's harassing conduct, where supervisor "routinely asked
inappropriate questions during interviews").
Resolving this substantive issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Moreover, none of this should be construed as invalidating the authors' more general point:
substantial discrepancies exist between hypothetical and actual reactions to potentially illegal or
improper interview questions.
318. Woodzicka & LaFrance, supra note 316, at 21.
319. Id. at 21.
320. id. at 22. In another condition, three "control" questions were interspersed with the
thirteen standard questions: "(1) Do you have a best friend? (2) Do people find you morbid? (3)
Do you think it is important for people to believe in G[-]d?"). Id. Note that the third control
question could itself be inappropriate under Title VII, because of the potential to discriminate on
the basis of religion.
321. Id. at 25 tbl. 1.
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27% of predictors). 322 Clearly, those imagining such an interview were unable to
accurately predict the emotional reactions of those actually participating in it.
Judgments by judges or juries about the reasonableness of a sexual harassment
plaintiffs perception of the allegedly harassing activity,323 or about the reasonableness
of her reactions, are crucial in evaluating the validity of such allegations. "Perhaps if
juries and jurists better understood the intimidation created by sexual harassment, they
might be less likely to blame women who do not respond directly to the harasser.
325
4. Litigants' Emotional Expectations
Finally, the affective forecasting literature may be relevant to whether parties enter
into the courtroom at all, though the phenomenon may have contradictory implications.
That is, inaccurate predictions may in some contexts lead to an increased probability of
litigation, but in other contexts may lead to fewer decisions to litigate.
In particular, commentators have recently begun to note the absence of emotions in
current models explaining parties' decisions to litigate, and the important role
emotional factors actually play in such decisions. 32 6 These scholars document the role
of emotion in influencing or even determining litigation and settlement behavior. Ward
Farnsworth, for instance, has identified the profound impact of litigants' emotions on
their decisions whether to bargain efficiently after a court decision is reached.
327
Specifically, Professor Farnsworth reviewed twenty nuisance cases that had proceeded
to judgment. Traditional law and economics doctrine-the Coase Theorem-suggests
that in at least some of these cases, the parties should bargain around the court's ruling
in order to allocate the relevant entitlement most efficiently. In not one of these twenty
cases, however, did parties bargain. 32 Professor Farnsworth interviewed their
attorneys to find out why. According to counsel, such non-Coasian behavior stemmed
primarily from "bad blood" between the parties;329 the litigants simply disliked each
other so much that they refused to deal with each other after the judgment.
330
322. Id. at 21, 25.
323. Blumenthal, A Meta-Analytic Review, supra note 210; Patricia A. Frazier et al.,
Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. IssuEs 21 (1995);
Maria Rotundo et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual
Harassment, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 914 (2001); Richard L. Weiner & Linda E. Hurt, An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Social Sexual Conduct at Work, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 556 (1999).
324. Beiner, supra note 311.
325. Woodzicka & LaFrance, supra note 316, at 26.
326. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. Ci. L. REv. 373 (1999); Guthrie, Regret Aversion, supra
note 44; Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L. REv. L.
& ECON. 31 (1992).
327. Farnsworth, supra note 326.
328. Id. at 384.
329. Id. at 388, 407,430, 436.
330. Id. at 384 ("[Iun almost every case the lawyers said that acrimony between the
parties was an important obstacle to bargaining.").
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Similarly, Huang and Wu have demonstrated through econometric modeling how
emotion can drive parties to litigate. 331 They show that anger or pride may lead to
increased frequencies of trials, depending in part on parties' beliefs and expectations
about the other party's behavior, beliefs, and emotions. For instance, a defendant
expecting a plaintiff not to file a particular suit who is then presented with a suit
(especially a suit solely designed to extract a settlement), may be "enrage[d]" by the
plaintiff's actions, and in "a fit of anger, such a defendant would go to trial in order to
'see that justice is done.' 332 Conversely, a plaintiff "outraged by an unexpected tort
would bring suit even when that suit has negative expected wealth value," but she
"would not bring suit if that tort had been expected. ' 333 More broadly, they suggest that
emotional factors involving beliefs and expectations about other parties may lead to an
increased level of litigation, in part to vindicate a party's own emotional states.
Frank Cross has made analogous points, pointing to "irrational" litigants' desires for
vengeance and vindication of reputation, as well as other "highly emotional issues," as
noneconomic grounds for the pursuit of litigation that will probably prove financially
unrewarding. 334 Robert Solomon similarly suggests that "the presence of anger,
resentment, and vindictiveness is the motivating force behind the persistence, the
obstinacy, the economic irrationality, and the ruinousness of a great many lawsuits."
335
Finally, others have pointed to the desire of many litigants to have their "day in court,"
seeking the satisfaction of presenting their side of the story regardless of the trial's
outcome.
336
In each of these examples, overestimates of the satisfaction or emotional vindication
to be derived from litigation may lead parties to trial when they otherwise "should"
either settle or not even initiate litigation. Even paying heed to "irrational" plaintiffs'
desire to seek emotional, rather than monetary, recompense at trial, plaintiffs may
simply be incorrect about the amount of satisfaction they will derive.
Some indication of this is apparent in research conducted by Randall Bezanson and
colleagues on actual plaintiffs bringing defamation suitS. 337 As part of a larger research
project, Professor Bezanson noted the importance for libel plaintiffs of noneconomic
331 Huang & Wu, supra note 326, at 36.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 39.
334. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-22
(2000) (reviewing emotional and other noneconomic grounds for "irrational" pursuit of
litigation).
335. Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of
Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 123, 135 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
336. Cross, supra note 334, at 19 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 89, 99 (The "most frequently cited objective of
lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to 'tell my side of the story ....')); Roy D.
Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 63 (1985) (noting that even when
settling a lawsuit would he more favorable than a trial outcome, plaintiffs may want to feel that
they have had their "day in court").
337. Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REv. 789 (1986). A more extended discussion of the research appears
in RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS (1987).
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motives to sue, such as restoring reputation and vengeance. 338 Although a substantial
majority of plaintiffs lost in court, about 50% of losing plaintiffs nevertheless felt that
the lawsuit had accomplished one of those goals.339 But despite such feelings, fully
two-thirds of plaintiffs expressed "dissatisfaction" or "extreme dissatisfaction" with
their experience with the libel suit. 34 0 Thus, although the majority of plaintiffs brought
their libel suit to obtain non-economic relief, and reported a sense of having achieved
such relief, most plaintiffs nevertheless reported feelings emotionally dissatisfied with
their experience. Many were frustrated with their experience with the judicial system,
and almost 10% were "angry and bitter" about it.341 In the words of the article title,
"what plaintiffs wanted" was quite distinct from "what they got."
These data are limited and my comments here are clearly inferential. Evidence that
plaintiffs who won their suits nevertheless expressed dissatisfaction with their
experience and/or did not achieve what they had hoped would be far clearer evidence
for my assertions; however, the authors did not provide specific data on the winners.
As a more general point, though, it seems that when plaintiffs expect to recover
emotional satisfaction instead of or in addition to money, they may be wrong. If that is
so, then potential plaintiffs' mispredictions of their emotional reactions to winning a
lawsuit may lead to overlitigating such suits.
On the other hand, there is also the possibility of underlitigation. Especially relevant
here is the recent "Regret Aversion Theory" of litigation proposed by Chris Guthrie.
342
Professor Guthrie suggests that contrary to traditional law and economics models,
emotions play an important part in litigation decisions. In particular, people make
choices so as to minimize the unpleasant feeling of regret over having missed what they
might perceive as a better outcome. Professor Guthrie suggests that people anticipate
the possibility of feeling regret, and make choices about their conduct that will reduce
or preclude the possibility. Specifically, potential litigants anticipate the possibility of
feeling postlitigation regret, and thus try to minimize that possibility.343 Because
litigants who settle before a trial decision do not learn what they would have recovered
at trial, whereas those who reject settlement do, Professor Guthrie's "Regret Aversion
Theory posits that litigants will choose settlement over trial to avoid feelings of regret
associated with learning after trial that they should have settled.'
Professor Guthrie tested this hypothesis in two empirical studies, providing study
participants with scenarios describing hypothetical actors who had to decide whether to
bring a lawsuit. One potential plaintiff made her choice in a "traditional" jurisdiction,
338. Bezanson, supra note 337, at 791. Approximately 29% of plaintiffs sought
vengeance against, or punishment of, the media; 30% sought to restore their reputation.
BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 336, at 261. Another 19% of plaintiffs sought to stop further
publication of the libelous material; approximately 22% sought monetary damages. Id.
339. Approximately 41% of losing plaintiffs felt that their reputation had been defended
by bringing the suit; approximately 10% felt that the lawsuit had punished the media. BEZANSON
ET AL., supra note 337, at 261.
340. Approximately 34% of plaintiffs felt "dissatisfied;" approximately 31% felt
"extremely dissatisfied." Id. at 262.
341. Bezanson, supra note 337, at 795 tbl.2.
342. E.g., Guthrie, Regret Aversion, supra note 44, at 45.
343. Id. at 72-73.
344. Id. at 73.
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where "the litigant will not learn what would have happened at trial if she settles the
case." 345 The other made her choice whether to sue in a "regret jurisdiction," in which
"the judge is required, upon learning that the parties have reached an out-of-court
settlement, to inform the parties of what he would have awarded." 346 In that
jurisdiction, therefore, the litigant learns what would have happened at trial if she had
settled the case. Professor Guthrie predicted that litigants pursuing their cases in a
traditional jurisdiction would be more inclined to settle than those litigating in a regret
jurisdiction, because settling would avoid the possibility of regret posttrial.347 Results
supported his predictions. In both studies, participants overwhelmingly predicted that
the individual in the "traditional" jurisdiction would be more likely to settle, in order to
avoid experiencing regret.
348
The connection to the affective forecasting literature is clear. If, all else being equal,
litigation decisions rely on anticipated regret, then inaccuracies in making such
predictions may lead some people to avoid litigation that will in fact not make them
feel as negative as they expect. Professor Guthrie notes this problem of inaccurate
predictions, citing some of the literature discussed here, but does not discuss it at
length. 349 He does, however, make points consonant with the discussion of "hedonic
adaptation" and the "psychological immune system."350 Specifically, he suggests that
even if litigants do make accurate predictions, counsel should emphasize that clients'
regret may "dissipate, change, and hopefully even disappear in time." 351 Attorneys
should remind clients who hesitate because of anticipated regret that they possess "the
psychological wherewithal to dampen regretful feelings associated with an unfortunate
litigation decision."
352
Professor Guthrie acknowledges methodological limitations on his study such as
external validity issues, 35 3 but contends that his study is nevertheless an example of
"the most reliable means of establishing the impact of a given variable on behavior,"
and that its results "provide[] ample support for the Regret Aversion Theory." 35 4 He
does not discuss one limitation, however, that is relevant to the affective forecasting
discussion: his design involved perceivers predicting hypothetical litigants' actions,
rather than mock (or actual) litigants deciding whether to litigate or settle under the
345. Id.
346. Id. at 73-74.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 75, 78-79.
349. Id at 85-86 ("[I]ndividuals are notoriously bad at predicting how they will feel in
the future.") (citing Kahneman, supra note 55, at 121-22, and Brickman et al., supra note 65, at
926).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 86.
352. Id. at 86-87.
353. Id. at 80. Another "limitation" he acknowledges, the use of a within-subjects
design, need not necessarily be thought of as such; under certain circumstances it can be entirely
appropriate. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 14, at 12 n.81 (discussing pros and cons of within-
subject designs).
354. Guthrie, Regret Aversion, supra note 44, at 81.
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potentially regret-inducing circumstances.3 5 5 Although this discrepancy limits the
direct claims to be made about the Regret Aversion Theory, it is hardly fatal to the
theory itself. Moreover, it emphasizes the tension discussed throughout this Article
between predictions of another's behavior based on perceived reactions to future
emotional stimuli, and that actor's actual behavior in response to such stimuli. It also
highlights additional empirical research to be done on the theory, and the close
connection that can be made between the theory and the affective forecasting literature
discussed here.
Recent experimental evidence lends support to the idea that individuals
overestimate the amount of regret they themselves will feel in response to a variety of
events. 356 If people do, in fact, overestimate the amount of regret they would feel after
losing a case, and thus settle the case rather than risk feeling the regret, then people
may be avoiding litigation they otherwise "should" engage in and settling cases that
they "should" bring to trial. Obviously, such prescriptive claims based on the amount
of regret actually felt ignore other aspects that might lead to settling or litigating, not
least the strength of the case and other "risk" factors such as the amount of money at
stake. But all else being equal, where litigation or settlement decisions are based on a
predicted amount of regret, those decisions may be objectively inaccurate and more
cases may be settled on that basis than otherwise should.
This discussion highlights what many of these researchers have noted: any analysis
of litigation decisions that rests solely on economic criteria may be impoverished.
Incorporating emotions into such analysis, however, leads to apparently divergent
results.35 7 Further empirical research into the decisionmaking of both mock and actual
litigants will help tease apart the role of emotions in such decisions.
B. Applications Outside the Courtroom
Each of the examples illustrated above largely underappreciated implications of
affective forecasting research for the trial context. Courts and commentators have been
more likely to note at least the possibility of inaccurate predictions of future emotions
in contexts outside the courtroom, in particular, in health law and biomedical contexts.
Indeed, in spheres such as surrogate parenting, this recognition has already had clear
consequences for the substantive law.3 5 8 In this Part, I document the relevance of the
affective forecasting literature to a number of these areas. I divide the discussion into
start-of-life topics (e.g., surrogate parenting), end-of-life topics (e.g., euthanasia), and
mid-life topics (e.g., informed consent). Each of these areas, of course, involves
substantial, at times rancorous, policy debate and discussion. My goal here is not to
enter into the voluminous substantive debate, but rather to highlight the relevance of
355. Id. at 73 ("[S]ubjects read about two litigants who must choose to settle or go
forward with trial.... [And] were asked to indicate which of the two litigants would be most
likely to settle.").
356. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking Forward to Looking Backward: The
Misprediction of Regret, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 346 (2004).
357. See Huang & Wu, supra note 326, at 41 (noting that anger and pride may lead to
increased frequency of litigation, but fear, anxiety, and similar emotions may lead to decreased
frequency).
358. See infra notes 365-67.
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the affective forecasting literature. Still, I do draw some preliminary conclusions, and




An early example of the relevance of affective forecasting errors and the difficulty
of identifying "true" preferences was raised in the study of women's preferences for
anesthesia before, during, and after labor and delivery. 361 In other start-of-life contexts,
however, such as surrogate mothering and frozen embryos, the affective forecasting
data have important consequences as well.
a. Surrogate Mothering
The fact that individuals fail to accurately predict their future emotions, and thus
may change their minds, has been recognized as highly relevant to the enforceability of
surrogate mothering contracts. As with the euthanasia debate discussed below, the
affective forecasting data lend empirical support to those stressing the legal
implications of changed minds. As with other topics, however, this possibility may cut
both for and against enforceability, a nuance that courts and commentators have not yet
recognized.
The background of the debate over surrogate parenting contracts is well known.
Briefly, some states prohibit the enforcement of such agreements outright,36 2 while
others prohibit them when they involve monetary compensation to the surrogate.
363
Where surrogacy contracts are not prohibited, courts tasked with deciding the
enforceability of such contracts have disagreed. Following the New Jersey Supreme
Court's In re Baby M. decision,36 4 emphasis is often placed on whether the contract
allows the surrogate mother to reverse her decision about relinquishing the baby upon
birth.
Specifically, the possibility that a surrogate mother might change her mind based on
the unpredicted emotions involved with pregnancy and giving birth plays an important
role in whether a surrogate parenting contract will be enforceable. For instance,
concern may exist that a woman will underestimate the emotional bond that develops
as she carries a child. Such concern has led to some state statutes providing that only a
359. See also infra Part III.
360. I use this term as a convenient categorization, with no political implications
intended.
361. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96.
362. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2002) ("A surrogate parentage
contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05
(2004) ("Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish that
woman's rights and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void.").
363. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1998) (same, where agreement
"would compensate a woman for her artificial insemination and subsequent termination of
parental rights to a child born as a result of that artificial insemination."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9:2713 (West 1991) (Where surrogate agrees to carry fetus and relinquish child for any
"valuable consideration," agreement is "void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.").
364. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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woman who has previously given birth may enter into a surrogacy contract.36 5 Other
states have reached this result through their courts. 366 More general concern about
emotions led some states to require an "evaluation" of a woman's ability to adjust to
the terms of such a contract, meaning, presumably, the requirement that she relinquish
the baby to the intended parents.
367
The link to affective forecasting is clear. Recognizing that a surrogate mother may
not realize the strength of the emotional bond that will grow between her and the child
she will carry, connects closely with the data showing that people often inaccurately
predict the strength of their emotional reactions to future events. On one approach,
recognizing that emotions might change justifies (to some) the characterization of such
a change as changed circumstances that should void a contract. From another view, the
failure to fully predict or understand one's future emotions vitiates the fully informed
consent necessary to the formation of a valid contract. 36 8 In either event, because
emotions are uncontrollable, courts and commentators suggest that the potential that
emotions will be mispredicted and a surrogate mother will change her mind about her
agreement to relinquish a baby should not prohibit her from doing so.3 69 Thus, some
courts will not enforce a surrogacy contract that does not provide for the possibility
that the surrogate will change her mind.
Commentators have pointed out, however, that such an emotional change may in
fact be foreseeable. The affective forecasting literature does demonstrate that it might
occur. Moreover, changed emotions are probably more foreseeable to a woman who
365. N.H. REV. STAT. ANaN. § 168-B: 17(V) (2000) ("No woman may be a surrogate,
unless she has a documented history of at least one pregnancy and viable delivery."); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(B)(6) (Michie 2004) (requiring that the prospective surrogate "is married and
has had at least one pregnancy, and has experienced at least one live birth"); see also NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 6(b)(6) (1998) (requiring that prospective surrogate have had "at
least one pregnancy and delivery").
366. E.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998) (stating one factor that
might be important in deciding the enforceability of surrogacy agreement is a requirement that
the surrogate "have had at least one successful pregnancy").
367. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B: 18(11)(b) (2000) (prospective surrogate mother
must have nonmedical evaluation assessing her ability "to adjust to and assume the inherent
risks of the contract").
368. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1248 ("Under the contract, the natural mother is
irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's
birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed .. "). But cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Baby
M and the Problem of Unstable Preferences, 76 GEo. L.J. 1829, 1831 (1988) ("Both sides of the
bargain had full information about the nature of the transaction .... ").
369. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 7, 13.(1988) ("Understandably, the gestational mother's feelings may
change once she has nurtured the fetus, given birth to a human being whom she recognizes as
part of herself and then holds, cares for, and comes to love."); Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case
of Baby M, THE NATION, May 23, 1987, at 685 (In "areas of profound feeling, you cannot
promise because you cannot know, and pretending otherwise would result in far more misery
than allowing people to cut their losses.") (quoted in Coleman, supra note 156, at 99).
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has previously given birth,370 the very class of women to which some courts and
legislatures restrict the pool of potential surrogates.371 If so, under traditional contract
doctrine, such a foreseeable change in circumstances may not excuse performance.
372
Indeed, foreseeing the possibility of emotional change might simply lead a potential
surrogate mother to raise the price for her participation, compensating her for binding
herself despite potential changed emotions.
Under this approach, factors that might be considered in assessing the enforceability
of such a contract include the parties' relative information and the likelihood of
"changed circumstances." With regard to each, the burden of such risks would seem to
be better placed on the potential surrogate who is, presumably, better "in touch" with
her emotions and more able to foresee emotional changes. 37 3 If a woman is
uncomfortable incorporating such risks into a contract, a market approach suggests,
then she simply need not become a party: "[p]ersons who believe that feelings about
parenthood are too hard to predict need not enter binding agreements. "
374
But this market approach is incomplete precisely because of the issues involved
with affective forecasting. Although it takes into account the fact that emotions may
change, it does not consider the fact the predictions of those future emotions may easily
be inaccurate, which is the thrust of the affective forecasting research. The question is
thus not upon whom to place the risk of changed emotions, but why such change
should not constitute changed circumstances. The affective forecasting data also
demonstrate problems from an efficiency standpoint. Even if we foresee emotional
"volatility" and thus incorporate additional costs into a contract to cover for it, our
predictions of how different those emotions will be will probably be inaccurate. If so,
the added costs may reflect this overestimate, thus rendering the contract inefficient.
370. Seidman, supra note 368, at 1831 ("[A]s an experienced mother, [the surrogate]
presumably knew about the bonding that occurs between mother and infant .). One New
Jersey court, citing In re Baby M., recognized this as follows:
In this case, [the gestational mother] has previously had one child and
therefore had an understanding of what is involved in carrying a
pregnancy to term at the time she signed the contract. The problem case
will present itself when a gestational mother changes her mind and wishes
to keep the newborn. This may be more likely where a gestational mother
has never had a child and is unfamiliar with the emotions and biological
changes involved in a pregnancy. She will not be able to predict what her
feelings will be towards the child she bears.
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948,953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
371. See supra notes 365-66.
372. Shultz, supra note 35, at 349-51 ("[If the surrogate simply mispredicted how
attached she would feel to this baby, the claim of excuse would be hard to sustain under existing
contract doctrine."); see infra notes 385-86.
373. Shultz, supra note 35, at 349-51 ("Probably the agreement itself would be deemed
to assign the risk of changed feelings to the surrogate, and if not, the surrogate would likely still
be in the best position both to control and to foresee the change of heart, thereby eliminating the
justification for excuse.") (footnotes omitted).
374. Id. at 349.
375. See also infra notes 408-09.
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
On the other hand, what is infrequently recognized is that this potential inaccuracy
also cuts against the current approach of affording leeway to surrogate mothers. That
is, allowing a surrogate to change her mind and "escape" a contract may stem from
courts' (or policymakers' or other third parties') overpredictions of the emotional
difficulty of relinquishing a child and of the subsequent pain of having separated. If
that difficulty is less than predicted, one argument against the nonenforceability of such
contracts would be diminished. Some support for this reading comes from examining
the rate at which surrogate mothers actually seek to void a contract on these grounds.
Available evidence suggests that this rate is in fact fairly low. By one count, "fewer
than one percent of surrogate mothers try to keep the resulting child, which is
analogous to the rates of 'women who change their mind about sterilization or• ,,,376
abortion. Some primary research suggests that some surrogate mothers apparently
"learn" not to attach to the unborn child. 7 Other researchers interviewing surrogate
mothers noted that many have previously acted as surrogates before: in one study five
out of seventeen mothers interviewed had done so; in another study seven of
nineteen had done so.379 In the latter study of nineteen surrogates, five had difficulty
relinquishing the child (a rate of about 26%), but only one had not relinquished the
child at all. 3s
We may overestimate the emotional trauma surrogate mothers experience, or at least
the "unbreakable bond" with the unborn child. Of course, this hardly means we should
not protect against the possibility of such trauma. It is simply important to recognize
the possibility, and recognize that the relevant data may point in different directions
depending how they are applied. How to apply them is a policy decision that must be
made by balancing the implications both for and against.
At bottom though, the existing approach, rather than the "market approach" alluded
to above, seems to better comport with psychological reality. That is, the market
approach assumes that emotions are not only foreseeable and predictable, but are also
controllable, 382 and for that reason places the burden on the surrogate. 38 3 As the
discussion throughout makes evident, though, emotions are hardly controllable and are
376. Amanda Mechell Holliday, Comment, Who's Your Daddy (and Mommy)?
Creating Certainty for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 1101, 1125 (2003) (citation omitted).
377. Hazel Baslington, The Social Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby
and the Role of Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57
(2002).
378. Melinda M. Hohman & Christine B. Hagan, Satisfaction With Surrogate
Mothering: A Relational Model, 4 J. HUM. BEAV. Soc. ENV'T 61, 66 (2001).
379. Eric Blyth, "I Wanted to Be Interesting. I Wanted to Be Able to Say 'I've Done
Something Interesting with My Life': Interviews With Surrogate Mothers in Britain, 12 J.
REPROD. & INFANTPSYCHOL. 189, 191 (1994).
380. Id. at 195.
381. Cf Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall", 79
B.U. L. REv. 263, 284-85 (1999) ("If legislators considering a bill to prohibit or regulate
surrogacy contracts want to maximize freedom, should they consider the percentage of surrogate
mothers that change their minds when the child is born?").
382. Cf. supra notes 35-37.
383. See supra note 372.
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poorly predicted. Hence, even the foreseeability of their change need not bind an
individual.
384
Even if emotions are not seen as controllable, the market approach simply places
them in the same framework as other business circumstances, the possibility of whose
changes are typically placed on the obligor under the contract. 385 That is, an obligor is
expected to fulfill a contract and perform, even if he is not at fault and "even if
circumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than he had
anticipated.' ' 386 Only where some extraordinary event occurs to make an obligor's
performance "impracticable," may that party discharge his duty and escape the
contract. To some commentators, a party's "emotional volatility" simply does not
qualify as such an extraordinary event, and the surrogate should assume the risk of
emotional change.
There are at least two responses to this approach, however. First, even under
traditional contract doctrine, such substantial emotional change as would make a
surrogate mother change her mind about relinquishing a baby may in fact qualify as the
sort of "event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, ' 387 thus discharging her duty and excusing her performance. The
Introductory Note to the Restatement's section on impracticability illustrates the
doctrine with a market example:
In contracting for the manufacture and delivery of goods at a price fixed in the
contract, for example, the seller assumes the risk of increased costs within the
normal range. If, however, a disaster results in an abrupt tenfold increase in cost to
the seller, a court might determine that the seller did not assume this risk by
concluding that the non-occurrence of the disaster was a "basic assumption" on
which the contract was made.
388
Similarly, even if a potential surrogate might foresee the possibility of emotional
change, and even if she assumes the risk of that possibility, inaccuracies in predicting
384. One of the leading commentators on biomedical issues, John Robertson, typically
advocates enforcing contracts. In the case of relinquishing a child, however, he has recognized,
though perhaps not promoted, that:
Childbirth is such a major change in circumstances that one should not reasonably
be held to foresee how one arguably would feel about child rearing until after birth
has occurred. Having undergone the physical rigors and bonding of pregnancy and
childbirth, women may have very different views about child rearing than when
they made a preconception agreement to relinquish the child for adoption.
Accordingly, they should be free to disavow the relinquishment terms of their
prior contract.
John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 407,
421 (1990). But see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REv. 2305 (1995) (arguing in favor of upholding surrogacy contracts in
most circumstances).
385. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979).





the intensity and duration of such change may analogize to that unforeseen, tenfold
price increase that serves to discharge a duty under the contract.
Second, the Restatement also provides for a discharge where an existing
circumstance, unknown to the obligor, makes her performance impracticable. 389 If, as
the market approach suggests, the surrogate should bear the risks because it is she
whose emotions might change, then the fact that she is already the person whose
emotions will change in fact might serve as such an unrecognized but existing
circumstance demonstrating impracticability.
Moreover, a discharge of duty under impracticability almost always involves some
sort of change of mind, where what is involved is not actual impossibility. Take, for
instance, the Restatement's example of a contract between A and B to carry B's goods
on A's ship to a designated foreign port. A civil war then unexpectedly breaks out in
that foreign country and the rebels announce that they will try to sink all vessels bound
for that port.390 Were A to refuse to perform, A's duty to do so would be discharged
under the Restatement approach, because the risk of injury is sufficient to make
performance impracticable. Of course, A is simply changing his mind here about
performing; trying to deliver is still possible. Were A to try to deliver and the vessel
sunk, performance would then be impossible. Plausibly, however, the threat and risk
involved in attempted delivery serve to excuse A from having to make the effort. The
question of whether to discharge an obligor's duty under the contract, therefore, is the
justification for the obligor's change of mind.
As in other contexts, that justification may simply stem from the subject matter of
the contract. 391 In the frozen embryos context (discussed further below), affording
more flexibility and autonomy to the contracting parties-for example, not simply
binding them to an earlier agreement-stems from a reluctance to treat the embryos392
"merely" as property. Similarly, a (plausible) disinclination to treat a gestating baby
as analogous to changed market prices may legitimately lead to greater flexibility in
evaluating the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. The circumstances where change
of mind should allow the voiding of a contact are not unlimited, however, likely
rendering fears of creating a slippery slope that would allow "mere" changes of mind to
void any ordinary business contract unfounded.
389. id. § 266.
390. See id. § 261, cmt. d.
391. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED
DECISIONS x (1998) (suggesting otherwise, however, that it can be appropriate to bind oneself
with advance contracts or agreements, also noting that contract law principles have been applied
in contexts "far removed from the commercial setting in which those principles were typically
spawned"); see George J. Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies and Assisted Reproduction,
339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 935, 937 (1998) ("Do commerce, money, and contracts really have more
to say about motherhood than pregnancy and childbirth?").
392. THE N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC PoucY 319 (1998) [hereinafter
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES) ("This contractual model of advance planning,
however, assumes that individuals' relationships with human embryos are equivalent to ordinary
property interests, a view that is inconsistent with the special respect that embryos are owed.").
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b. Disposition of Frozen Embryos
As with surrogate parenting, the affective forecasting literature is relevant to
decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos. The issues involved relate, as in
surrogacy contracts, to whether parties should be bound by agreements about
disposition made at Time,, when their choices or preferences are different at Time2.
Courts presented with enforcing contracts regarding the disposition of frozen embryos
are about evenly split. Two of the highest state courts to rule on the issue have held
such contracts enforceable. 393 Another state court has ruled that an agreement between
the parties to relinquish embryos to medical personnel was enforceable. 394 Two others
have limited the enforceability of such contracts or rejected them outright.39 5 Few
states have dealt with the issue by legislation.
396
Most assisted reproduction facilities require couples to provide written agreements
designed to govern the future disposition of extra or unwanted frozen embryos under
foreseeable circumstances.3 9 7 Thus, the enforceability question, again, turns on whether
to bind individuals (or a couple) to decisions made at one time about the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos, either when circumstances change or when individuals
otherwise change their mind about those previous decisions.
A number of commentators argue in favor of precommitment, binding parties to the
- -.398
decisions they made in the advance contract. These advocates emphasize at least two
primary justifications for so binding a party. First, they note that the parties are fully
informed of their options when they enter such an agreement, understanding the
possibility of divorce, separation, unavailability, default on payment of storage fees,
393. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that parties' agreement
providing that upon divorce, embryos be donated for research purposes, should be presumed
valid and binding); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that an existing
agreement between the parties should be upheld).
394. Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). Specifically, the court
ruled that the lower court was correct to decline to award the zygotes in question to either of the
divorcing parties. Id. at 468.
395. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (holding unenforceable,
because of changed circumstances, an agreement that embryos could be implanted after
divorce); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (holding parties' agreement should be
enforced, "subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind").
396. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
397. See, e.g., G. Pennings, The Validity of Contracts to Dispose of Frozen Embryos,
28 J. MED. ETmics 295,295 (2002); AssISTED REPRODucrvETEHNOLOGIES, supra note 392, at
298 (citation omitted).
398. See Pennings, supra note 397, at 298; John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues
in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1870-72 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson, Precommitment
Issues] (reviewing argument in favor of enforcing agreements for the disposition of frozen
embryos); John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategiesfor Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50
EMORY L.J. 989, 1016-27 (2001) [hereinafter Robertson, Precommitment Strategies] (same);
Jeremy L. Fetty, Comment, A "Fertile" Question: Are Contracts Regarding the Disposition of
Frozen Preembryos Worth the Paper upon Which They are Written?, 2001 L. REv. MICH. ST. U.
DETROr C. L. 1001 (arguing in favor of enforcing agreements for the disposition of frozen
embryos); Erik W. Johnson, Note, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition Through
Contract, 55 RuTGERS L. REv. 793 (2003) (same).
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etc. 399 Second, they note that when one party changes his or her mind about what to do
with a frozen embryo, the decision necessarily implicates or directly contradicts the
preferences and desires of the other party. Additionally, the other party or parties may
have substantially relied on the first party's decision as expressed in the advance
agreement, either in entering into the agreement in the first place or in subsequent
conduct. Applying traditional contract doctrine, these commentators argue that such
"[d]etrimental reliance by others is a good reason for enforcing Time 1 expressions of
Time 2 preferences despite one party's Time 2 objections."4 Thus, proponents of this
view place profound importance on informed consent and reliance.
Others are as strongly opposed to limiting decisionmaking freedom in this way.
At least one commentator has suggested treating the right to control the disposition of
one's frozen embryos as an inalienable right that cannot be relinquished in advance.
40 2
Others distinguish advance agreements of this sort from those involved in terminal
illness or loss-of-competency, pointing out that unlike the latter, in many frozen
embryos cases there is no change in decisionmaking competency.40 3 Yet others
criticize the contract approach as dealing only with some of the issues in question, but
ignoring others such as the "social consequences" that may follow legal and policy
.... 404
decisions regarding the disposition of frozen embryos. Finally, as with the surrogacy
contracts debate, criticism of the contractarian approach emphasizes the special nature
of the subject of the contract, regardless of whether the frozen embryos are thought of
as life or potential life. 405 The New York Task Force suggested that the contractual
model of advance planning "fails to account for the importance of contemporaneous
decision making in matters of reproductive choice." 4 W Another commentator
399. Robertson, Precommitment Issues, supra note 398, at 1871.
400. Id. at 1872. As noted above, see supra note 384, Professor Robertson is flexible in
some cases about when to adhere to previous contracts. Similarly, he recognizes that even in the
frozen embryo context, other values, such as the best interests of a child, may outweigh the
values of precommitment. Robertson, Precommitment Issues, supra note 398, at 1872.
401. Note, of course, that an individual in one sense restricts her own freedom to make
future deals by changing her mind. Pettit, supra note 381, at 285.
402. Coleman, supra note 156, at 57-58.
403. Id. at 125 ("If it is inappropriate to enforce an advance directive over the
objections of a patient who lacks decisionmaking capacity, it is even less appropriate to enforce
a prior disposition decision over the objection of a person whose mental capacity is not in
doubt."). See Pennings, supra note 397, at 298. Professor Pennings also notes that such frozen
embryos agreements may have originated in the context of loss of decisionmaking capacity, but
have since been extended to cover even cases not involving such loss. Pennings, supra note 397,
at 295.
404. Annas, supra note 391, at 936 ('"rhe courts are not simply affirming the contents
of a contract but are implicitly making profound and wide-ranging decisions about the status of
embryos, the interests of children, and the identifications and responsibility of their parents.");
Kimberly E. Diamond, Cryogenics, Frozen Embryos and the Need for New Means of
Regulation: Why the U.S. Is Frozen in Its Current Approach, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 77, 97
(1998); see also supra note 400 (noting other interests that may be at stake).
405. The Davis court noted the embryos' "potential for human life," in assigning them
to some "interim category" that was neither "'persons' nor 'property."' Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
406. AsSISTED REPRODUCTrIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 392, at 319.
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highlighted the fundamental emotional nature of the issues involved, emphasizing that
the "usual premises of bargaining, efficiency, and rationality generally do not hold for
people embarking on a program of IVF."'
4
Along these lines, one commentator has recognized that in the foreseeability
context, an important distinction exists between the changed circumstances contract
doctrine on the one hand, and the informed agreement approach on the other.
Specifically, Professor Coleman has pointed out that "[pirotecting individuals from
commitments based on uninformed predictions about future events is not the same as
invalidating contracts because of changed circumstances."'408 He emphasizes that
foreseeability-"recognizing what might happen in the future"-is importantly
different from fundamental changes in emotional reactions, as well as from the
concomitant difficulty recognizing how such "circumstances would feel if the situation
actually occurs."
'4W
The affective forecasting literature takes up this reasoning and supports the latter,
noncontractarian approach, allowing for the possibility that parties will change their
mind based on changing emotions. The findings highlight the focal difficulty of
enforcing Time1 agreements, that they often poorly reflect a person's or couple's "true"
feelings about disposition. 41 Of course, this statement raises the question of which is a
party's "true" feeling: that expressed at Time,, at the time of the advance agreement, or
that expressed at Time2, the time at which a contemporaneous decision must be made.
In light of the affective forecasting data, it makes more sense to see the Time2
preference-which is generated in response to an actual event-as worthy of being
privileged over the Time, preference-which was hypothetical, generated in response
to an imagined event. Because individuals forecast reactions to hypothetical events so
inaccurately, the affective forecasting data illustrate the validity of privileging Time 2,
contemporaneous expressions of preference.
2. End-of-Life Issues: Euthanasia and Advance Directives
The possibility of changed minds also arises in discussions of euthanasia and
advance directives. One hesitation about allowing euthanasia is the possibility that
patients will change their minds, that is, that an interest in or preference for euthanasia
(in whatever form-removal of life-sustaining measures, physician- or other-assisted
. .. . . 411 . .
suicide, or patient suicide ) may change between the time it is expressed and the time
• • 412...
that euthanasia might be effected. Other concerns arise in considering public support
for various means of euthanasia. Another relates to the possibility that the preferences
407. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One's Mind, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 75, 103 (2002).
408. Coleman, supra note 156, at 98-99 n.209.
409. Id. at 99 n.209.
410. Id. at 119 ("before [IVFI treatment begins a couple has little way of knowing how
they will feel about the embryos once they exist"); see also infra notes 515-16 and
accompanying text.
411. Obviously there are differences among these means of effecting euthanasia; for
present purposes, though, I group them together.
412. E.g., Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 989 (1958).
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of someone making a decision about such action, whether a physician or someone
designated by the patient, may not reflect the patient's true preferences. Of course,
these issues arise in the context of living wills and advance directives more
generally.
4 13
Though commentators have primarily noted these difficulties in the abstract, some
empirical evidence supports their concern. The New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, for instance, noted that typically, suicidal patients do not actually attempt
or complete suicide. When they are given appropriate personal support and palliative
care, most patients (again echoing the Brickman et al., study above) "adapt and
continue life in ways they might not have anticipated.... [P]atients are able to sustain
and cope with tremendous suffering as they approach death." 414 Similarly, in the
hospice context, although medical professionals rarely see terminally ill patients who
wish to have assisted suicide or euthanasia, when they do, these patients usually change
their mind when pain is controlled and they receive supportive hospice care.41 5 The
United States Supreme Court recognized such findings in declining to find a
constitutional right to assisted suicide.
The affective forecasting research lends further empirical support to critics of fully
legalizing euthanasia. At least in the abstract, the research demonstrates the possibility
that patients predicting how they might react when faced with the choice about
euthanasia would in fact reject that option when presented with the actual decision.
This type of decisionmaking would mirror, to some extent, the decisionmaking
described above by women in labor.4 17 The data go to instances where someone has
413. E.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80
CAL. L. REv. 857, 873-74 (1992). See infra notes 423-34 and accompanying text.
414. THE N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT:
AssIsTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 178 (2d ed. 1997).
415. John Finnis, Euthanasia, Morality, and Law, 3 t Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1123, 1142
(1998) ("The great majority of people who request euthanasia in hospices change their minds
and come to value their last months or weeks of illness, severe though this often is."); Jill A.
Melchoir, Casenote, The Quiet Battle for the Heart of Liberty-A Victory for the Cautious:
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1359, 1366 (1998)
(noting "inundat[ion]" by the media with "stories of patients who had wished to die but changed
their minds"); Anissa C. Wemer, Note, The Michigan Legislature Persists in Prohibiting
Assisted Suicide, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. Rev. 875, 924 (2000).
416. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,730 (1997) (quoting HERBERTHENDIN,
SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND THE DUTCH CURE 24-25 (1997) as noting that
suicidal, terminally ill patients "usually respond well to treatment for depressive illness and pain
medication and are then grateful to be alive").
417. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96. 1 do not mean, of course, that a patient who
at Time, expressed a preference about whether to have life-sustaining measures taken to keep
her alive if she entered a vegetative state might consciously "choose" differently if she entered
that state at Time2. Cf. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375,
412-19 (1988) (discussing whether to adopt the viewpoint of the past or the present self in
regard to directives about death); Shultz, supra note 35, at 383 n.285 ("Various commentators
have discussed which self ought to control when a person expresses different opinions at
different points in time.") (citing Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients:
Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 379-81 (1986)
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predicted that she would (or would not) commit suicide or request euthanasia, or
expressed a preference for (or against) suicide or euthanasia, when presented with
some terminal illness, but nevertheless changes her mind when presented with such
circumstances.
418
There are at least two further examples of the relevance of the affective forecasting
data to the question of legalizing euthanasia. First, Oregon's law allowing assisted
suicide in fact allows for the possibility of changed feelings; an individual choosing
assisted suicide must maintain that decision for fifteen days,419 at the end of which time
an attending physician must offer the patient the opportunity to change his or her
mind.4z° But some research suggests that changing one's mind in these circumstances
may take longer than fifteen days.42 1 Second, although public support for euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide has increased dramatically in the twentieth century, it is
nevertheless still the case that far more people support legalizing such measures in the
abstract, than think they would in fact take advantage of them.
Again, the affective forecasting data are relevant to any sort of advance directive,
not only ones involving euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. 42 3 The findings are
consistent with empirical research showing the inconsistencies of patients' own wishes
at one time, as expressed by advance directive or other means of expressing
preferences, and at subsequent points in time.42 4 In one recent study, researchers
interviewed patients as to their desire to receive medical treatment in several different
scenarios. The patients were hospitalized for treatment, but recovered. The preferences
patients reported after hospitalization differed from those they expressed before
(arguing that an incompetent patient may be a different self than a competent patient who signed
an advance directive)).
418. The data may also suggest that someone who pursued suicide or assisted suicide
might have changed her mind under other circumstances.
419. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 § 3.06 (2003) (requiring patient to "reiterate the oral
request to his or her attending physician no less than fifteen (15) days after making the initial
oral request"); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850 § 3.08 (2003) ("No less than fifteen (15) days shall
elapse between the patient's initial oral request and the writing of a prescription.").
420. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 § 3.06 (2003) ("At the time the qualified patient makes
his or her second oral request, the attending physician shall offer the patient an opportunity to
rescind the request."); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.845 § 3.07 (2003) ("A patient may rescind his or
her request at any time and in any manner without regard to his or her mental state. No
prescription for medication ... may be written without the attending physician offering the
qualified patient an opportunity to rescind the request."). See Carl H. Coleman & Alan R.
Fleischman, Guidelines for Physician-Assisted Suicide: Can the Challenge Be Met?, 24 J.L.
MED. & ETICS 217, 218 (1996).
421. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, 284 JAMA
2460, 2460 (2000) ("Over a few months, half the patients changed their minds.") (emphasis
added).
422. Annette C. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45, 55 (1996).
423. One set of researchers has recently discussed the connection between affective
forecasting findings and problems in implementing advance directives. Angela Fagerlin et at.,
The Use of Advance Directives in End-of-Life Decision Making: Problems and Possibilities, 46
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 268, 274 (2002).
424. See generally id. at 272-75.
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425hospitalization. Patients who were hospitalized reported less interest in life-
sustaining treatment upon hospitalization; however, a few months after being
hospitalized, patients returned to expressed preferences for treatment.
Such shifting decisions before, during, and after an event are reminiscent of the
"bicycle-trip" findings mentioned above, in which predictions and memories of an
event were seen quite differently from the experience itself.42 6 In another study,
presenting AIDS patients with hypothetical situations about their health state and
soliciting preferences about cardiac resuscitation or life-extending treatment, about
one-quarter of respondents who initially desired resuscitation changed their minds after
four months; about one-third of those initially rejecting it later changed their minds.
For life-extending treatment more generally, about one-quarter in each category
changed their minds.4 27 Most broadly, some medical researchers suggest that overall,
there is "little evidence that the decisions patients make when they are relatively
healthy predict their choices when death is imminent.
' 428
Other evidence suggests at least some stability to patients' decisions to forego life-
sustaining treatment. But importantly, again consistent with the affective forecasting
literature, when individuals do change their preferences, they may not realize that they
have done so. Patients may not realize, then, that their original choices of treatment (or
lack of treatment) may not accurately reflect their preferences when presented with an
immediate treatment decision. 430 Most generally, "over time periods as short as 2




A final point on the stability issue reflects findings of individual differences
regarding stability of preferences. Recent research suggests that older individuals have
425. Peter H. Ditto et al., Context Changes Choices: A Prospective Study of the Effects
of Hospitalization on Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences 13 (2002) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author), cited in Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for
Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1823, 1835 (2003).
426. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
427. Joel S. Weissman et al., The Stability of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Care
Among Persons with AIDS in the Boston Health Study, 19 MED. DECISION MAKING 16 (1999).
428. Diane E. Meier & R. Sean Morrison, Autonomy Reconsidered, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1087, 1087 (2002).
429. Marion Danis et al., Stability of Choices About Life-Sustaining Treatments, 120
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 567 (1994) (individuals predicting that they would prefer no treatment
for a hypothetical terminal illness were less likely to change their prediction at a follow-up
interview two years later than those predicting that they would desire treatment). Others have
also found "moderately stable" expressed preferences over two years. Linda L. Emanuel et al.,
Advance Directives: Stability of Patients' Treatment Choices, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
209 (1994).
430. See Dresser, supra note 425, at 1834-35 (2003) (citing R. Mitchell Gready et al.,
Actual and Perceived Stability of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 11 J. CLINICAL
ETmcs 334, 335 n.3 (2000)); Fagerlin et al., supra note 423, at 273 (participants in the Gready
et al., study "mistakenly believed that the preferences they stated during the second interview
were identical to those stated during their first interview").
431. Fagerlin et al., supra note 423, at 273.
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more stable preferences. 432 Recall that older individuals may be less subject to
forecasting errors;433 thus, fluctuations in younger patients' expressed preferences
about life-sustaining treatment may exacerbate the problems described above.
434
The affective forecasting research is also relevant to instances where, upon a patient
entering a stage of decisionmaking incompetence, a substitute decisionmaker, family or
physician, must choose for that person. Specifically, such findings support earlier
research showing the likelihood of a discrepancy between the patient's preferences as
predicted by substitute decisionmakers and as might actually be expressed by the
patient.4 35 Family members tend to be inaccurate at identifying a patient's wishes,
4 3 6
though they tend to be better predictors than physicians.
43 7
Finally, the affective forecasting research highlights potential problems in setting
policy, given the likely substantial discrepancy between assumptions about others'
desires and that person's actual desires. Recall the sharp distinction between
laypeople's perceptions of paraplegics' life satisfaction and the actual reported
satisfaction, S 8 or the potential distinction between what courts and policymakers
believe about a surrogate mother's likelihood of relinquishing a child, and what the
actual rate of relinquishment is.4 39 Similarly, public perception of the circumstances
under which terminally ill individuals might request euthanasia or physician-assisted
432. Peter H. Ditto et al., Stability of Older Adults' Preferences for Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 605, 613 (2003).
433. See supra note 162.
434. To an extent, this is speculation. Affective forecasting errors may be reduced in
individuals over 60. See supra note 40. The adult patients in Ditto's study were all older than
65. Ditto et al., supra note 432, at 607.
435. E.g., Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in the Hospital: When Do Physicians Talk with Patients?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1089 (1984) (physician's opinion about a patient's desire for life-sustaining measures (for
example, resuscitation) correlates only poorly with the preference expressed by the patient);
Fagerlin et al., supra note 423, at 275.
436. Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and
Religion in Dying, 58 U. PIr. L. REv. 549, 552 (1997) (citing Bedell & Delbanco, supra note
435, at 1089, for proposition that "families are poor substitute decisionmakers," but suggesting
that "when dealing with incompetent patients who have not effectively expressed their treatment
preferences, the law should recognize families as the proper decisionmakers"); Rena Cooper-
Kazaz et al., Longitudinal Changes in Attitudes of Offspring Concerning Life-Sustaining
Measures for Their Terminally Ill Parents, 47 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 1337, 1341 (1999)
("Since most attitude studies are based on control groups, namely people who are asked about
their views in theoretical situations or remotely after a life event, these studies may not reflect
real attitudes and certainly cannot reflect the actual decision of a family member in a real-time
situation."); Peter H. Ditto et al., Advance Directives as Acts of Communication: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED). 421,422-23 (2001); Dallas M. High, Families'
Roles in Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at S17 (noting that
"studies have consistently shown that surrogates, including families, do not fare well in making
accurate predictions").
437. Bedell & Delbanco, supra note 435, at 1089; Kristen M. Coppola et al., Accuracy
of Primary Care and Hospital-Based Physicians' Predictions of Elderly Outpatients' Treatment
Preferences with and without Advance Directives, 161 ARCHIvES INTERNAL MED. 431 (2001).
438. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
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suicide apparently differs from circumstances in which they actually do. Where such
public perception serves as the basis for policymaking, too many (or too few) patients
may undergo euthanasia.
For instance, as a general matter, terminally ill patients with cancer or AIDS
approve of assisted suicide legislation at rates approximating those in the general
public. 4 1 Looking more closely at reasons that members of the public might support
assisted suicide measures, however, disparities appear. A recent review of attitude
research suggested that public support for interventions focuses on patients who are
suffering "excruciating" physical pain.4 2 However, patients in "excruciating pain"
seem not to be the ones requesting euthanasia. Rather, "depressive symptoms,
hopelessness, and otherpsychological factors appear to motivate patients' requests for
euthanasia and PAS."43 And, in fact, public support for euthanasia drops when what is
involved in a hypothetical patient's decision to pursue euthanasia is not pain, but is
instead, for instance, a decision not to burden family members.
4
"
Again, my goal is not to join the substantive debate over the assignment of
decisionmaking power for incompetent patients, or even to express a strong opinion as
to the appropriateness of euthanasia or PAS. I will note, however, that the affective
forecasting literature lends empirical support to those pointing out potential dangers of
allowing euthanasia, such as the possibility that someone would change his or her mind
when presented with the emotional reaction involved in an actual situation. Similarly, it
highlights the best-of-a-bad-situation difficulties of placing decisionmaking power in
family members or in physicians. Whether the data are interpreted to imply an outright
prohibition on euthanasia, or simply that additional conditions should be placed on
euthanasia decisions or advance directives (for example, requiring that a patient have
the option to change her mind) is for another discussion. As discussed above, this
"additional condition" approach is used in surrogate parenting issues. As in surrogacy,
though, the issue is the extent to which individuals should be bound to previously
expressed preferences, once the recognition of even foreseeably changing emotions is
included.
440. Meier & Morrison, supra note 428, at 1087 ("The fact that less than 0.1% of
terminally ill patients in Oregon have opted for assisted suicide further suggests that the
preferences of the worried electorate contrast sharply with those of persons who are seriously
ill.") (footnote omitted).
441. See Barry Rosenfeld, Assisted Suicide, Depression, and the Right to Die, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 467,479 (2000).
442. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Review of the
Empirical Data from the United States, 162 ARCHVEs INTERNAL MED. 142 (2002); see also
Rosenfeld, supra note 441, at 480 ("[Diespite the frequent suggestion that untreated pain or
other physical symptoms might lead to requests for assisted suicide, several studies have failed
to support this hypothesis.").
443. Emanuel, supra note 442; Rosenfeld, supra note 441, at 480 (noting that
"depression and social support are significant contributing factors" in requesting euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide); Coleman & Fleischman, supra note 420, at 221.
444. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy, 82 MINN. L. REv. 983, 996 (1998).
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3. Mid-Life Issues: Informed Consent and Medical Treatments
The affective forecasting data are not merely relevant to beginning and end of life
issues. They are also relevant in the context of identifying patients' values and utilities
when seeking medical treatment and when giving informed consent.
In the context of advance directives, researchers have noted physicians' difficulty in
identifying patients' actual preferences. 4 45 When a patient must choose a particular
course of treatment, a similar difficulty arises in that patient's own assessment of those
preferences. Taken together, there may be doubt as to the extent to which a patient can
in fact grant informed consent to a particular treatment at all, when it is not clear that
she fully understands the emotional reactions she will face upon receiving it.44 6 This
has led some researchers to emphasize the importance of discussing emotional, as well
as medical, factors with patients choosing among treatments.
447
For instance, researchers conducting decision analysis to help patients quantify, and
select among, the outcomes of various treatment options have noted significant
differences between the preferences of patients with a colostomy after surgery for
rectal cancer and those without a colostomy, who were treated for rectal cancer by
radiotherapy. 448 Those with a colostomy valued it more highly than those without.
Similarly, physicians involved in treatment of rectal cancer assigned values closer to
those patients who had had a colostomy. Healthy volunteers, on the other hand, who
were asked to assign some utility to a colostomy, were closer to patients who had been
treated by radiotherapy.449 Clearly, as with the paraplegia studies, "the role played by
direct knowledge of what life is like with a colostomy" was essential in determining
expressed preferences. 45 Similar results were found in the context of treatments for
renal failure; patients with renal disease gave higher utility ratings to dialysis options
than members of the general public. 451 And, of course, Christensen-Szalanski's study
of women in labor who changed their minds about anesthesia demonstrates the
difficulty presented by shifting preferences.
Commentators have therefore encouraged physicians to more fully discuss the
implications of various medical treatments. Statistics such as survival rates may not
adequately capture the issues that should be involved in patient decisionmaking.
445. See, e.g., Bedell & Delbanco, supra note 435, at 1089; Coppola et al., supra note
437, at 431.
446. My focus here is on consent in the context of choosing medical treatment.
Informed consent to participate in research studies is another issue, beyond the scope of this
Article. See, however, Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject
Research, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (2004), for a fuller treatment of that topic.
447. E.g., Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 74 (1993).
448. Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose UtilitiesforDecisionAnalysis?, 10 MED. DECISION
MAKING 58, 65 (1990).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 66.
451. David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as
Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASE 697, 702-03 (1978).
452. "To the extent that physicians anticipate their patients' adapting to different health
states, true informed consent would require highlighting these future preferences when
discussing current therapeutic alternatives." Redelmeier et al., supra note 447, at 74.
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Similarly, the affective forecasting literature shows that patients' decisions may be
biased by overemphasis on the transition from one state to another.453 Thus, colostomy
patients may focus on their reaction immediately after surgery, rather than consider
how they may come to deal with the colostomy over time. If so, patients presented with
the colostomy option (or any medically appropriate treatment, of course) may
undervalue the utility of the procedure. Patients' pretreatment belief that a particular
treatment is undesirable would neglect the likelihood of adaptation,454 leading to the
pursuit of inappropriate treatment.
Physicians should recognize that "utilities for a particular state of health may change
when an individual enters that state," and counsel patients accordingly.455 More
broadly, those who deal with patients or members of the public pursuing some
biomedical decision (such as couples deciding about assisted reproduction) should
incorporate discussion of the potential for adaptation in the former and changed
feelings in the latter. It is likely that such discussion might realistically influence the
decisions to be made, 456 especially as inaccurate predictions are likely most common in
predicting circumstances with which an individual is unfamiliar.
4 57
Understanding that a neglect of future circumstances might bias one's choices may
significantly help patients in making decisions, both in selecting the medically
appropriate treatment and at the same time potentially reducing the influences that
might lead to inaccurate decisions. As in the football fan study above, drawing
attention to the circumstances that might help patients (or any individuals) adapt to new
situations helps them take those circumstances into account in making their
predictions.
45
This is of course easier when the time frame involved in adaptation is longer than,
for instance, delivering a child, but an obstetrician or other physician might still discuss
with an expectant mother the likelihood that her in-the-moment preferences might
change. Doctors may present a prospective mother with a precommitment option,
binding herself to having anesthesia or not, as well as a choice to leave her options
open and retain the freedom to change her mind at any medically appropriate point
during labor.459 The latter option, of course, raises again the concern about which
"self'['s] values to privilege. 46 It also raises issues about whether decisionmaking in
453. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
454. Patients "may regard a particular outcome of treatment as highly undesirable but
then become accustomed to it when it is directly experienced, and learn to tolerate it well."
Boyd et al., supra note 448, at 66.
455. Id.
456. For instance, Coleman notes that when the implications of donating frozen
embryos to other infertility patients are fully explained to couples-such as the possibility of
genetically related siblings being born to those other couples, with the concomitant emotional
issues that possibility raises--couples' interest in such donation decreased. Coleman, supra note
156, at 64 (citation omitted).
457. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; Christensen-Szalanski, supra note
96, at 56 ("[Platients may make inherently less reliable value assessments of abstract outcomes
they have never experienced-a conclusion that raises additional questions about the use of
patients' values in management decisions.").
458. See supra text accompanying note 124.
459. See Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96, at 56.
460. See supra note 156.
[Vol. 80:155
0]A WAND THE EMOTIONS
both states is "rational," to the extent that one likely does not reflect a patient's long-
term preferences. 46 1 In any event, the affective forecasting data highlight the potential
for differences in a patient's pre- and posttreatment preferences, based on inaccurate
predictions of future emotional reactions as well as neglect of adaptive circumstances.
In turn, this emphasizes the importance of physicians' incorporating mention of such
possibilities in discussions of the treatment consequences and outcomes, with the goal
of eliciting truly informed consent.
46 2
I do not mean that any additional legal duty should necessarily be imposed on
physicians to do so. However, such richer discussion of the situation and consequences
involved in some treatment mirrors recommendations for physician conduct that take
into account cognitive heuristic and biases. For instance, commentators have suggested
that to protect against the pervasive cognitive biases involved in framing effects-for
instance, potential biases that depend on whether a treatment is presented in terms of
survival rates or mortality rates-physicians should present both perspectives.463
Similarly, to guard against difficulties interpreting probabilistic information and to
ensure fully informed consent, professionals should express probabilities in both
numerical and qualitative terms, and should "translate" such terms into analogies to
more familiar probabilities of risk.46 4 My recommendation here simply extends this
approach to circumstances in which emotional biases or errors may occur.
C. Caveats
The foregoing Parts illustrate the need to substantially reconsider existing
substantive legal doctrines and public policy, ranging from decisionmaking by civil and
criminal juries to decisions about basic bioethical concerns. However, for a number of
reasons we should nevertheless be cautious at this point about implementing such
changes. These reasons fail into two broad categories: the first involves the current
state of affective forecasting research, and the second involves more general concerns
about the application of research data to legal policy. Although these concerns need not
be resolved definitively, they should be noted in any discussions regarding the
application of these data to legal policy.
465
461. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96, at 56 (noting that the freedom to change her
mind may result in a mother's "making a decision that is contrary to her long-term preference").
This issue is discussed further in Part III.B.
462. See Kahneman & Snell, supra note 81, at 198 ("[T]he value that is attached to
'informed consent' to surgery is surely limited if patients are incapable of assessing the quality
of their post-surgical lives.").
463. RuTH R. FADEN E7 AL., A HISTORY AND ThEORY OFINFORMED CONSENT 321 (1986).
464. Id. at 322.
465. David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations
on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 661,669
(2000) ("[Mlore often than not, and almost invariably in the area of applied science (of the sort
the law cares about), facts are known with more or less confidence. Lawmakers ultimately must
decide how much confidence they need in a fact before making a decision.").
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1. The Current State of the Research
In Part I.C above, I sketched a number of potential concerns regarding the existing
body of affective forecasting research. I noted that these concerns were not substantial
enough to dismiss the findings of this burgeoning body of research, but nevertheless,
some aspects of the data and the methodology suggest that it is too early to apply the
findings wholesale in the areas I have described. That is, although the implications I
review in Parts II.A and B may follow logically from the affective forecasting data, we
should be cautious of unconditionally applying them before certain concerns are
addressed.
Again, some such concerns were sketched earlier, for example, self-report data and
between-subject experimental designs. I explained, however, why these are of only
passing concern. Another point is that the affective forecasting research has, for the
most part, documented a general phenomenon. 4 66 Overall, as a general matter,
individuals are inaccurate at predicting future emotional states and the duration and
intensity of their emotional reactions to future events. However, the research has not
yet thoroughly identified whether, and to what extent, certain groups might be more or
less accurate at doing so.4 67 Preliminary evidence, sketched above, sugests that
women and older individuals may be less susceptible to forecasting errors, but this is
far from clear. Identifying which witnesses may be most accurate at predicting their
own future emotional experiences, and which jurors may be least susceptible to
mispredicting litigants' emotions, must be left to further research.
Finally, there is the usual concern about "external validity," or "the degree to which
the effects observed generalize to the actual [legal] setting. ' ' 469 No researcher has
specifically conducted an affective forecasting study in the context of legal
decisionmaking. 470 We thus do not yet know whether expert testimony, closing
argument, or judicial instruction about the phenomenon may influence actual jurors'
perceptions of the harm caused by a murder. 471 We do not know whether grief experts'
testimony about the phenomenon will influence actual juries' damage awards. No
study has directly compared perceptions of life on death row with prisoners' actual
experiences, nor addressed whether and how death row inmates might possibly adapt to
their time there.
Thus, as a general matter, more research will be useful before the affective
forecasting research can be applied in any particular case. But it would be a serious473
mistake to dismiss the findings based solely on perceived methodological flaws or
insufficient research. A meta-analysis would be useful in identifying the overall
466. Blumenthal, supra note 28, at 87.
467. See id. at 88 & n.181.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 162-163.
469. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using
Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REv. 777, 787 (2002).
470. Woodzicka & LaFrance, supra note 316, arguably come closest. I have also begun
an empirical research program examining some of the jury decisionmaking issues raised in Part
Il.A.
471. See supra Part l.A.2.a.2.
472. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
473. Cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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quantitative state of the affective forecasting research and in identifying moderators of
the phenomenon. 474 However, the methodological concerns need not be fully resolved
before a discussion of the relevance of the research can begin; recognition of the state
of the research should simply be a part of that discussion. 4 Finally, contrary to some
courts' perspectives,47 6 "it is not necessary that a study mirror the conditions of an
actual trial for the study to have high external validity and for it to be useful in a legal
or policy context." 477 Many-perhaps most--of the affective forecasting studies were
not limited to laboratory settings, instead examining individuals' judgments in the real
world about directly relevant situations. Many of the studies relevant to biomedical• • • 478
issues have reasonable external validity. And more generally, identifying a
phenomenon that is consistently and robustly found across so many instances both
inside and outside the lab suggests that affective forecasting inaccuracies do not
disappear when forecasters find themselves in a courtroom.
4 79
2. Applying Social Science Data to the Legal System
There are more general tensions between the perspectives of social science and the
law that warrant caution in applying empirical data. Some of my, previous comments
are relevant here, such as those pertaining to external validity. But there are other
legitimate reasons that courts or policymakers may choose not to apply a particular set
of findings or body of research. I have discussed some such reasons elsewhere;
481
general points can be made here.
First, law and social science do not necessarily share the same objectives in their
attempts to resolve certain questions. More specifically, in their approaches to
gathering knowledge and ascertaining the "truth," law and science may even be thought
474. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
475. Phoebe Ellsworth points out, in a discussion of the use of amicus briefs, that
science can never wait until its data are definitive, or its "research is perfect," to present those
data to the legal system, because "that day never comes." Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We
Know or Wait for Godot?, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 77, 89 (1991). Rather, it is incumbent upon
social scientists to provide such data-within ethical bounds-when they "have something to
say that would improve the quality of [courts' or legislatures'] decision making." Id. at 89 n.6;
see also Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAw, supra note 31, at 1,8 (noting
that in the context of research on emotions, "[a]t some point, we need to take what we know,
with a large dose of humility, and incorporate it into our decision making processes").
476. See supra note 109.
477. Robbennolt, supra note 469, at 788.
478. See generally supra Part II.B.
479. Cf Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism
and Theory in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (noting, in the context of
external validity concerns over public goods experiments, that "[w]hile there may be general
problems in drawing inferences from the laboratory, the broad weight of both casual and
experimental evidence is consistent with the notion that people do behave irrationally and
cooperate").
480. See supra text accompanying notes 476-79.
481. See generally Blumenthal, supra note 13.
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of as rivals. 482 Concomitantly, the principles valued by each discipline differ;483 such
differences can, justifiably, lead to less use of data by the legal system than social
scientists may otherwise hope for.4 84 This is not only the case for the traditional
examples of differences between the two fields-"data and observation" versus
"precedent and hierarchy" or scientific method versus adversarial system485 but for
values such as finality or efficiency.48 6 Where parties' settled expectations are
important, for instance, it is not a per se flaw for courts to rely on precedent rather than
data.487
The distinction between the principles valued by these two fields is most evident
when constitutional issues are involved; we may legitimately be concerned about488
applying data when such issues are at stake, and courts often are. Of course, this in
no way means that empirical data, including about affective forecasting, are irrelevant
in constitutional cases. Nor would I advocate the sort of disingenuous approach that
some courts take by using flaws in individual studies to justify dismissing a larger body
of research.48 My point is simply that a court or legislature may at times bejustified in
declining to make constitutional-level decisions based on incomplete data, or even
when a body of research in fact supplies persuasive data upon which most social
scientists agree.
49 1
482. Faigman, supra note 465, at 669 ("Law and science do not have an identity of
interests nor do they share objectives."); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 156 (1990).
483. Tanford, supra note 482, at 156.
484. Id. at 167.
485. E.g., Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual
Jurisprudence, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 147, 159-68 (1980); Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the
Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice
Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1063 & n.172 (2001).
486. Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 48-49.
487. Id. at 49 ("[T]o the extent that people need to know what law is and have settled
expectations about it, and in order to prevent the [substantive] law from changing every time a
new study is presented to a particular judge, reliance on precedent [rather than data] is useful.")
(footnotes omitted).
488. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119-20 (1995) ("Such assumptions [about
the necessity of remedial programs] and any social science research upon which they rely
certainly cannot form the basis upon which we decide matters of constitutional principle.");
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (Brennan, J.) ("[Piroving broad sociological
propositions by statistics ... is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
Equal Protection Clause.") (footnote omitted); cf. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 150, 157-58 (1955) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, Professor Cahn noted that
he "would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on any
such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records").
489. See supra note 109.
490. But see Ellsworth, supra note 475 (noting that because science is an accretive and
progressive field, in one sense research is always "incomplete"; that should not, however,
prevent courts and policymakers from making use of relevant findings).
491. See infra notes 493-94 and accompanying text.
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This may be true in the affective forecasting context, where a surprising number of
fundamental constitutional concerns may be implicated.4 9 2 As I sketched above, given
our constitutional and political celebration of the jury in the context of civil juries and
civil damage awards, we may be entirely comfortable with maintaining jurors' broad
authority to determine damages, despite the potential for errors. So long as the award is
within a range that does not "shock the conscience," we may value the compensation of
tort victims sufficiently that potential deviations from optimal levels are tolerable.
Similarly, we may so value the inclusion of victims' "voices" in the capital sentencing
process (or other principles), that we accept potential errors in jurors' judgments of a
crime's harm. And we may hold so fast to our intuitions about the horrors of death row
that we might simply disregard the possibility of inmates' psychological or hedonic
adaptation.
This approach is certainly the case when First Amendment issues of free speech are
493involved, even with the existence of far more certain data. We know, for instance,
that people are poor judges of the persuasiveness of a message, tending to focus on
extra-message cues such as the speaker's authority or attractiveness or the complexity
of the message. Nevertheless, we insist on relying on the "marketplace of ideas" to
chill false or hurtful speech. Similarly, we know that
people are differently persuaded and articulate different beliefs, attitudes, and
opinions depending on whether they are in a positive or negative mood, e.g., based
on such minor differences as whether they just saw a happy or sad movie or
whether it is a sunny day or not .... Despite clear empirical evidence of the
influence of mood on judgment, we do not bar people from seeing, nor require
them to watch, Jaws or Sophie's Choice immediately before entering the voting
booths, nor do we hold public elections only on sunny, or rainy, days. Despite
knowing that people can be easily persuaded even by false or hurtful ideas, or that
weather affects people's articulated beliefs, or that people have a tendency to
believe that new information is true, society and the law value established
constitutional rights over empirical data.49
Finally, there is the traditional "nomothetic versus idiographic" point. That is,
empirical research tends to focus on extracting generalizable propositions from
observed data. Courts, of course, must resolve discrete idiographic issues. As such they
may demand answers as to the specific defendant, witness, or judge in question, rather
than look to generalizations about defendants, witnesses, or judges as a group. This is
in a sense connected to the individual differences discussion above, as it notes that
social science may have observed a general phenomenon but is not necessarily able to
predict who will display it.
As a general matter, however, courts and legislatures should recognize the role of
empirical social science data that speak to legal and policy issues. In fact, such data
will be common, because "the legal system is fundamentally based on assumptions
492. Seventh Amendment concerns are involved in discussions of civil damage awards;
Eighth Amendment concerns are implicated in discussions of capital punishment. See supra Part
II.A. 1-2. Constitutional concerns over privacy issues can be implicated in some of the
biomedical topics discussed in Part II.B.
493. Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 50.
494. Id. at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
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about human behavior., 495 Nevertheless, such data must come from theoretically and
methodologically sound research, experimental and otherwise, presented by social
scientists in valid and useful ways.496 Even when it is, social scientists should recognize
that other factors in the legal system may plausibly militate against the use of such data.
Relevant data should be used, but that is not to say they invariably must.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The perhaps simple notion that people are surprisingly inaccurate at predicting the
intensity and duration of both their own future emotional states and those of others has
practical implications for a wide variety of legal issues. The preceding Parts reviewed a
number of these issues, both in and out of the courtroom, but also reviewed reasons to
be cautious about immediately applying the data.
From a broader perspective, though, the notion also has theoretical implications,
both for public policy and for legal theorizing about the role of emotions in the law. I
turn now to brief discussions of some of these theoretical implications.
A. Implications for Theories of Welfare4
97
Most broadly, the affective forecasting research has implications for theories based
on promoting happiness and welfare. Of course, a fundamental basis for theories of
welfare (and much of law and economics498) is that people seek to maximize their
preferences and expected utility.4 99 Accordingly, efforts to promote efficiency have
largely focused on a rather narrow criterion of happiness-preference satisfaction.
500
Much has been written, though, about individuals' incorrect beliefs about how much
life satisfaction various goods will bring them.5 0 1 The affective forecasting literature
495. Id. at 52; HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 173-74 (1935)
("Psychology's primary contact with the law lies in its possible substantiation or contradiction
of the frequent psychological assumptions made by the courts in formulating legal rules of
conduct. That is to say, when a court makes an assumption with respect to how individuals
behave under particular circumstances it is making an assumption which the data of psychology
may corroborate or contradict.... In many fields of the law the courts are making psychological
assumptions ... which the present development of psychology makes it worth while for the law
to collect and test in the light of such facts as psychology is now prepared to offer."); James R.P.
Ogloff, Two Steps Forward and One Step Backward. The Law and Psychology Movement(s) in
the 20th Century, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 457, 467 (2000) ("[Llegal psychologists are
interested in evaluating the assumptions that the law must make about human behavior.").
496. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 38-46 (reviewing meta-analytic techniques for
presenting data to the legal system).
497. "[H]umans do have a knack of choosing precisely those things that are worst for
them." J.K. ROWLUNG, HARRY POTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 297 (Scholastic Press 1998).
498. See supra notes 8-9.
499. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 44, at 1675-90, for a critique of such subjective
preference theories.
500. Id. at 1671.
501. ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 549 (1991) ("People do not know what
makes them happy.") (emphasis in original); see generally TIBOR SCrrOVSKY, THE JoYLEss
ECONOMY (1976); Gohm & Clore,Affect as Information, supra note 161, at 110 ("Chasing the
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buttresses this literature with empirical data, emphasizing that if we do not know what
will make us happy or unhappy--or, more precisely, how much something will make
us happy or unhappy and how long it will do so-then we can never be sure how to
maximize happiness or minimize unhappiness.
As suggested above, the data also raise issues about the assumptions of "rational"
decisionmaking. Virtually all decisions about future conduct involve some sort of
prediction of future tastes or feelings; "people's actions are based, in large measure, on
their implicit and explicit predictions of the emotional consequences of future
events." 502 Thus, being able to correctly predict those future preferences is an integral
aspect of rational decisionmaking. 50 3 An inability to do so may call into question the
rationality of such decisions.
50 4
B. Implications for Theories of Law and Emotions
The affective forecasting literature also has clear implications for those efforts by
legal scholars to explicitly model the relationship between law and the emotions. The
literature in fact undercuts some such efforts, suggesting that the assumptions on which
they are based are mistaken. For other efforts the data are more ambiguous, suggesting
that additional research should be conducted in order to further support or challenge
those scholars' models.
A number of recent discussions of law and the emotions reintroduce the notion of
"cultivating" emotions, that is, of exercising rational control over them.50 5 To the
extent that these discussions, and the law and emotion models they sketch, are based on
the assumption that people are able to accurately predict how they will feel under
certain circumstances, and modify their behavior accordingly, the models are
incomplete at best, and false and misleading at worst. For instance, Professor Eric
Posner places the ability to "anticipate" emotions and "plan around" them at the core
of his proposed model for incorporating emotional experience into a rational
decisionmaking framework.5 06 Indeed, his framework for a model of law and emotions
rests on two basic assumptions: that individuals "usually know their emotional
dispositions and can take steps to modify them or to avoid conditions that activate
them" 507; and that, again, "people can anticipate and plan around their emotions, by
cultivating emotional dispositions and avoiding stimuli.' Based on these
currency of value rather than value itself, whether the currency is money or pleasure, leads to
misery and meaninglessness.").
502. Gilbert et al., supra note 40, at 617; see James G. March, Bounded Rationality,
Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978).
503. Kahneman & Snell, supra note 81, at 189 (noting the "ability to predict the
intensity [and duration] of one's future likes and dislikes appears to be an essential element of
rational decision making"); Kahneman, supra note 55, at 108 ("Errors in the assignment of
decision utility to anticipated outcomes can arise from inaccurate forecasting of future hedonic
experience. Correct prediction of future tastes is therefore one of the requirements of rational
decision making.").
504. See infra text accompanying note 518.
505. E.g., Bandes, supra note 31; Katyal, supra note 34; Posner, supra note 34.
506. E.g., Posner, supra note 34, at 1990.
507. Id. at 1982.
508. Id. at 1990. Other commentators make use of the notion of "managing" one's
emotions. E.g., Moran, supra note 161; Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11
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assumptions, he uses his framework to draw implications for various basic areas of
law-criminal, tort, property, and contract. Other researchers have also alluded to the
possibility of educating decisionmakers about differences between calm- and emotion-
state decisions, with the goal of helping them "avoid situations in which the dangerous
temptation might occur."
50
Professor Posner is almost certainly correct that "people's 'calm' preferences-that
is, the preferences that they have when they are not emotionally aroused-differ from
their 'emotion state' preferences. '5 10 Substantial evidence illustrates such a "hot-cold
empathy gap," that is, the tendency for individuals to have, and express, different
preferences when in a more nonemotional state than in an emotional state.511 But he is
just as likely mistaken about people's abilities to accurately predict those differences
and take actions to guard against them. The affective forecasting data illustrate that an
assumption that "people can anticipate their emotional responses to various
conditions"512-at least the intensity and duration of those responses-is probably
flawed. 513 If so, then efforts to compensate for future emotional reactions may not even
take place.514 Even if they do, the actions taken (or not taken) may be flawed because
they are based on flawed predictions. Even educating decisionmakers about decision
state differences entails making predictions about future emotions, as well as
convincing them that their predictions will likely be inaccurate. The effectiveness of
such education efforts is typically short-lived.
515
The affective forecasting literature also suggests an alternative way of framing
Posner's claims about rational decisionmaking under the influence of emotion.
Specifically, Posner suggests that contrary to the traditional perspective, people under
the influence of emotion nevertheless still act "rationally."5 16 That is, although the
preferences in the "calm" state differ from those in the "emotion" state, during the
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 747 (2001); Shultz, supra note 35, at 350. Professor Moran's
examples, however--exercising good manners, for instance, or norms requiring women not to
make eye contact with a man-seem to express a different perspective than Posner's. Moreover,
Professor Moran seems otherwise critical of Posner's approach. See Moran, supra note 161, at
9-10 ("[Posner's] approach probably comports more closely with the needs of law and
economics than with the observations of behavioral psychologists."). She and I both, however,
recognize the usefulness of his "complicating" discourse about the role of emotions in the law.
Id.
509. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future
Feelings, in WELL-BEING, supra note 54, at 85, 100.
510. Posner, supra note 34, at 1978. As a result, he suggests, a person can foresee "his
actions in the emotion state." Id. at 1994.
511. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior,
90 Am. ECON. Rav. 426, 428 (2000) (discussing studies); see also Colin Camerer et al.,
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric
Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1238 (2003) (discussing hot-cold empathy gap).
512. Posner, supra note 34, at 1978; id. at 1982 ("[A]gents anticipate their emotion
states and take actions in anticipation of them.").
513. How far this flaw actually undercuts Professor Posner's conclusions is another
issue. He may be correct about the inferences he draws and the suggestions he makes; if so,
however, it is not for the reasons he gives.
514. Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 27.
515. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 509, at 101 n.13.
516. Posner, supra note 34, at 1982.
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emotion state the person acts consistently with those temporary preferences. 5 1 7 On the
one hand, this is wholly consistent with much of the data reviewed here, showing the
likelihood that preferences expressed at Time, may differ substantially from those
expressed at Time2. On the other hand, though, this approach seems to render empty
the notion of rationality, as highlighted by one of the early researchers discussed
above:
Distinguishing between current and long-term values creates a problem when
deciding which of two mutually exclusive outcomes represents the "rational
choice." Selecting the outcome that maximizes the mother's long term values (i.e.,
deliver her child without anesthesia) should presumably result in the greater value
overall to the woman; hence it is a rational choice. However, in making that
"rational" choice, the woman during active labor must act "irrationally" and refuse
the outcome with the greater current value at the time of the decision.
518
Others agree that the existence of differences between expressed preferences at
different times indicates that one of the expressions is in fact not "authentic," 1 9 and a
number of reasons exist to believe that decisions in a "hot" emotional state may be
suboptimal, or at least inconsistent with an agent's more reasoned, long-term
preferences.
520
Finally, recall Guthrie's suggestions about the Regret Aversion Theory and its
implications.5 21 Recall that Guthrie's suggestions were based on a study that asked
perceivers to predict hypothetical litigants' actions under the potentially regret-
inducing circumstances, rather than eliciting mock or even actual litigants' behavior
under those circumstances. The methodological reasons for doing so are obvious, but
to the extent that perceivers' predictions of another's emotional reactions differ from
that person's actual reactions, more research will have to be conducted in order to
support his claims.
5 22
The literature also has repercussions for practical suggestions that are based on
various theories of law and emotions.523 For instance, certain social norm theorists
have suggested using alternative punishments such as shaming penalties, based on
theories of how emotions affect behavior.524 But efforts to build legal rules based on
the flawed assumption that people can well predict, manage, and cultivate their
517. id.
518. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 96, at 57.
519. Fagerlin, supra note 423, at 272 ("An authentic treatment preference is one that is
rooted in considered and important values and thus should be both consistent with the
individual's past life narrative and persistent in the face of actual illness experience.").
520. E.g., Camerer et al., supra note 511, at 1238.
521. See supra text accompanying notes 342-55.
522. For a more recent discussion of inaccuracies in predictions of regret, see Gilbert et
al., supra note 356.
523. Professor Posner and others emphasize that the "law affects people's incentives to
cultivate, and act on, their emotions." E.g., Posner, supra note 34, at 1984.




emotions may be misguided. 52 Trying to use the law to generate emotions may also be
problematic because people may not accurately predict that they will feel the way the
law wants them to; their behavior will thus not conform to that which the law had
sought.52 6 Moreover, inaccurate predictions of others' emotional reactions may call
into question such efforts. For instance, advocates of shaming penalties suggest, in
part, that the elicitation of shame in punished offenders may act as a deterrent. 527 But
just as deterrence theorists must take into account the likelihood that some people are
not the rational cost/benefit balancers that are hypothesized, social norm theorists who
advocate such shaming penalties might consider that legislators' prediction of the
shame a punished criminal might feel undergoing such a penalty may be quite different
from what that individual actually experiences.5
28
On the other hand, the "deterrent" effect of a particular legal rule will depend, in
this context, on individuals' accuracy in predicting their emotional reactions to the
circumstances with which the rule is concerned. Again, take the example of shaming
penalties. Individuals tend to overestimate their reactions to negative emotional events.
Although legislators might overestimate the actual negative impact such a penalty will
have on an individual who adapts emotionally to (for instance) a sign on his front lawn
stating his crime, the individuals in question may also overestimate the shame they will
feel, and such penalties might deter with greater-than-expected effect.
C. Implications for Paternalism
The proper role of the state in regulating, encouraging, and directing individuals'
behavior has been long (and tendentiously) debated. More recently, the implications of
behavioral and social science findings have been imported into the traditional
normative discussion. 529 For instance, commentators recognize that when the
behavioral science approach "identifies cognitive errors that parties are prone to
525. Cf Langevoort, supra note 155, at 869 ("In general, law cannot function well if it
depends on the ability of people to recognize the risks or wrongs of actions to which they are
committed or otherwise motivated to pursue.").
526. Bandes, supra note 475, at 7 ('"o the extent legal systems thrive on categorical
rules, emotion in all its messy individuality makes such categories harder to maintain. Rules...
based on tidy assumptions about how people will react to certain penalties may be threatened by
more complex evidence about motivations.... The notion of the rule of law is based, at least in
part, on the belief that laws can be applied mechanically, inexorably, without human
fallibility.").
527. E.g., Kahan, supra note 524; see Posner, supra note 216, at 320 (discussing effect
of shaming penalties).
528. See Massaro, supra note 135, at 91; id. at 95-97 (discussing some problems with
the shaming penalty approach).
529. E.g., Camerer et al., supra note 511; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003) [hereinafter Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Psychological Case]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549 (2002); Rachlinski,
supra note 11; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Liberal Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1159 (2003); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229
(1998) (recognizing implications of research on bounded rationality for paternalistic theories).
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making, it supports somewhat paternalistic legal doctrine."5 30 There is little discussion,
however, of the implications of research on affect and the emotions for the scope of
paternalism, or examples of paternalistic steps to be taken (or not) based on such
research.531
As an initial matter, recognizing the scope of paternalism helps narrow the
circumstances in which it might be relevant. One characterization recognizes that the
law "commonly seeks to protect innocent people from their own foolishness by
imposing formal requirements on others who might overreach in dealing with them.",
532
Thus, to the extent that paternalism focuses on protecting oneself from oneself, then the
issue is less directly relevant to many of the "inside the courtroom" topics discussed
above. 533 In those contexts, we are, to an extent, trying to protect individuals (or the
system) from general biases, just as we might seek to protect against undue influence
on a jury by introducing rules of evidence that limit what the jury may hear. Thus,
implications of affective forecasting for paternalism issues may simply be beside the
point for issues such as civil damage awards or victim impact statements.
In other contexts, however, such as litigants' expectations, "outside the courtroom"
topics, and others, the data are relevant to the extent that they suggest guidelines for
protecting individuals against decisions that are, potentially, in conflict with what their
true preferences might be. Data about emotional biases or errors may suggest taking
certain paternalistic steps, just as data on cognitive errors, heuristics, and biases do.3
Indeed, "[w]hat weight should be given to a choice that is informed by personal
experience if this choice can be traced to a faulty evaluation process? 5 35 Should not a
third-party step in when appropriate?
In fact, such steps are not unusual in certain contexts; a number of paternalistic
policies exist that recognize individuals' potential for making inaccurate predictions
about their feelings and preferences.536 An obvious one is the development of "cooling-
530. Rachlinski, supra note 11, at 763.
531. One exception is Huang, Emotional Investing, supra note 28. See infra text
accompanying notes 541-542. Professors Hanson and Kysar discuss the danger of marketing
experts' manipulation of consumer preferences, using as one example the exploitation of time-
variant preferences. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 15, at 735-36. See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Emotional Paternalism (2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
532. Langevoort, supra note 155, at 878 (emphasis added); see E. Allan Farnsworth,
Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 286 (2000) (paternalism includes
legal rules that "for a person's 'own good' disable that person from making a binding
commitment"); Kronman, supra note 30, at 763 ("In general, any legal rule that prohibits an
action on the ground that it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic."); id. at
764 (primary purpose of paternalism is "to protect the promisor himself by limiting his power to
do what the law judges to be against his own interests").
533. See supra Part II.A.
534. See generally Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 529.
535. Kahneman et al., supra note 117, at 404.
536. See Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 509, at 100 (citing as examples "social




off periods" designed to protect consumers against hasty or emotional purchases.5 37
Such periods are imposed either before a consumer can take possession of a purchased
item, or as a time frame during which the consumer can change her mind about a
purchase.5 3 8 Some commentators have described such protections as involving
cognitive factors,5 39 but they clearly protect against emotionally-induced errors as
well. s4°
Similarly, Peter Huang has recently suggested protecting investors against their own
emotionally-biased decisions, just as current securities law doctrine is designed to
protect them against their cognitive-based concerns. 54' In particular, Professor Huang
suggests that in the context of securities fraud, courts consider not only the cognitive
impact that prospectuses or other informational material might have on potential
investors and on shareholders, but also the emotional impact. He notes that the positive
mood induced by "puffery" can lead to more superficial processing of a prospectus
containing such puffery, and recommends that the affect induced by positive material
be considered in evaluating how a "reasonable" reader might interpret that material.
Similarly, he suggests modifying the current "total mix" doctrine of evaluating the
materiality of information presented in investment material to include evaluation of the
"total affect" induced by that information.542 Taking such steps to protect investors
against their own emotional tendencies is one example of emotion data suggesting
paternalistic steps.
Most broadly speaking, though, the affective forecasting findings need not mandate
paternalistic policies, but may at least reject one common counterargument, the
libertarian perspective that people should be "left alone" because they typically know
what is good for them.5 43 Kahneman et al., for instance, emphasize the possibility of
resisting overly paternalistic policy inferences by appeal to other grounds, such as "the
value of freedom and the high risk that coercive power will be abused." 544 Indeed,
many of the social scientists conducting this line of research are wary of finding
paternalistic implications in their results, primarily by making one of those two points,
or by suggesting that the state of research is simply too preliminary to justify
substantial intervention.5 45 Legal commentators as well advocate looking to autonomy
and other factors as alternatives to potential paternalistic implications. Coleman, for
instance, has argued forcefully for treating decisions about the disposition of frozen
537. See, e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 511, at 1238-47; Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,450
n.114 (2002).
538. Other research by affective forecasting scholars, however, raises questions about
the consequences of such steps. For instance, Gilbert and Ebert, supra note 110, have shown
that people generally prefer to have reversible choices. These preferences, however, sometimes
lead to reduced liking for the products that people end up with. Id.
539. E.g., Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 529, at 1224.
540. Camerer et al., supra note 511, at 1240.
541. Huang, Emotional Investing, supra note 28.
542. Id.
543. Kahneman et al., supra note 125, at 397.
544. Id.
545. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 509, at 100; Kahneman et al., supra note 125,
at 397.
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embryos as involving inalienable rights.546 Rather than binding oneself to decisions
based on unexperienced emotions-that is, paternalistically limiting one's decision
set 54 7 -Coleman advocates maintaining autonomy by encouraging contemporaneous
548decisions. Other data show the autonomy argument to be weaker than is traditionally
thought,549 but it is nevertheless a plausible prima facie reason to be cautious about
paternalism. A difficulty for basing paternalistic policies on the affective forecasting
data is that some of the findings run counter to such inferences. In particular, although
people may not know what is good for them, it may be that they know better than
policymakers who do not know them at all. This point is not new; John Stuart Mill
recognized it in his classic "On Liberty":
[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be
possessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgement
and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general
presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as
not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the
circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from
without.
550
I do not yet take sides in the discussion, but simply point out the importance, in
discussions of paternalism, of adding consideration of emotional "errors" to
consideration of cognitive errors.
551
CONCLUSION
A burgeoning body of social science research documents an initially
counterintuitive, but upon reflection straightforward phenomenon-people's difficulty
at predicting the intensity and duration of their future emotions, as well as those of
others. I have discussed important consequences of this phenomenon for a wide variety
of legal and public policy topics, both in and out of the courtroom. From decisions
about both civil and criminal punishment to ones concerning medical treatment,
recognizing the possibility for errors in affective forecasting may have profound effects
546. E.g., Coleman, supra note 156. But see Robertson, Precommitment Strategies,
supra note 398, at 1024 (potential gains from precommitment "should not be shunted aside with
an ipse dixit about personal liberty.").
547. See Farnsworth, supra note 532.
548. Coleman actually characterizes one potential criticism of his approach as stating
that it is itself paternalistic, assuming "that people need to be protected from the consequences
of their own choices." Coleman, supra note 156, at 120. He rebuts the potential objection, but
also points out that even if making decisions freer does somehow impose paternalistically on
individuals, it does not "infantilize" them or reduce their autonomy, because it is precisely in
areas of difficult emotional decisionmaking that people should be allowed such latitude. Id. at
122.
549. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 531.
550. JOHN STUART MLL, ON LEBERTY, reprinted in J.S. M11, ON LIBERTY IN FOCUs 21,
91 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991).
551. For a fuller discussion see Blumenthal, supra note 531.
20051
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
on our treatment of legal and policy issues. Existing models of law and emotions may
be based on flawed assumptions, and policy initiatives of such models may thus be
misguided.
My goal has been twofold: first, to highlight existing empirical data about the
emotions and import them into the developing discussion of law and the emotions,
emphasizing the relevance of these data to several areas of law and policy. Additional
research will be useful in many of the areas I have discussed, and I suggested
possibilities, both theoretical and experimental, for such future work. Second, more
broadly, I sought to highlight the neutral nature of such data, in many of the cases
deliberately refraining from advocating certain policy implications of the research.
Moreover, in some instances, such as capital punishment or surrogate mothering, I
pointed out that the affective forecasting data may point both in favor and against each
"side" of the issue. For instance, the possibility of overpredictions of the harm
attending a murder may lead to increased death sentences, which supports abolitionists'
efforts to do away with victim impact statements. On the other hand, the possibility of
hedonic adaptation by death row inmates undercuts those abolitionists' claims that the
death row existence is "psychological torture" and is necessarily worse than execution.
Taking this approach emphasizes, I hope, the importance of presenting and using
social science research in as value-free a way as possible.552 Social scientists, of
course, and those making use of social science data, may advocate some particular
position, and at times here I have. But ultimately, courts and legislatures should and
will be making decisions based on those data. Presenting all of those data's
implications will not only help policymakers make those decisions in a more informed
manner, but can also force additional honesty and accountability. When the data point
in different directions, a policymaker's choice of one of those directions (or one
unsupported by the data) will have to be explicitly justified.553
552. Blumenthal, supra note 13, at 48.
553. Id. at 51.
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